[Full text of the Qadhafi statement plus other material will be issued in a later edition of Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily.]

Reports suggested that the preference of the Iranian Khamene‘i Government had been to sell Libya a less-advanced missile system, possibly an earlier version of the Shahab-series with a range of 965 km [approximately 600 miles] as opposed to the 1,300-1,500 km [808-932 mile] range of the Shahab-3, which remained the “crown jewel” of the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal. While strategic relations between Tehran and Tripoli continued to be warm, because of mutual concerns over the US (despite profound distrust at a religious level), the Iranian leadership would have to seriously consider the implications of allowing its most advanced missile to be sold to any state, even an ally.

While acknowledging these concerns, Tehran apparently remained interested in selling the Shahab-3 to Libya for a number of reasons. The fact that the DPRK was encouraging such a deal would have a significant effect on the Iranian leadership, which realizes that Iran remains greatly indebted to DPRK expertise and support in maintaining its own ballistic missile force. DPRK missiles experts and technicians are lodged all over Iran, most notably as of late August 2003 at locations east of Bafq and south of Yazd. The additional presence of DPRK mining experts at both these locations appeared related to the nearby presence of uranium deposits. Reports indicated that at least some of this work was linked to perfecting the Shahab-3’s ability to carry a nuclear warhead, as well as the construction of launch units designed to consist of 15 batteries capable of mounting 12 Shahab-3 type missiles each.

The Shahab-3 had been inaugurated by Iranian Supreme Leader, “Ayatollah” Ali Hoseini-Khamene‘i, on July 20, 2003, in a ceremony at which the Iranian Supreme Leader declared: “Today our people and our armed forces are ready to defend their goals anywhere.” This came on the heels of a June 2003 test of the Shahab-3 which Iran declared a success. Yet, a July 25, 2003, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report entitled “Iranian Clerical Leaders Continue to Defy Opposition, Causing Hardening of Position by its Allies” cited a credible internet report that contradicted the official Iranian announcement, noting:

“…the authoritative Middle Eastern web-based information service, Debka.com, which clearly has strong sources within the Israeli intelligence community, stated in a July 23, 2003, dispatch that the missile had, in fact, failed its most recent test. According to the Debka.com report, Iranian officials were, as of late July 2003, in North Korea attempting to expedite shipment plans for new engines in hopes of fixing the Shahab-3’s remaining defects. It remained unclear whether the July 23, 2003 , report of North Korean-Iranian missile shipments was linked to the arrival of a large Iranian cargo ship to a North Korean port at Haeju Harbor in the Yellow Sea during early July 2003.”

Regardless of questions about the missiles immediate viability, there were indications that Libya wanted Iran in any Shahab-3 missile deal to include a promise to set up a missile production facility in Libyq in addition to the actual sale of the yet-to-be-decided quantity of Shahab-3s. This should not have surprised Tehran. Tripoli’s earlier — and in some cases ongoing — joint-weapons development programs with Iraq and Egypt had both included the construction of weapons production facilities in Libya. GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily sources had long reported on the Iraqi-Libyan WMD cooperation at a site near the Egyptian border called al-Kufra [aka al-Kafra] and the presence of some 20,000 Iraqi technicians and scientists in Libya to help with these efforts. 

See also Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reports:

November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel.
July 28, 2003: Niger-Iraq Fissile Material Issue Escalates; More Expected.
July 29, 2003: Niger-Iraq Uranium Reports Involve Ongoing Libyan Deception Ops.

Libya had earlier acquired the NoDong-1 surface-to-surface missile with an estimated 1,000 km-range and 1,000 kg payload directly from North Korea initially tasked for Egyptian use in a joint Iraqi-Egyptian-Libyan procurement effort. By November 2000, the NoDong-1 SSMs had been deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a central HQ in Tripoli. As GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted in a November 6, 2000, report, the Israeli Mossad had at that time notified the governments of Spain, France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey that they were in range of the Libyan NoDong-1s.

The deployments made after Libya’s last significant missile acquisition seemed instructive as to Tripoli’s intentions if it were to now acquire the Shahab-3.

Central to Col. Qadhafi’s desire to acquire the Shahab-3, along with other advanced weapons systems including WMD and related delivery systems, was the Libyan leader’s ongoing preparations to ready the nation for his son Saif al-Islam’s ascension to leadership. Col. Qadhafi’s strategy in this effort saw the reentrance of Libya into the international community as paramount to the success of securing the Libyan succession process. Equally important to this veritable “sunshine policy” via the West was a consolidation of relations with distinctly anti-Western governments viewed as rogue or pariah states in particular by the US. It was the parallel pursuit of these two seemingly diametrically opposed policies that formed the core of Col. Qadhafi’s approach.

July 29, 2003

Niger-Iraq Uranium Reports Involve Ongoing Libyan Deception Ops 

1. Highly-reliable sources within the Italian intelligence community have confirmed to this Service that the documents — subsequently demonstrated to have been forgeries — introduced by the US and UK governments showing a contact between the Nigerien and the Iraqi governments for the export of uranium were, in fact, produced by the Libyan Government. The documents were used in the State of the Union Address by US Pres. George W. Bush on January 28, 2003, and were widely interpreted as part of the casus belli underwhich the US-led Coalition attacked Iraq in March-April 2003. 

2. The Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) passed on, in a single transaction and through a Libyan intermediary, a file of forged documents to Italy’s SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare). According to Italian sources, the documents appeared to be part of a larger, ongoing Libyan double-deception operation designed to discredit US decisionmaking and the US leadership. The documents were designed to take issues which were in fact verifiable — or approximately verifiable — by US intelligence agencies and then provide seemingly valid collateral documentation. By then exposing the “valid collateral documentation” as fake, the premise of the intelligence — and the subsequent US policy — would then be undermined and discredited. 

3. US officials in December 2002 publicly claimed that Niger had signed an agreement in 2000 to sell Iraq 500 metric tons of a concentrated form of uranium known as yellowcake. The British Government also presented the IAEA with “Nigerien state documents” that were to prove Nigerien-Iraqi attempts to trade in uranium after the UN embargo on Iraq strictly forbade this. This “documentation” was seen as a key element in the US-UK quest to prove that Iraq was still trying to develop nuclear arms. Niger had supplied Iraq with yellowcake for its nuclear program in the 1980s, which at that time was legal. The British and US governments had tried to prove that Niger recently agreed to resume those shipments, illegal since 1991. US officials claim that Iraq imported uranium from Niger even after 1998 and that more shipments were planned in 2000.¹ 

4. On March 8, 2003, Mohamed El-Baradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN agency, declared that the documentation used by Pres. Bush in his January 28, 2003, speech was forged. The statement by Mr El-Baradei seemed to exonerate the Niger Government in the matter of alleged uranium sales to Iraq, and the Prime Minister of Niger, Hama Hamadou, in an interview with The Sunday Telegraph, of London, and published on July 27, 2003, explicitly denied the allegations. 

5. Libyan and other sources have told this Service that, in fact, yellowcake was being procured (or at least had been the subject of agreements) from Niger for Iraq during the embargo period, but by the Libyan Government. The yellowcake was being used for weapons development programs by Iraq and Libya (and possibly Egypt, one of the partners in the strategic weapons program) being conducted by joint teams in the Libyan facilities at Sabha and Kufra.² When asked whether the ESO documentation was designed to cover up and distract from Libyan involvement in the Iraqi nuclear program, one key Libyan source told this Service that this was only part of the objective. This Service was told that it was part of a broader plan, involving other documents and deception operations, designed to more comprehensively discredit US decisionmaking. This Service, on November 8, 2000, discussed how Iraq and Egypt had agreed with Libya in 1999 that Libya should act on behalf of all three countries to procure NoDong-1 strategic weapons-capable ballistic missiles from North Korea. The pattern for Libya-Iraq strategic weapons cooperation — which had been evident even before that time — was thus clearly established in the current context. 

6. It seems clear that the Iraqi Government did not need to negotiate directly with the Government of Niger for the procurement of yellowcake. Had it done so, this fact would almost certainly have come to the attention of the Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA), given the closeness of Niger-Nigeria relations, and it apparently did not. However, Libyan procurement of fissile material on behalf of Iraq was less noticeable. 

7. Italian sources confirmed to this Service that significant sections of the Italian Intelligence Community (IC) had been, at one time or another (including in this latest episode), working in cooperation with the Libyan Government and ESO, usually on the basis of payments made by the Libyans “for services rendered”. 

8. The question, at this stage, remains whether the Government of Niger was aware of the onward destination of some of the yellowcake provided to Libyan buyers, and whether or not the Libyan buyers significantly obfuscated their own identities in the procurement process. This would significantly impact how the US would deal with the Government of Niger. It should be expected that the US Government would also request assistance from the Nigerian Government in resolving the matter. The UK Government said that it had confirmation of the supply of yellowcake from Niger to Iraq from “other African intelligence services”, independent of the Italian-routed false documentation. 

Footnotes:

1. In the early 1980s, Con Coughlin’s book, Saddam: King of Terror, noted, on p.188: “Before the war [Iran-Iraq] started, Saddam had been promised that the reactor would be ready to produce weapons grade material by July 1981. Although the French, responding to international pressure, were still dragging their feet on supplying Saddam with the enriched uranium necessary to power the Tammuz reactor cores … Iraq was also engaged in a worldwide search for uranium. 120 tons were acquired from Portugal in 1980, and a further 200 tons from Niger.”

2. Sabha, and the region around it, is home to the Libyan Strategic Industries complex and a variety of storage facilities for nuclear, chemical and biological material, laboratories and facilities. Global Information System (GIS) reported on January 7, 2002, that al-Kufra (aka al-Kafra) was the location of a warehouse on the road to Al-Sara military camp which included 1,800 barrels of chemical material and other biological materials which was transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah.

See Also:

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel.
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, July 28, 2003: Niger-Iraq Fissile Material Issue Escalates; More Expected.

March 12, 2003

Libya Grasps at “Normalization” of Relations With US, UK as Saudi Arabia Reverses Relations With Tripoli

Analysis. With input from GIS Station Riyadh, and other sources. The effective leadership of Saudi Arabia, around Crown Prince ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud, has made a major policy decision to oppose Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, who had, for the past three decades, been protected by the Saudi leadership who may, in fact, have helped him to power. The move came just as Col. Qadhafi appeared to have reached an accord with the US State Department and UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office to strike a settlement on the Pan Am 103 terrorist bombing of 1988.

It is highly probable that the reports of a new agreement on settlement with the US and UK were merely the result of another “leak” from the Libyans to imply that they would settle on the PA103 case as a means of forestalling any US hostility at a critical time in the Libyan leadership succession process.

Significantly, at the same time that the Libyans were apparently offering a settlement to the US and UK on the PA103 issue, some US senior officials were puzzled by the apparent change of heart in Riyadh toward Qadhafi. The US had agreed to withhold support for anti-Qadhafi political groups and opposition leaders because Saudi officials had constantly urged them along this course. Now, according to very senior sources in Riyadh, Crown Prince ‘Abdullah was “even prepared to talk with Prince Idris al-Senussi”. Prince Idris, the grand-nephew of the late King Idris I, of Libya, had been specifically rejected by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah because the Saudi Crown Prince reportedly did not think Prince Idris — although a sharif, or descendant of the Prophet — was sufficiently serious as a Muslim leader. Other sources, however, attribute the Crown Prince’s earlier attitude to the fact that Prince Idris had specifically told Saudi emissaries on at least one occasion (in London in the 1990s) that he would make Libya a constitutional monarchy, and not an absolute monarchy such as Saudi Arabian leaders espoused.

Now, however, Crown Prince ‘Abdullah felt that even the charismatic Prince Idris, who is supported by the Sanussiyyah movement, a moderate Sunni sect almnost diametrically opposite to the Saudi Wahhabi sect, would be more in line with Saudi ideals that Col. Qadhafi.

The change of heart in Riyadh — where, because of King Fahd’s illness, Crown Prince ‘Abdullah is effectively head-of-government — followed a bitter exchange between the Crown Prince and Qadhafi at the Arab League Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on March 1, 2003.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, March 3, 2003: Outburst by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah Acknowledges Possible Saudi Rôle in Libyan 1969 Coup and Highlights Qadhafi’s Illness.]

Significantly, this bitter exchange followed a gesture from Qadhafi to the Saudi leadership earlier in February 2003: he used his private jet to fly the King of Swaziland, King Mswati III, to Saudi Arabia for a long audience with King Fahd and other Saudi officials. Col. Qadhafi had essentially promised that King Mswati would convert to Islam. However, King Mswati did not agree to convert from Christianity to Islam, and subsequently left, on Qadhafi’s aircraft, for a meeting with Qadhafi — who is terminally ill with cancer, heightening the need for a replacement in Libya — and then flying on to Paris.

The failure of the “Swazi initiative” — reported exclusively by GIS primary sources — followed by the significant exchange at Sharm el-Sheikh were seen as an embarrassment for Qadhafi, who was anxious to win some support in Riyadh while at the same time destabilizing Southern Africa, as a final gesture toward South African Pres. Thabo Mbeki, whom Qadhafi believes “stole” from him the initial leadership of the African Union (AU), which Qadhafi had hoped to make his lasting legacy.

See also:

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 13, 2003: Swazi King Departs for Saudi Arabia, Libya; Major Changes Anticipated.
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 20, 2003: Swazi King Maneuvers, Resists Deal With Saudi Arabia, Libya;
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 28, 2003: Swazi King Distances Himself from Qadhafi Overtures.

Senior officials from the US State Department had agreed on March 12, 2003, with at least one reporter — from the French news agency, Agence France Presse — that the United States, Britain and Libya were “close to reaching agreement” on a multibillion-dollar compensation deal for the relatives of victims of the 1988 PA103 Lockerbie bombing. Some of the families of the 270 victims said they understood that a deal had been reached but the US officials, as well as the State Department, said reports of a final agreement were premature.

The US Government would only believe that an agreement was imminent if there had been some recent and sudden change of heart, or a hint of a change of heart, by the Qadhafi Administration. The Libyan team has used this tactic on several occasions in the past to forestall what it felt was imminent US hostile action against it. That US State Department official spoke as senior diplomats from the three nations met on March 11, 2003, in London to try to finalize the deal, which would see Libya freed from remaining UN sanctions and possibly dropped from the US list of “state sponsors of terrorism”. Significantly, while the State Department negotiators might tentatively agree to this as part of a settlement, other key US Bush Administration officials (in the White House, for example), and the bulk of the US Congress would not agree to dropping Libya from the terrorist list.

This was hinted at when the State Dept. official stressed to the AFP journalist that any agreement reached at the London meeting would have to be signed off on by numerous top authorities in the three nations as well as run by the families of the victims.

The United States has said that UN sanctions cannot be lifted until Libya satisfies all of its requirements under UN Security Council resolutions, including the payment of compensation, an admission of responsibility for the bombing, the disclosure of all relevant information about it and a renunciation of terrorism. US sanctions, imposed under different terms, would require those steps in addition to moves from Tripoli.

Given Col. Qadhafi’s declining health, his son and designated successor, Saif al-Islam, as well as their entourage, were now anxious to win a rapprochement with the US before the anticipated US-led war on Iraq, especially in light of US Administration hints that Libya (as well as Syria and Iran) would be the focus of US hostility after Iraq’s Pres. Saddam Hussein. Key US defense figure Richard Perle — Chairman of the US Defense Advisory Board, which reports directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld — told Arab journalists in London in late February 2003 that the US would seek to change the leaderships of Iran, Libya and Syria, following the war against Iraq.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 27, 2003: US Bush Administration Looking Beyond Iraq to Promote Change in Iran, Libya and Syria.]

March 3, 2003

Outburst by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah Acknowledges Possible Saudi Role in Libyan 1969 Coup and Highlights Qadhafi’s Illness

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the March 1, 2003, Arab League summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, was the angry exchange between Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdallah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz al Sa'ud and Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in which the de facto Saudi leader implied, for the first time, that Saudi Arabia had backed the 1969 coup by Qadhafi against then King Idris al-Senussi of Libya. He also implied that he knew what has been officially denied by the Libyan authorities and something which the US and UK authorities had also denied: that Qadhafi was terminally ill.

The angry exchange at the summit was partially televised before Egyptian authorities cut the live broadcast.

Prince 'Abdullah, in a retort to Qadhafi, said: "Who exactly brought you to power? ... You are a liar and your grave awaits you."

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs exclusively reported on Col. Qadhafi's terminal illness on February 15, 2002, noting:

“Saif al-Islam, who spearheaded the latest move to retrieve the al-Qaida members, has been increasingly thrust into the limelight in Libya, and as a Libyan representative abroad, in a move to strengthen his credentials to assume the leadership after his father, Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, left office. This has taken on an increasingly active and urgent nature, given the advice from doctors who operated in late 2001 on Qadhafi that he may not live more than 18 months to two years, due to the advanced nature of his cancer. He was operated on around the neck and throat area by Egyptian and Lebanese doctors. Col. Qadhafi is also known to have had leukemia since the 1970s.”

[See also Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 15, 2002: Libya Wins State Department Approval to Deal With US Oil Leases, and Then Takes in al-Qaida Captives.]

GIS has reported consistently on this aspect since that report. It has also reported on the fact that the Saudi Government had consistently worked to protect Col. Qadhafi's Administration from any move by the US to help a "regime change" in Libya. This was, in large part, because of the original reasons behind the Saudi support for Qadhafi's original coup in 1969 against King Idris I: the fact that the Sanussiyyah of Libya were, as a Muslim sect (under the leadership of King Idris al-Senussi) diametrically opposite to, and literally opposed to, the doctrine of the Wahhabis supported by the House of Sa'ud.

As GIS has also consistently reported, this historic alliance between Saudi Arabia and Qadhafi shaped Saudi pressures on US leaders, particularly US Secretary of State Colin Powell, with regard to Libya. This position has now become embedded in State Department policy, which, in any event, favors status quo -oriented solutions, rather than radical action. This has protected the Qadhafi Administration, at a time when Qadhafi's impending death means that one of his sons, Saif al-Islam, will attempt to take power. The US has not moved in any way to support the Libyan opposition, largely because it, in the words of one senior State Department source, "prefers the devil it knows than the devil it doesn't know".

Significantly, however, Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdullah has for some time been increasingly disenchanted with Qadhafi's mercurial radicalism, his lack of religious conviction and his arrogance toward Saudi Arabia, his original benefactor. As a result, at the Arab League summit on the Iraq problem, tensions for the first time boiled over, and Prince 'Abdullah revealed what had long been suspected as to the origins of the Libyan coup, and, at the same time, confirming what US State Department and UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office officials had been denying: Qadhafi's terminal illness. Some Western media reports, however, believed that the outburst by Prince 'Abdullah hinted that Qadhafi had come to power with the aid of the United States Government.

Sources close to Prince 'Abdullah report that while he is now sufficiently disenchanted with Qadhafi to welcome a successor from almost any area outside the Qadhafi family, he will not support either an Egyptian candidate or a de facto Egyptian control over Libya or the only acknowledged Libyan leader currently with support in the military and most of the tribes: Prince Idris al-Senussi, the grand-nephew of the late King Idris I, and the nominated political head of the Sanussiyyah . It is also known that Crown Prince 'Abdullah's feelings about Prince Idris — whom he reportedly dislikes because of the Libyan prince's strongly pro-Western attitudes, his "lack of seriousness" (he is a businessman, not a fulltime politician or sect leader, despite being a sharif, a descendant of the Prophet) and his past record of having rejected Saudi attempts to buy him off — have been conveyed to the US, coloring US White House and State Department views of Prince Idris.

However, the combined Libyan opposition has increasingly been rallying behind Prince Idris, who is currently in Europe. GIS has been told even by the leadership of Col. Qadhafi's own tribe, the Gadadfa, that Prince Idris was their preferred candidate to assume power; they have rejected absolutely supporting Saif al-Islam or any of the other Qadhafi children. Despite that, unless the US Government, Prince 'Abdullah and Prince Idris come to some kind of rapprochement, it seems likely that Saif al-Islam will, within months, assume some form of leadership in Libya. This may result in attempts at a coup d'etat, but it is believed that Egypt would support Saif al-Islam as its preferred surrogate in Libya.

GIS has received consistent reporting from inside Libya during January and February 2003 that the Qadhafi apparatus was purging its ranks of unreliable officers in the Armed Forces, and was attempting to "contain or constrain" senior officers by questioning them about the origins of their wealth, bank accounts, etc.

Meanwhile, on March 1, 2003, at the Arab League summit, the Saudi delegation briefly walked out of the summit after the exchange. Col. Qadhafi had claimed that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd had been ready to "strike an alliance with the devil" to defend the Kingdom after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Prince 'Abdullah then cut in, saying: "Saudi Arabia is not an agent of colonialism", referring to Saudi hosting of US military forces.

The summit "completely rejected" any US-led war on Iraq or the participation of any Arab state in the anticipated conflict. Kuwait, however, has allowed the deployment of more than 140,000 troops US and British troops on its soil, and Qatar was also hosting invasion forces. Bahrain had deployed air and ground units to Kuwait in advance of anticipated conflict with Iraq.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, speaking to Al-Arabiya satellite TV from Sharm el-Sheikh, dismissed Western media reports that Saudi Arabia would provide logistical support to US forces, and said that Riyadh would have no part in a US-led war on Iraq.

February 27, 2003

US Bush Administration Looking Beyond Iraq to Promote Change in Iran, Libya and Syria

Analysis. Key US defense figure Richard Perle — Chairman of the US Defense Advisory Board, which reports directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld — has told Arab journalists in London that the US would seek to change the leaderships of Iran, Libya and Syria, following the war against Iraq.

The comment, which was not elaborated, was significant because it demonstrated that there was some consideration of future goals, beyond Iraq. Richard Perle is one of the few policy-level figures in Washington who is both influential, and sufficiently outside the day-to-day machinations of policy implementation that he can think in terms of post-Iraq strategies. At present, virtually no US Administration or Defense official will discuss broader issues, or, indeed, anything beyond the immediate military-political objectives with regard to Iraq.

There is no doubt that the comments will cause significant re-thinking in Tehran, Tripoli and Damascus, although the Iranian clerical Government was already convinced that the US Administration was committed to the overthrow of their rule. Libyan officials, on the other hand, have been hoping to put in place a successor leadership to Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi before his anticipated death from cancer within the coming months or year. Indeed, buoyed by the appearance of support from the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the US State Department, Libyan officials loyal to Col. Qadhafi and his designated heir and son, Saif al-Islam, have believed that they could put a change of face — but not a change of substance — on the Libyan Administration while the US and its allies were distracted over the Iraq issue.

Saif al-Islam and Col. Qadhafi, who now works only a few hours a day, have moved onto the offensive in attempting to move Libya away from its outlaw status.

For example, the embassy of Libya in The Gambia on February 25, 2003, released what it called “forward looking” proposals from Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi aimed at ensuring Iraq’s compliance with the international community and preventing a US-led invasion of Iraq. Col. Qadhafi’s proposals arose out of meetings he held with the Spanish Prime Minister Husey Maria Aznar and other world leaders the previous week to seek ways of preventing war with Saddam Hussein. Prime Minister Maria Aznar was quoted by the Libyan Embassy in Banjul as informing Col. Qadhafi of meetings held between NATO and the European Council and on going high-level talks between Spain and America aimed at finding a peaceful resolution of the Iraq crisis.

As well, the Libyan Government has used the offices of the Malaysian Government to propose mediation between Filipino Muslim rebels and the Philippine Government.

Libya also officially — and while attentions were drawn elsewhere — recently admitted that it had been engaged in the development of medium-range strategic ballistic missiles, for defensive purposes and not aimed at Israel. As with the North Korean and Iranian announcements of nuclear programs, the Libyan move was specifically designed to put its missile program on the table as a legitimate and, de facto, accepted factor. However, as outlined in a variety of GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs reports, the Libyan missile program is, in fact, intimately linked with the longer-range ballistic missile programs of Egypt and Iraq, and involved Libya taking delivery of North Korean No-Dong 1 MRBMs on behalf of Iraq and Egypt.

However, there have been no moves by Libya to stop its own chemical and biological warfare programs after having moved and hidden its laboratories and stockpiles during the period up to 1999.

Meanwhile, however, the Libyan opposition is beginning, for the first time in several decades, to work together and may soon meet to name a leader who could replace Qadhafi in the near future. Significantly at this time, the US motion picture studio, Twentieth Century Fox, is looking for partners to come aboard its expensive “Tripoli” project, which is slated to begin shooting on the coast of Morocco in the Summer of 2003. The film “Tripoli” tells the true story of William Eaton, an US citizen who helped the heir to the throne of Tripoli lead an overthrow of a corrupt ruler in the early 1800s. Today, the one Libyan leader who appears capable of representing a united face of the opposition and public is the designated political leader of the Sanusi movement, Prince Idris al-Senussi, who is currently in Rome.

At the same time, however, the State Department view is that Prince Idris represents a risk to the status quo, and as a result the State Dept. has advocated seeking some kind of accommodation with the Qadhafi Administration. The problem with this is the probability that the Libyan Armed Forces would not accept Saif al-Islam as a successor to his father, nor, indeed, any other of Qadhafi’s sons.

GIS sources have reported that there is now a growing program of “containment” of Libyan senior military officers. All the senior officers are being questioned as to how they obtained their assets, whether they have foreign bank accounts, and so on, in an effort to find any links to foreign sponsorship. Qadhafi has, in the past two years, consistently used allegations of “corruption” against senior officials to constrain, demote or imprison them.

In Syria, Libya and Iran, Richard Perle’s comments have caused significant reverberations. The question remains, however, as to what the comments mean. It is known that Mr Perle does not favor US military action against Iran, rather letting the Iranian public know that they have international support in removing the clerics from office without outside interference. Equally, given Mr Perle’s historic support for Israel and Turkey, his opposition to the Syrian leadership is, in fact, not new.

Was the comment by Mr Perle a statement of his own, or was it meant as a sounding board for post-Iraq actions?

December 11, 2002

Fresh Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi Involves Family; Highlights Confusion

Exclusive. From GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. A serious, although unsuccessful, coup attempt was made against the Libyan leadership of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi on December 5-6, 2002. Absolutely reliable, first-hand sources confirmed to GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily that widespread arrests occurred beginning December 6, 2002, following the unsuccessful attempt. It was also understood that a number of Qadhafi family members were involved in the attempted coup, which was not only aimed at the ailing Col. Qadhafi — who is now well-advanced in his terminal cancer — but also against his “chosen heir” and son, Saif al-Islam.

Full specifics of the coup attempt were not available as at late December 11, 2002, other than the fact that there appeared to be a link between the coup and another son of Col. Qadhafi, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, who now lives in exile in Egypt, following a major disagreement with his father. Dr Moatasam, until the beginning of 2002, maintained a militia unit separate from that of Saif al-Islam, but this was forcibly disbanded after the disagreement in early 2002.¹ Several “cousins” within the Qadhafi family were also reported by GIS sources to have been involved.

Sources close to Col. Qadhafi said that the Colonel’s response to the coup attempt was “confused”, and noted that his health was now deteriorating rapidly. This meant that the response to the coup was clearly in the hands of the loyalists within the security apparatus, almost certainly that run by Hannibal al-Qadhafi.

It was also understood that some of the coup organizers, apparently mostly within the Gadadfa tribe of Col. Qadhafi, were supportive of another son of Col. Qadhafi, Mohammed al-Qadhafi. Engineer Mohammed, who is from a different mother² to Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha (whose mother,³ Safiya, comes from the key Bara’asa tribe, near Beida), is regarded as the most conservative of Qadhafi’s sons, and is understood not to control his own militia. [Hannibal, the youngest son of Qadhafi, does not maintain his own militia, but essentially works directly with Col. Qadhafi, maintaining control over his immediate security.]

Sources said that it was possible that support and planning for the coup attempt could have come from Dr Moatasam in favor of a group within the Gadadfa supporting Eng. Mohammed, on the basis that he was the most capable of the Qadhafi children to succeed the Colonel.

However, it is known from close family sources that Col. Qadhafi’s wife, Safiya, had, in recent weeks, been lobbying hard to get her brother-in-law, Abdullah Senussi Megrahi, brought back into favor to help support the fortunes of her son, Saif al-Islam, in the succession process. It is not known how successful her attempts have been. Abdullah Senussi Megrahi — not a member of the Senusi clan which traditionally has ruled most of Libya — was the head of strategic intelligence before Moussa Koussa.

Saif al-Islam had, along with External Security Organization (ESO) chief Moussa Koussa, been working hard to win international support for Saif al-Islam’s succession of the Colonel. Moussa Koussa, largely regarded as one of the Colonel’s “old guard” had clearly thrown in his lot with Saif al-Islam as the most favored successor.

Analysis:

1. Qadhafi Family Issues: The internal power struggles between members of the Qadhafi family were predicted by GIS to be a possible result of the succession process which began in Libya when the illness of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi became known in late 2001. It is significant that the US State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the UK intelligence services and those of the Australian Government (which recently began entering into major diplomatic accords with Libya, pushing Australian energy companies into investments there) still have not acknowledged the terminal illness of Qadhafi, which was first reported by this Service. The health of Col. Qadhafi is central to the whole succession scramble.

On January 7, 2002, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted:

Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has for some years reportedly been suffering from what had been believed to have been an undiagnosed illness. In fact, it seems likely that the Colonel’s reported illness has been known for some time: Leukemia. The specific type of leukemia is, however, not known. He underwent a complete blood change in Germany in 1978, but has only in the past two years reportedly exhibited increasingly severe symptoms of the disease. He was reported to have suffered, during 2001, at least four or five major collapses, during which he went into comas lasting sometimes longer than five hours. During the latter months of 2001 he has been noticed by close family and colleagues to have been showing signs of constant fatigue, a symptom often associated with leukemia as white cell counts diminish energy levels. It has been reported that he faints regularly. His health outlook, based on these reports, seems at best uncertain, although he has gone to great lengths to disguise symptoms of his condition.

Earlier, on December 10, 2001, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, in an article entitled Qadhafi’s Health at Issue as Libyan Future Debated, noted: “Highly-reliable sources inside the Libyan leadership indicate that there are growing concerns over the health of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi who has now undergone several collapses which have left him in comas lasting up to five hours. No medical explanations have yet been found for the illnesses.”

By early 2002, however, GIS received first-hand information from medical sources directly involved to the effect that Col. Qadhafi had undergone surgery for throat cancer in November 2001, and had been given less than two years to live.

On March 27, 2002, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted:

• (i) The prospect of a middle-level or junior-level military coup if and when Qadhafi’s illness or death provides an opportunity. This would hold the most chance of success and durability, but may not have international acceptance, which may diminish its prospects;

• (ii) The prospect of an attempted putsch by Saif al-Islam, perhaps in cooperation with one or more of his brothers, to pre-emptively retire Qadhafi before his illness removes their chances of succession;

• (iii) The prospect that one or other military or family candidates could be assisted in forcing a transition (or capitalizing on the death of Qadhafi) by the Government and Armed Forces of Egypt. Egypt [see: Egypt, below] remains a key factor in the Libyan situation, and the Egyptian Government is clearly aware of Qadhafi’s health condition and the possibility of imminent change;

• (iv) The prospect that Qadhafi, resisting any erosion of his power (which is currently the case) would himself pre-emptively attempt to remove potential suitors for succession. Qadhafi has already, in November 2001, undertaken purges of officials — particularly those from Benghazi, in Cyrenaica, the hotbed of the Sanussiyyah — on a variety of pretexts, almost all usually involved allegations of "corruption".

2. The Armed Forces and the Tribes: What was of particular significance in the December 5-6, 2002, coup attempt was the fact that the Armed Forces did not appear to interpose themselves in any way in support for, or in opposition to, the coup. Sources within the Gadadfa tribe have told GIS that they, and the Armed Forces leadership, were not prepared to support any of the Qadhafi family members achieve power, despite the fact that the Gadadfa tribe owed its wealth to the three decades of power of Qadhafi. The Gadadfa tribal leadership and the Armed Forces leadership reportedly remains committed to a solution which would involve the traditional Libyan leadership of the Sanusiyyah movement. [See Libya Special Report of February 1, 2002.]

The Sanusiyyah have named exiled Prince Idris al-Senusi as their political leader. He has been building a strong base of support inside and outside the country and has now reportedly assembled a “government in exile” in that he has identified and tasked individuals to be responsible for the various branches of government in the event that a Sunusi government could be formed. Key Armed Forces leaders have committed to support this, according to statements made privately to GIS.

3. Outlook: The Libyan power structure of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is collapsing rapidly, with the predicted infighting among Qadhafi family members now erupting openly and the Armed Forces standing by, without supporting either Qadhafi or the fighting family members. The US and UK, in particular, have stood by also and made no major preparations, although it is believed that the Egyptian authorities have, indeed, taken steps to ensure their position. Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak regards Libya as an Egyptian sphere of influence, and it is possible — even probable — that Egyptian authorities were at least aware of the alleged involvement of Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi in the latest coup attempt. If that is the case, or even if it is not, Col. Qadhafi must now assume that Pres. Mubarak has decided to move against him.

Footnotes:

1. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reported on January 7, 2002: There were, at the beginning of January 2002, disturbances around Benghazi which the Government attributed to the disbanding of the 77th Militia, the group which was the private militia of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's son, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, who is currently in exile in Egypt. The militia resisted break-up and had to be forcibly disbanded, which did, in fact, lead to the establishment of road blocks around Benghazi. However, at about the same time, and totally separately, a group in Benghazi reportedly attempted a coup against Qadhafi. This apparently occurred in early January 2002, and failed. Arrests were subsequently made in Benghazi, Tobruq, Misratah, Tripoli and Tarquna.

2. Not long after the coup which put Qadhafi in power, Qadhafi forced the daughter of a key Royalist general, Kheidy Khaled, to marry him as a condition to release the general. This woman is the mother of Eng. Mohammed.

3. The mother of Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha comes from the Bara’asa tribe, near Beida. This tribe was traditionally close to the late King Idris I. The sister of this key wife of Qadhafi is married to Abdullah Senussi Megrahi, who had been a key advisor to Qadhafi. There was, however, in 2001 a significant falling out between Qadhafi and this formerly powerful advisor.

October 1, 2002

Weapons Grade Uranium Moving in Middle East; Iraqi WMD and Delivery Development Being Undertaken in Libya

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor. The seizure at the end of September 2002 of weapons grade uranium on the Turkish-Syrian border, and the presence of some 20,000 Iraqi technicians and specialists in Libya, working on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems, complicates the political posturing of the United States, the United Nations and other governments on the question of sending weapons inspectors to Iraq to verify compliance with UN resolutions and the terms under which the 1991 Gulf War was ended.

Turkish paramilitary police were reported on September 28, 2002, to have seized more than 15 kg (33 pounds) of weapons-grade uranium and detained two men accused of smuggling the material. Officers in the southern province of Sanliurfa, which borders Syria and is about 250km (155 miles) from the Iraqi border, were reportedly acting on information from an informant when they stopped a taxi cab and discovered the uranium in a lead container hidden beneath the vehicle’s seat. Authorities said that they believed the uranium came from an east European country and had a value of about $5-million. Israel Radio quoted Turkish police as saying that the uranium originally came from a former Soviet state. 

It was not immediately clear when the seizure operation was carried out. The Turkish Anatolian News Agency only gave the first names of the suspects, which appeared to be Turkish. Police in Turkey seized more than one kg of weapons-grade uranium in November 2001; that had been smuggled into Turkey from an east European nation. 

The movement of such large quantities of weapons grade fissionable material meant that evaluations of when countries such as Iraq could field viable nuclear weapons would have to be re-considered. Given the fact that Iraqi and other Arab scientists were now thoroughly familiar with the requirements for nuclear weapons, and had done all of the major engineering, only the production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium was left as the major challenge. All estimates of the time it would take Iraq, for example, to produce a viable nuclear weapon were based on the local production of the fissionable material on a “milligram by milligram” scale. 

At the same time, Libyan sources have told GIS that they believed that it was possible that the bulk of the “heavy engineering” of Iraq’s strategic weapons programs had been undertaken for some years in Libya, rather than in Iraq itself. This included weaponizing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) payloads (biological, chemical and nuclear) for deployment on ballistic missiles, including the NoDong 1 systems acquired from North Korea (DPRK) in 2000.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of November 8, 2000, reported: 

“The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad’r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.”

With the bulk of the major strategic weapons program of Iraq being developed outside the country, UN weapons inspections inside Iraq become meaningless. Even before the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Libya and Iraq had maintained a close cooperation — reported on extensively at the time by Defense & Foreign Affairs publications — in the flow of defense matériel and technology, often using Sudan as the staging ground.

At the same time, Libya was itself developing its chemical and biological weapons programs on an unfettered basis, having moved its facilities away from those earlier discovered at such facilities as Rabta. These activities have also been documented extensively by GIS Libya sources in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, and can be found in the Libya Special Reports section of GIS.

Libyan opposition activists inside the country have said that they cannot understand why the US has ignored the Libya-Iraq connection for so long, and why it has toyed with the idea of normalizing relations with the present Libyan leader, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi and his son, Saif al-Islam, given the continued commitment of Qadhafi to WMD and terrorism. Some Libyan opposition sources have said that, given Qadhafi’s known terminal illness — confirmed to GIS by Qadhafi’s doctors and by other African leaders close to Qadhafi — they may not be able to wait for US support to remove Qadhafi. It was possible, then, that a move against Qadhafi by internal opponents could come even before a US attack on Iraq. If so, this would materially impact Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s ability to utilize his strategic weapons.

What was significant about the November 8, 2000, reports was that the NoDong 1 missiles already operational in Libya were targeted at European cities. These were missiles reportedly partly paid for by Iraq.

August 14, 2002

UK Promises Qadhafi Support in Exchange for IRA Data

Exclusive. From GIS Stations London and Tripoli. The UK Government has agreed with the Libyan Administration of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi that Britain would “deliver” US support for Qadhafi and a transition of power to his son, Saif al-Islam, in exchange for a nominal agreement to compensate victims of the Pan Am PA103 airliner bombing of December 21, 1988, and complete details on the terrorist Irish Republican Army (IRA) operations in the UK. 

Highly-reliable sources in both governments on August 13, 2002, confirmed the essence of the arrangement, concluded during the August 2002 visit to Tripoli and Sirte by UK junior Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Mike O’Brien. Mr O’Brien arrived in Libya on August 6, 2002, and said that Libya had agreed to help the UK with intelligence for the “war on terror”. What has emerged is that the intelligence only applied to Britain’s own conflict with the IRA, which was now largely over.

The sources said that Libya had provided the UK with an initial “good faith” batch of intelligence, naming IRA terrorists trained in Libya, and on details of arms and explosives provided to the IRA by Libya. If this was found to be reliable, a more broadly-based exchange would occur, and the UK would “proceed at full speed” to see Qadhafi rehabilitated in the Western media and with the US Government. This would also entail some form of agreement under which the Libyan Government would accept responsibility for the PA 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, but Col. Qadhafi himself would be cleared of any involvement and would be free from prosecution or personal liability.

This did not meet the criteria which the US Congress sought, which was to have Libya detail the known connections on the PA103 bombing to Iran and Syria, the principal actors in the bombing.

It was known that the UK FCO had liaised with the US Department of State on the negotiations with Qadhafi, and State and the FCO were trying to sell the package to the US Bush Administration as a “victory” over terrorism, and to show that a leader of a Muslim state could be well-received by the West after having “renounced terrorism”. However, there was no indication that Qadhafi had in any way made meaningful gestures on renouncing support for Islamist radical movements, nor on the question of the destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) still held — and still being actively developed and deployed — by Libya.

Libyan sources said that Col. Qadhafi felt sufficiently confident about the deal with the UK that he had ordered a stop to attempted mediation through another country with the US on the question of normalizing relations. At the same time, Qadhafi Administration officials had stepped up their campaign to discredit moves among the Libyan expatriate community to gather behind the traditional — and moderate, pro-Western — Libyan Sanusiyyah movement to be ready to replace Qadhafi when he left office.

The Qadhafi Administration’s decision to betray its former colleagues in the IRA comes as the IRA’s cohesiveness in its own terrorist war in Britain has been winding down. The IRA had, in July 2002, issued a formal “sincere apology” to the families of those civilians killed by the IRA during a terrorist incident in Belfast known as “Bloody Friday”, 30 years before, when more than 20 IRA bombs were detonated. However, while it was clear that the IRA problem had not been eliminated in the UK, what appeared to be happening in 2002 — as the IRA through its political wing, Sinn Féin, attempted to legitimize its operations — was that IRA splinter groups were now pursuing separate terrorist operations.

Sinn Féin on August 12, 2002, meanwhile, called on Colombia’s chief prosecutor, Luis Camilo Osorio, to resign after further claims had been made of IRA links to FARC guerillas. The Colombian official alleged the IRA had been weapons testing in his country and sharing techniques used in recent FARC mortar attacks. Sr Camilo Osorio said that recent attacks by FARC guerillas had employed techniques similar to those used by the IRA. Three Irish republicans —Jim Monaghan, Martin McCauley and Niall Connolly — had been held in Colombian security for the past year, awaiting trial accused of training FARC terrorists. Sinn Féin chairman Mitchel McLaughlin said that the comments by Sr Osorio were a “disgrace”, claiming the men's chances of a fair trial in Colombia had been seriously damaged by the prosecutor-general’s remarks.

The Colombian incident gave credence to the UK Government’s claims that the IRA had not yet been eliminated as a terrorist threat to Britain. And given the importance of the Colombian war with FARC — which has, through its illegal narcotics operations, links with the Islamist terrorist groups — as far as the US was concerned, the UK Government was making headway in Washington with its attempts to get the US to support the rapprochement with Qadhafi. But this had still not addressed the fact that the Libyan WMD programs continued, and that Qadhafi was attempting to “buy off” Western governments so that his son could take power without resorting to valid elections.

One Libyan opposition leader said: “The Libyan people, who have always been pro-Western, are now being sold out, yet again, by Western governments. If they can let Qadhafi off, why not let Osama bin Laden off with a fine and a strict warning now?”

August 7, 2002

UK Begins Direct Negotiations With Libya “On Flawed Premise”

Analysis. By Gregory Copley, Editor, GIS. With input from GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. The British Government began high-level discussions in Tripoli with the Libyan leadership in a move which many senior US Bush Administration and Congressional officials have privately condemned as damaging to efforts to end Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s radical and anti-Western activities. The UK Government has said that it has the support of the US Government in sending the ministerial delegation to Libya, but, according to Washington sources, this “stretched the truth”.

The US Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not protest the visit, but White House and Congressional leaders from both US major parties were skeptical about its purposes. One senior Washington source noted: “The British said that they were seeking Libya’s help in the war on terror, but this is laughable. We have certainly seen what the Libyans have offered in the way of intelligence on al-Qaida, for example, but we also know that Libya has both financed al-Qaida from time-to-time and has given operatives a safe-have in Libya. The UK is merely attempting to secure a trade advantage with Libya, which is very short-term, and which allows Qadhafi to continue as a problem for his own people and for everyone else.”

Junior UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister Mike O’Brien became the first British minister to visit Libya since 1983 when he arrived in Tripoli on August 6, 2002. Minister O’Brien’s visit was, according to the UK Government, publicly aimed at securing the support of the Libyan Government in the “war on terror”.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, July 30, 2002: Time to End the Hypocrisy Over Qadhafi.]

The UK Government leaks said that Mr O’Brien was ask the Libyan leadership to help the West by providing intelligence on al-Qaida. 

July 30, 2002

Time to End the Hypocrisy Over Qadhafi

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. Saif al-Islam, the son and designated heir to Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, spends much of his time in London, attempting to pursuade the world that things have changed in Libya. It has been his message that the “bad old days” have ended, and that the time has come for the international community to “normalize” relations with the government of the country which his father seized by force, and continues to hold, today, solely by force of arms.

But the “bad old days” have not ended. The killings not only have not stopped; they have once again escalated inside the country, as Saif al-Islam and other members of the Qadhafi entourage jockey for position as the time of transition draws near. It draws near not because the self-appointed “colonel” is about to retire from power, but because his illness — cancer — is terminal and he has, probably, less than two years to live. Significantly, Qadhafi claims that he holds no official position other than as “leader” of the “revolution”; now Saif al-Islam is vying for Western approval — he knows he will never get the approval of Libyans — to succeed his father.

The Australian Government in July 2002 normalized relations with Libya and sent a trade mission to the country. Australia has no vested hostility toward Qadhafi, other than the fact that Qadhafi has funded radical activity in Australia in the past. But in August 2002, the British Government has said that it would send a trade mission to Libya, and has alleged that it was doing so because the US Government “supported” the view of the UK’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office that Libya had turned away from terrorism.

Apart from the gross distortion of this statement — that the US Government “supported” the UK perception — it begs the question of whether governments are to be held accountable for their actions. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has said that they should (when referring to former Yugoslav Pres. Slobodan Miloševic, Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, etc.). Now, he wishes to deny the evidence of ongoing Qadhafi radical activity — acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs, including chemical and biological weapons, medium-range ballistic missiles) and supporting terrorism (funding of al-Qaida, stirring radicalism in Zimbabwe, etc.) — because of a perceived belief that he can win short-term gains, such as oil and gas concessions, in Libya.

The hypocrisy of Blair’s position, when Qadhafi was avowedly responsible for the death of a British policewoman in 1984 and for the December 1988 PA103 terrorist bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, equates to forgiving British multiple murderess Myra Hindley should she but pay enough money to the right people. Hindley, after all, has served more than 30 years in prison for the “Moors murders”, and UK public opinion is adament that she not be released. Blair has said that she will not be freed. But he forgives Qadhafi because he “has turned away from terrorism”. 

Can al-Qaida’s Osama bin Laden — recently praised to the hilt by Qadhafi — be forgiven and rehabilitated by Blair and the US Department of State if he but pays enough money and “turns away from terrorism”?

There are certain facts which are being ignored in this latest situation.

Firstly, “the US Government” does not support the position that Qadhafi has “turned away from terrorism”, or has ceased to be a problem. It is true that the US Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have supported this view. But it is not the view of the bulk of the US Congress, the White House and the Department of Defense. Indeed, the White House leadership is becoming further estranged from the State Department’s view on many things, and from Secretary of State Colin Powell, in large part because he has supported the Saudi Arabian Government’s view — and that of Egypt’s leadership — that Qadhafi was the best option in Libya.

Secondly, the relationship of the Saudi and Egyptian leadership to the Qadhafi question, and the relationship of US Secretary of State Powell to the Saudis, demands an explanation. The Saudis support Qadhafi largely because he overthrew King Idris I and the Sanusi movement. The Sanusi sect of Islam is moderate, progressive and democratic, and a direct confrontation and contrast to the Saudi Wahhabi sect which is the legitimizing prop of the House of al-Sa’ud. But Saudi and Egyptian officials are being paid large amounts of money by Qadhafi. And US Secretary of State Powell has an historic friendship with the Saudi leadership which needs greater discussion.

Thirdly, Qadhafi himself is moving rapidly, along with his sons (particularly “heir” Saif al-Islam), to consolidate a transition before the people of Libya can assert their own desire for leadership, which is generally regarded as the leader of the Sanusiyyah, Prince Idris al-Sanusi. Qadhafi even said, on Egyptian television on July 27, 2002, that the US Government was trying to put Prince Idris on the throne of his uncle. Prince Idris, in Washington with his family and many Sanusiyyah leaders, has only called for the restoration of democracy and accountable government, which Saif al-Islam and Qadhafi are trying to avoid. And despite the claims of the Saudi and Egyptian governments, the State Department and CIA, a viable plan to allow the Libyan public — aided by the Armed Forces who oppose Qadhafi — does indeed exist and does not require some massive military operation by the West.

For Tony Blair, the US State Dept. and CIA, and others to move to “normalize” relations with Qadhafi instead of with the Libyan people is shameful, hypocritical and short-termism which will lead to further international distrust of the motives of the West in its “war on terrorism”.

July 29, 2002

Qadhafi Claims That US Attempting to Replace Him With the Sanusi Monarchy

Analysis. With input from GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, speaking on Egyptian television on July 28, 2002, said that the US Government wanted to replace both himself and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein with the restored monarchies of the respective countries. It was his first public reference, in the 33 years since he seized power in a coup from King Idris I, that he had referred to the Libyan Sanusiyyah monarchy, and sources in Tripoli said that this indicated his mounting concern over the political momentum of the Sanusiyyah movement — an exceptionally moderate, Sufic form of Islam which centers around the Sanusi leaders — and its leader, Prince Idris al-Senussi (Sanusi), now in Washington, DC.

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily sources said that Col. Qadhafi was trying to further pressure Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak to do more to rein in the US and to try to stop support from building for Prince Idris and the Sanusi movement. The reference about US support for the monarchy in Iraq was in regard to Sharif Ali, the heir to the Hashemite Throne of Iraq. Sharif Ali is now, with Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) opposition movement. 

[Sharif AlHussein bin Ali — more commonly known as Sharif Ali — whose father was Prince of Mecca until 1908 and uncle to King Faisal I, was cousin to the late King Faisal II, who was killed during the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy. Like Prince Idris al-Senussi, he is a sharif, a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed.]

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 1, 2002: The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam: Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture.]

Highly-authoritative sources in Cairo and Tripoli have told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs repeatedly over the past decade that a number of officials in the Egyptian and Saudi governments had been paid substantial amounts of money by Col. Qadhafi to maintain pressure on the US Government not to take any steps toward removing Qadhafi or his family from power. Indeed, Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak and key Saudi leaders had exerted maximum pressure on the US Government to keep it from taking decisive steps against Qadhafi. This campaign had now reached a crescendo.

The momentum within Libya by the Sanusi movement to reassert itself was also now moving to a more advanced stage, to the point where, in the past year, the Qadhafi Administration could no longer ignore the fact that the Sanusi sect of Islam had not been destroyed by the Revolution. The Saudi leadership, however, saw the continuation of the Sanusi movement — which also existed in Saudi Arabia (the second largest mosque in Saudi Arabia is a Sanusi mosque) — as a threat to the continued dominance of the Wahhabi sect of Islam, which was the foundation of the House of al-Sa’ud and its control of the Kingdom. It was for this reason that the Saudi Government continued to support Qadhafi, and to pressure US Secretary of State Colin Powell and other State Department officials to ensure that the US Bush Administration did not attempt to displace Qadhafi.

Significantly, Saif al-Islam, the son of Col. Qadhafi and his designated heir, had recruited a considerable number of Wahhabi fighters, many of them from al-Qaida terrorist group, into his personal militia because he knew that the Sanusiyyah regarded the Qadhafi family as their opponents. But publicly, Saif al-Islam now also had to acknowledge the growing reassertion of the Sanusi movement. 

Apart from dominating the religious scene in Libya, the Sanusi are spread across much of North and Central Africa — there are some four-million in Nigeria alone — and in the Arabian Peninsula, where the Sanusi sect began.

Clashes were reported during July 2002 between what were described as “Sufi” Muslims (ie: Sanusi) and militant Salafis in al-Zawia (az-Zawiya), a few miles West of Tripoli, with each group trying to impose its way of conducting prayers. The Salafis have fundamentalist views similar to those of the Taliban or the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi movement. News of the clashes was first revealed on July 25, 2002, in a statement denouncing Islamic extremism by Saif al-Islam. Police broke up the clashes then forced demonstrators who had beards to shave them off. Libyan Justice Minister Mohammad al-Misrati said on July 25, 2002: “Libyans like their mosques free from Muslim extremism.” While it was true that Col. Qadhafi saw Islamism as a threat to his rule, his overthrow of the Sanusi in 1969 removed a significant challenge to the Saudi ability to project its influence through Wahhabism. And Saif al-Islam had been a major instrument in liaising with, and using, Islamist terrorist movements.

The extent of Qadhafi’s concern for his security was clear when, before he attended the early July 2002 inaugural summit of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, he had a Libyan Army base — and hundreds of its occupants — destroyed in a rain of artillery rockets in order to destabilize any attempts for a coup during his absence. 

[Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, July 12, 2002: Qadhafi Orders Killing of Occupants of Entire Libyan Army Base, Then Tells CNN He Opposes Terrorism.]

Meanwhile, the Government of the United Kingdom on July 27, 2002, indicated that it was preparing to send a ministerial mission to Libya for the first time in nearly 20 years. This followed a visit in early July 2002 to Libya by a Ministerial mission from Australia. UK Foreign Office Minister Mike O'Brien said that he hoped to visit Tripoli as part of the campaign against international terrorism. The planned visit, in early August, came, the UK Blair Administration indicated, against the background of slowly improving relations between Col. Qadhafi’s Administration and the international community. The Foreign Office assessment was that Libya had turned away from supporting terrorism and claimed that this was a view supported by the United States. Not insignificantly, Saif al-Islam has spent much of his time during 2002 in London, attempting — often with substantial incentives — to influence British leaders to improve their ties with the Qadhafi Administration.

However, it was in fact not true that the US Government “supported” the view that Libya had turned away from terrorism. While the State Department and CIA did take this line, the White House, Congress and the Defense Department did not.

The battle lines were now being drawn within the US Government on the question of Libya. Very reliable sources in Washington indicated that the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were aggressively pushing the Saudi-Egyptian line of attempting to sustain Qadhafi in office. At the same time, key elements in the Defense Department, the Congress (both Republican and Democratic Party members) and the White House were increasingly moving in favor of removing Qadhafi. This further compounded the isolation of the State Department and CIA from White House strategic policy planning. Indeed, Secretary of State Powell’s closeness with the Saudis, which dated back to the 1990-91 Gulf War, was increasingly a cause of annoyance to some officials in the White House and in Congress.

One of the key tools being used by State Department and CIA officials was the claim that there was no time to build a campaign against Qadhafi, and, in any event, there was no plan or leadership in place to take over from Qadhafi. In fact, the Sanusi leadership was demonstrating repeatedly that it had the support within Libya — something the CIA, which basically had few, if any, HUMINT sources in Libya, had said was untrue — and the heads of the Sanusi movement and Sanusi family were now gathering in Washington to demonstrate solidarity for Prince Idris, the designated leader of the movement.

Prince Idris, who has had decades of experience in the oil and gas industry, has said that Libya should be restored to a constitutional democracy which could play a vital rôle in Mediterranean and European security, accessible to NATO. But, in a meeting at the Libya Policy Council, a study unit of the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), in the Washington, DC, area on July 28, 2002, he said that the first priority was to ensure that the Libyan economy began benefiting Libyans, who had been denied fundamental rights, healthcare, education and infrastructure for more than three decades. This, he said, would have a profound impact on the entire North African and Mediterranean economy, as well as on the African economies.

He also said that Libyan energy production could rise again substantially when an open, moderate system was restored to the country. He noted: “Libya produced 2.5-million barrels of oil a day under King Idris’ elected government. Today, Libya produces 1.4-million bpd.” He said that Libyan energy production should ultimately be ramped up to four- to five-million bpd. When asked whether there was an alternative government or leadership ready to replace Qadhafi, he said that he had seen numerous detailed plans for all aspects of national management, with competent Libyans ready to return to the country to help rehabilitate it. 

Prince Idris had, through his al-Taj Foundation, been working since the 1980s to promote moderation in Islam and to strengthen the ties between Islam and the West, in line with the teachings of the Sanusi movement.

He also said that, given the growing isolation of the Qadhafi Administration and the illness of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, even the Gadadfa tribe of Qadhafi supported moves to restore the country to democracy. “Moreover, it would not take a military invasion of Libya to remove Qadhafi,” Prince Idris said. “The Libyan people and the Libyan Armed Forces only need to know that external powers are not going to prop up Qadhafi. The Libyan people can make the change themselves if only the US can ensure that there would be no interference from vested external interests.”

July 12, 2002

Qadhafi Orders Killing of Occupants of Entire Libyan Army Base, Then Tells CNN He Opposes Terrorism

Exclusive. From GIS sources in Tripoli. Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, just before he left for the last Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Durban, South Africa, on July 6, 2002, ordered the destruction of a Libyan Army base and its occupants in the town of Gharyan, in the foothills of the Jebal Nefusa range of mountains, two hours’ drive due south of Tripoli.

He ordered a surprise rocket attack on the barracks, catching the occupants by surprise. It is known that six colonels were among those killed, and it was believed that the death toll was possibly in the hundreds. 

No reason was given for the attack, and its occurrence was not publicized or commented upon officially. 

There is some speculation that Col. Qadhafi undertook the attack in order to deter the threat of a coup by the Army while he was out of the country on a well-publicized visit to the OAU Summit. It would have been the logical time for any military action against him, particularly as it is well-known internally that he is in poor health and attempting to facilitate a transition of power to one of his son’s Saif al-Islam. 

One source within Col. Qadhafi’s entourage told GIS: “We do not know specifically why the Brother Colonel ordered the attack, but it was probable that he did not trust some of the people there. Such surprise attacks are not uncommon; they are used to keep potential enemies off-balance.” 

It was believed that the attack occurred about a week before Col. Qadhafi left for South Africa. After arriving in Durban, Col. Qadhafi gave an interview to the US television network, CNN, which published the report by CNN Johannesburg Bureau Chief Charlayne Hunter-Gault on its website on July 11, 2002. In it, Qadhafi — who had, in the previous two days, lambasted the US and its “war on terrorism” — said that Libya was in the forefront of the war against terrorism, and that there was no evidence that his country was engaged in terrorism or support for terrorism. This contradicts definitive reports by GIS regarding payments by Libya to al-Qaida organizations during the past 18 months, and the recruitment of al-Qaida personnel from Afghanistan and Pakistan into Saif al-Islam’s personal militia.

Despite this, CNN said:

Qadhafi referred to “a number of elements from Afghanistan” that he said infiltrated Libya and caused “quite a lot of trouble” — one of the reasons he would not harbor groups like Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida terrorist network or allow them to take refuge in Libya.

“Actually, we are not in need of bin Laden,” Qadhafi said. “We don’t need his money, we don’t need his protection, we don’t want to use him or be used by him. We just want to defend ourselves.”

If any members of al-Qaida are found in Libya, he said, “We shall arrest them and they shall be put on trial.”

Meanwhile, the Australian Government has re-established diplomatic links with Libya, and Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile arrived in Tripoli on July 11, 2002, on a four-day visit. The Libyan Government had indicated that it would open a “People’s Bureau” (Embassy) in Canberra, although for now Australia would handle its diplomatic links with Libya through its Embassy in Cairo. Vaile was accompanied by a big delegation, including Brendan Stewart, chairman of Australia’s wheat exporter AWB (the Australian Wheat Board). Libya imports up to 1.5-million tonnes of wheat a year. 

However, the major deal with Australia is over oil. Two major Australian oil exploration and production companies have already sewn up significant blocks of exploration territory, conscious of the fact that they would of necessity go against the US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). The US State Department had reportedly encouraged Australia to normalize relations with Libya, despite the fact that the US Congress and White House had taken an opposing view on Libya to the State Department.

Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi was not likely to meet with the Australian delegation, however, despite assurances that he would be available for meetings. Instead, he was expected to pay a three-day visit to Swaziland after the OAU/AU summit, his first tour to the Kingdom. He had earlier offered support to King Mswati III of Swaziland, but the King was cautious in accepting any aid which could be construed as supporting Qadhafi in his campaign against South African Pres. Thabo Mbeki.

But typical of the contrary actions of the Colonel, on July 9, 2002, at the African Union (AU) launching conference, he seized a microphone to demand that Zimbabwe Pres. Robert Mugabe reconcile with the white community in his country, despite the fact that Libyan funds and security agents had been provided to help Mugabe in his campaign to seize white farms in Zimbabwe. 

May 17, 2002

New Round of Libya-US-UK Talks Getting Underway, But No Settlement Anticipated

Analysis. From GIS Stations. Reliable sources in London and Tripoli reported on May 16, 2002, that Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) chief Moussa Koussa had arrived in London in preparation for tripartite talks with the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the US Department of State. It was understood that US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, was to head to the US delegation, and that US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officials would be present.

Libyan sources have said that the US continued to push for a compensation offer from Libya to the relatives of victims of those killed in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. However, Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi steadfastly refuses to acknowledge any responsibility for the terrorist bombing. Reports, leaked by lawyers for the victims’ families, had been published in Time magazine to the effect that the Qadhafi Administration was prepared to pay US$3.7-billion to the families. This was, at the time, completely discounted by Libyan sources.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, May 1, 2002: Libyan Sources Say Reports of Impending PA103 Pay-Offs Designed to Stave Off US Hostility.]

There appears to be something of a split within the Libyan leadership, among those advocating offering some kind of settlement to placate the US and British authorities, and those who absolutely reject any admission of guilt in the bombing. In any event, Col. Qadhafi continued to adamantly reject any admission of guilt. As a result of this the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) had drafted a document which was intended to address Libyan sensitivities on the issue, namely: Libya will not admit guilt in the PA103 bombing, and will not apologize for the incident. However, it was understood that at least some Libyan officials favored a payment of up $1-billion. 

US sources told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on May 16, 2002, that (a) $1-billion would be insufficient compensation, and (b) no resolution of the matter would be agreed unless Libya acknowledged responsibility for the act and offered formal apologies. This was adamantly and specifically rejected by Libyan leaders around Col. Qadhafi.

Libyan sources within the Administration did not seem to believe — given the neglect which US intelligence services have paid to Libya in recent years — that the US or UK had sufficient intelligence penetration of Libya to be able to verify the claims by US Under-Secretary of State John Bolton in Washington, DC, on May 6, 2002, to the effect that Libya was continuing with its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) research and development (particularly in chemical and biological weapons), coupled with ballistic missile development. GIS sources, however, said that this did not take into account the degree of penetration of Libyan military and weapons facilities by Israeli intelligence.

Meanwhile, on May 11, 2002, the Pakistan Government handed over the relatives of al-Qaida members arrested in Pakistan to the Qadhafi Foundation of Saif al-Salam, son of Libyan President Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi. Six women and 14 children flew to Libya, accompanied by the foundation officials on the night of May 11, 2002. The husbands of four of the women were from Libya, while two were from Saudi Arabia. Following their arrests, Pakistan Government functionaries contacted their respective embassies and made them aware of the women and children. The Saudi Embassy refused to accept its people, while Libya agreed to take them all. The Qadhafi Foundation had earlier (as reported by GIS) taken 44 al-Qaida members back from Pakistan to Libya, where they were reportedly incorporated into Saif al-Islam’s private militia.

May 9, 2002

Saif al-Islam, in Bid to Move Into Libyan Decisionmaking, Focuses on Libyan al-Qaida Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay

The son of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi who has been chosen to succeed his ailing father, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, on May 8, 2002, billed himself as a “charity leader” to call for international observers to check the wellbeing of three Libyan nationals — and members of the al-Qaida terrorist organization of Osama bin Laden — being detained by the United States at Camp X-Ray, at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Saif al-Islam maintains a substantial militia separately from the Libyan Armed Forces and had, during 2001-2002, built up that force by recruiting radical Islamist fighters, including al-Qaida terrorists.

Significantly, some news organizations, including United Press International (UPI), which is now Saudi-owned, ran the Saif al-Islam story, virtually as a press release, painting Saif al-Islam as a “charity leader”.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted on February 15, 2002:

The Libyan Government sent an aircraft to Pakistan to repatriate 44 Arab al-Qaida fighters who had been detained in Afghanistan, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the son of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, said on February 13, 2002. Saif al-Islam, who heads the Qadhafi Foundation, said that the aircraft had left on February 12, 2002, for Pakistan to repatriate “44 Afghan Arabs, mainly Libyans”.  “For humanitarian reasons, the foundation has negotiated their repatriation and paid sums of money to the Afghan groups which were holding them,” Saif al-Islam said. He said that Libya had not informed the US of the move, but did not know whether the Pakistani Government had done so. Saif al-Islam refused to say how much had been paid to the Afghan groups to release the captives.

The Qadhafi International Foundation for Charity, al-Islam Qadhafi’s so-called charity, asked the International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights groups to ask US authorities to allow observers to go to Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo where al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners were being held. Significantly, the Qadhafi International Foundation for Charity was used to funnel money to al-Qaida and Taliban operations, inside Afghanistan and elsewhere, after the September 11, 2002, terrorist attacks on the US, and had also, in mid-2001 sent at least $25-million to an al-Qaida organization.

The organization, in a statement issued May 8, 2002, said: “It is a test of the world's conscience. We raise our voice to have the international community stand by the rules of justice and fairness in order to avoid a precedent in Guantanamo where suspicion of committing a crime would be considered a justification for violating human freedom and pride.”

US-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan have in captivity at least one Libyan senior al-Qaida member, and two lesser-ranking Libyans from the organization. Pakistan handed over Ibn al-Shaykh Libi — who ran paramilitary training for al-Qaida — to US forces in early 2002. 

May 8, 2002

US Now Focuses Attention on Libya as Hostile State, While Libya Moves Rapidly to Bolster Strategic Ties With Iran

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, GIS Editor. Libya continued in early May 2002 to rebuild its already strong strategic alliance with Iran, a matter which gained considerable urgency with the formal statement of US Under-Secretary of State John Bolton on May 6, 2002, that Libya — with Cuba and Syria — were now formally considered to be hostile states developing or acquiring chemical and/or biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. The addition of Libya to the list of targeted states was highly significant. The US Administration had earlier already indicated that Syria was on the list of states believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and harboring or sponsoring terrorists.

As well, given the emerging evidence of closeness between the Libya and Palestinian leaderships — which has waxed and waned over the years — it now seemed likely that any escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict would almost certainly include Israeli military strikes against Libyan strategic missile installations, from which NoDong-1 missiles with WMD warheads could reach Israeli targets. This could include air strikes, special operations raids and surface-to-surface missile strikes from one or more of the Israeli Navy (Heyl ha-Yam) three Eilat-class (Saar 5-class) FFLs (corvettes), which are almost certainly being fitted with the new Israeli land-attack cruise missiles also fitted to the three Dolpheen-class submarines operating in the Red Sea/Indian Ocean area.

At the same time, the Libyan Government of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi was working increasingly openly — once again — against the US, but, as reported consistently by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs, had been continuing its WMD and ballistic missile developments while also harboring and sponsoring terrorists, including al-Qaida members and al-Qaida organizations. However, what has become increasingly apparent is the Libya-Iran-Palestinian linkage. What had not been noted was the fact that the captain of the ship, the Karine-A, which was intercepted, laden with Iranian arms bound for the Palestinian Authority (PA), in the Red Sea by Israeli commandos on January 4, 2002, was a Palestinian living in Libya. Capt. Omar Akawi, who admitted that he was closely involved with PA Pres. Yasir Arafat’s Fatah movement, could not have undertaken the mission without the complicity of the Qadhafi Government in Libya. Capt. Akawi said the arms shipment had been overseen by Palestinian Authority official Adel Awadallah, and the PA confirmed that he was a middle ranking member of the PA’s naval unit. Capt. Akawi had been a member of Fatah since 1976, although he and his family were resident in Libya.

US Under- Secretary Bolton, in his May 6, 2002, speech entitled “Beyond the Axis of Evil”, said that the three nations (Libya, Syria and Cuba) could be grouped with other states which the US deemed hostile by attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and/or for their support of terrorism: Iraq, Iran and North Korea (DPRK). He also warned that the US would take action.

In Washington, the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), which is associated with GIS, announced the formation of The Libya Policy Council, a specialist unit to study developments in Libya. The Council indicated on May 7, 2002, that the head of the principal Libyan Muslim sect, the moderate Sanusi or Sanusiyyah movement, Prince Idris al-Senussi, was gaining significant support within Libyan military and civil circles. There was concern within Libya over the illness which doctors have said would end Col. Qadhafi’s life within 18 months, raising fears of a fight for power. One of Col. Qadhafi’s sons, Saif al-Islam, who had a substantial militia which included a considerable number of former al-Qaida fighters, to press his claims for leadership. However, The Libya Policy Council said that only Prince Idris has widespread support within the Armed Forces and key elements of the civil population.

In Tehran on May 4, 2002, Libyan Ambassador to Iran Ali Mahmoud Maria met with Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karroubi and, in a statement issued immediately afterwards, Speaker Karroubi referred to the record of good relations between the two countries and noted: “We hope to witness further expansion of mutual relations relying on the two sides high potential in various fields.” It was highly important that Speaker Karroubi made this comment within a statement focused on the current regional and global situation being “a very significant factor in helping further consolidate and deepen ties among Islamic states, particularly those between Iran and Libya”.

Libyan Ambassador Ali Mahmoud Maria also referred to the level of Iran-Libya relations adding that the current situation in the region and the threats of US leaders against other countries had compelled them to collaborate and coordinate their actions. 

There were grounds to believe also that Iran and Libya were, in fact, coordinating their development activities on derivatives of the NoDong-1 strategic ballistic missiles. Libya and Iran had been buying the missiles at the same time in 2000. As well, US sources were well aware that the whole question of the PA103 terrorist bombing in 1988 principally involved Iran and Syria, with Libya playing only a supporting rôle. 

Making the US position clear in Washington, Under-Secretary of State Bolton said: “America is determined to prevent the next wave of terror. ... States that sponsor terror and pursue WMD (weapons of mass destruction) must stop. States that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our effort, but those that do not can expect to become our targets.”

The Bolton statement was a clear indication that the Department of State had now essentially abandoned its attempts to come to an agreement with Libyan leader Qadhafi over reparations for victims of the PA103 terrorist incident of 1988, and agreed with GIS assessments that fresh “leaks” of information via a Swiss lawyer to the effect that Libya would pay $3.7-billion in compensation to victims’ families was, in fact, a hoax designed to stave off US hostile actions against Qadhafi.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, May 1, 2002: Libyan Sources Say Reports of Impending PA103 Pay-Offs Designed to Stave Off US Hostility.]

Under-Secretary Bolton also said that Cuba’s threat to the US was consistently “underplayed”, noting: “[Cuba] has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort (and has) provided dual-use technology to other rogue states.”

Significantly, with regard to Libya, Egypt had for more than a decade undertaken to the US Government that it would “contain” Libyan activities, but had, in fact, worked with Libya on strategic ballistic missile programs, including the NoDong-1 procurements from the DPRK. On March 5, 2002, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, in an article entitled US Pressure Expected on Egyptian Pres. Mubarak Over Libya, WMD, noted that the US was displeased with Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak over his failure to contain Qadhafi. Pres. Mubarak subsequently visited Tripoli for talks with Col. Qadhafi, but only to ask for financial help in the wake of the refusal of the US to supplement its aid to Cairo. 

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, April 29, 2002: Mubarak Flies to Libya to Seek Funds from Qadhafi.]

At the same time, Libya, Egypt and Iran were now increasingly strengthening their military relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a move which gave all parties confidence that they could resist US pressures regarding terrorism. This trend was particularly noticeable following the recent visit to Libya and Iran by PRC Pres. Jiang Zemin. [Pres. Jiang’s April 8-22, 2002, visit took him to Germany, Nigeria and Tunisia, as well as to Libya and Iran.] 

April 29, 2002

Mubarak Flies to Libya to Seek Funds from Qadhafi

Analysis. With input from GIS station Tripoli. Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak on April 28, 2002, flew to Tripoli to meet with the increasingly ill Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi to seek Libyan financial support for what the Egyptian leader is clearly aware will be trying times ahead. Pres. Mubarak is preparing both for a reduction of US financial aid in the wake of his clear decision to distance himself from the US, while at the same time anticipating major reductions in foreign exchange earnings as the continuing conflict in the region stops tourism and potentially threatens to cut traffic through the Suez Canal.

As well, Egypt has been spending heavily to get the Armed Forces into shape for a possible new war with Israel. 

The visit has two additional strategic ramifications:

1. The move by Pres Mubarak to build warm relations with Col. Qadhafi further polarizes US-Egyptian relations, while at the same time heightening US suspicions of Col. Qadhafi; and

2. Potentially directly engages Libya in the new conflict between Israel and the Arab states.

Much of Libya’s ongoing work on assembling, developing and deploying the DPRK-supplied No Dong 1 theater ballistic missiles over the past two years has been at the behest of Egypt and Iraq. Egyptian engineers have been involved in the program. It is possible (although there is no direct evidence) that Egyptian scientists have also been working with Libya on the development of strategic payload packages for the No Dong 1s, which are already deployed with some kind of warheads. Libya has continued work on chemical and biological weapons, and Libyan work has almost certainly been geared to a marriage of these weapons with the theater-strategic missiles.

Sources in Tripoli indicated on April 28, 2002, that Pres. Mubarak promised Col. Qadhafi “unlimited protection” from Egypt if he provided the financial support requested.

March 27, 2002

Libya’s Saif al-Islam Admits Prospect of Assuming Leadership; Qadhafi Refuses to Participate in Arab League Summit

Analysis. From GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. The second eldest son of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam, has now said that he could become leader of the State in succession to his father, who is known to be seriously ill with cancer. “Obviously, I would be lying if I told you there was no chance I might become leader one day,” he said to a French journalist in March 2002.

However, in another interview he dismissed the possibility of his father being replaced by one of his four sons in a Syrian-style hereditary succession. “The regime in Libya is not hereditary and what happened in Syria will not happen in Libya,” Saif told Asharq al-Awsat on March 25, 2002. A Tripoli-based diplomat noted: “Saif is becoming a rising star and he is forcing diplomats, oilmen and other trade middlemen to pay attention to his rôle and views.”

The succession issue is pressing. Col. Qadhafi now works only about five hours a day because of his illness, and reports from usually reliable sources in Tripoli indicate that this was a key factor in his refusal to attend the March 27-28, 2002, Arab League summit in Beirut. Col. Qadhafi had dangled the prospect of attendance, only at the last minute appearing to “change his mind”, although sources said that there was never a real prospect of his personal participation. Some Libyan diplomats had, by March 26, 2002, arrived in Beirut for the summit.

Col. Qadhafi confirmed on March 25, 2002, that he would not attend the upcoming 14th Arab League summit. He told the Qatari-based satellite television Al-Jazeera that his refusal to travel to Beirut for the two-day summit was not motivated by a feud with Lebanon’s Shi’ites but by the failure of the previous summit in Amman to implement its resolutions. “If the summit does not respect its resolutions, then I will not attend it,” he said. Lebanese Pres. Emile Lahoud had said on March 23, 2002, that he would warmly welcome the attendance by Col. Qadhafi at the summit. Adm. Lahoud said that the participation in the summit by Qadhafi was of great importance for a successful convention of the annual but highly spectacular conference. Col. Qadhafi had earlier said in a letter delivered by Libyan diplomatic officials in Beirut to Adm. Lahoud that he would go to Beirut to participate in the summit. This followed a personal appeal for his attendance by Pres. Lahoud. Col. Qadhafi indicated that he was “touched” by Pres. Lahoud’s appeal by telephone on March 20, 2002, and “could create a surprise by going to Beirut”, he said. 

Meanwhile, on March 25, 2002, Saudi Arabia’s acting Foreign Minister Prince Turki Muhammad Bin Sa’ud, who was also the special envoy for Saudi Deputy Prime Minister: Crown Prince Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud, left Tripoli following a visit to Libya during which he handed over a message from the Crown Prince to Col. Qadhafi. In a press statement, the Saudi official underlined the importance of this visit and expressed his satisfaction over its results. 

GIS noted on March 15, 2002, the fact that Libyan relations with the US would polarize following the rejection of the appeal against his murder conviction by Libyan intelligence officer Abdelbaset al-Megrahi over the bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 in 1988.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, March 15, 2002: Libya Expected to Resume More Overtly Radical Approach With Rejection of al-Megrahi Appeal on PA103.]

The polarization of Libyan-US relations has, indeed, begun to occur, and the Libyan Administration was taking steps to avoid giving the US an excuse to target Libya in its “war on terrorism”. On March 19, 2002, the current Chairman of the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council, Hussein Aideed, accused Eritrea, Djibouti, and Libya of collaborating in the supply and delivery of armaments to groups in Somalia. The Libyan Foreign Minister however, denied any sponsoring of arms into Somalia. He told reporters that Libya was actually buying arms out of Somalia since there was too many there already. The Minister accused Aideed himself of requesting to be supplied with arms. However, as Defense & Foreign Affairs publications reported on numerous occasions that Libya had been a major supplier, through Eritrea, of weapons and training instructors, for Somali militant groups.

On March 15, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell noted: “I'm concerned about the fact that as Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is trying to show a more positive and benign face to the world, there is clear evidence that he has ambitions with respect to the development of weapons of mass destruction. I think it’s idiotic on his part. I don’t know why he continues to do it. But as long as he continues to do it, we will continue to watch carefully.”

March 15, 2002

Libya Expected to Resume More Overtly Radical Approach With Rejection of al-Megrahi Appeal on PA103

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, with input from GIS stations. The failure of the appeal against his sentence for involvement in the bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 in 1988 of convicted Libyan intelligence officer Abdelbaset al-Megrahi on March 14, 2002, was expected to end any pretense by Libyan officials that the PA103 episode could be ended. Had al-Megrahi’s appeal been successful, Libya had hoped to have US unilateral sanctions removed and a new relationship built with the US and Britain. This is now unlikely to happen.

Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi had forcefully rejected suggestions during recent months that he would accept US demands for the payment of compensation to the families of the victims of the December 1988 bombing, knowing that such a payment would indicate an acceptance of responsibility. With the legal process now closed, and with al-Megrahi returned from the special Scottish court in the Netherlands to a prison cell in Scotland, there is now not even the pretense of hope for Col. Qadhafi to rehabilitate Libya’s position. This is all the more important in light of Col. Qadhafi’s poor health: he is not expected, because of his cancer, to live more than 18 months to two years.

It should now be expected that Libya will return to a more radical path vis-à-vis the US and UK, although with some caution. It is now becoming clear that the US Government is preparing to target Libya once again for the country’s involvement in terrorist matters and weapons of mass destruction (WDM), as noted earlier by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reports. Col. Qadhafi’s eldest son, Saif al-Islam, is expected, however, to continue working with radicals to build his power base in Libya to ensure that he has enough firepower to succeed his father. At present, Saif al-Islam is aware that he cannot rely on the Libyan Armed Forces, nor even the old guard of advisors around his father. Saif al-Islam, and his brothers and sister, have completely alienated virtually all of the old retainers around Col. Qadhafi. The Colonel has also expressed to numerous friends in recent months that he has been completely disappointed by his family, although he has little option but to support Saif al-Islam’s bid for succession. This, however, is almost certain to be challenged by others in the hierarchy after Col. Qadhafi’s death.

Meanwhile, it was now expected that Abdelbaset al-Megrahi will have few options to overturn or commute his 20-year sentence in Scotland, other than by cooperating with British authorities in divulging details of Libyan involvement in both the PA 103 affair and other terrorist activities. While his testimony at this stage would be dated, it could provide the political trigger to allow the US to target Col. Qadhafi’s Government. It is known from UK sources that al-Megrahi had suffered badly at the hands of other prisoners whilst in detention in Scotland during his appeal. He was thought ready to cooperate with UK intelligence authorities at that time but for the prospect that the Scottish court in the Netherlands — specially established at Camp Zeist, Holland, for his trial — might acquit him for the murder. Indeed, for a time, it seemed that this was very much an option which was possible.

The Libyan Government on March 14, 2002, condemned the rejection of his appeal as a “political verdict” handed down under pressure from Washington and London. The Libyan Government said that it was “absolutely convinced” of the innocence of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. Indeed, there are many in the US and British intelligence community who are also of the belief that the PA103 bombing was in fact the work of Iran and Syria, with Libya playing a secondary and supporting rôle, and that the bombing was in fact inspired by Iran in response to the US downing of an innocent Iran Air Airbus airliner, which was shot down by the USS Vincennes. [On July 3, 1988, the Tidconderoga-class Aegis-cruiser Vincennes shot down an Iranian Airbus passenger aircraft with 290 aboard, allegedly mistaking it for an Iranian F-14A Tomcat fighter. It was clear, however, that the US action was the fault of extremely poor framing of rules of engagement for US warships operating at that time in the Persian Gulf, and by hasty action on the part of the warship’s commander. Not surprisingly, however, the Iranian reaction to the event was at the core of much of the angst for later targeted Iranian terrorist activity against the US, possibly including support for the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, and later terrorist actions.]

Meanwhile, the President of the Libyan bar association, Hafid Jhoja, said the court which upheld the life sentence against Megrahi had been swayed by political influence. “The trial was a political matter, not a legal matter. There was no clear evidence, as the whole world knows. All the Libyan people, all the Arab people, are upset by this judgment,” he said. In London, British Home Secretary Jack Straw said he hoped the decision would bring “solace and comfort” to the families of the victims, and urged Col. Qadhafi to “fulfill his obligations”.

It is now expected, however, that Col. Qadhafi would return to his attention to other matters as a means of creating his legacy, realizing that now there was little hope in his lifetime of seeing the West accept him. 

March 11, 2002

Libya Continues to Escalate Anti-US, Anti-Israeli Stance Following Breakdown of Talks

From GIS Station Tripoli and other sources. Despite the ongoing illness of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and the battle for succession by his eldest son, Saif al-Islam and other contenders, Libya has resumed its antagonism toward the US and Israel. It is now clear that Col. Qadhafi sees no value in waiting for the results of the Scottish court appeal by the convicted Libyan intelligence officer in the bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 in 1989, nor in the prospects of relief from US sanctions from the flurry of talks which began with the US State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in October 2001.

The Libyan National Popular Committee announced on March 9, 2002, announced a range of measures, including the donation of $50-million, to support the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. The committee, which is the Libyan Cabinet and which does not act independently of Col. Qadhafi, denounced Israel's "unprecedented ... massacres" of Palestinians and committed resources to help the Palestinian cause, offering to pay the medical expenses of injured Palestinians and send medical equipment, food, clothes and blankets to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

As well, Libyan officials noted the reports in The Los Angeles Times on February 10, 2002, that the US Bush Administration had ordered the US military to prepare contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, including Libya. Citing a classified US Defense Department report the newspaper also reported that the military was also directed to build smaller nuclear weapons for use in certain battlefield situations. The countries named in the secret report — provided to Congress on January 8, 2002 — were the People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iraq, North Korea (DPRK), Iran, Libya and Syria. Significantly, the PRC and Russia were included in the new targeting planning because they had possession of major stockpiles of ICBMs and nuclear weapons, rather than because of any belief of any imminent intent to use them against the US. The other five states, however, were now clearly the focus of US pressure.

Libya was also sensitive over the fact that the breakdown in its talks with the State Department and CIA have been matched by a gradual increase in US coolness toward Libya in the public arena. On March 10, 2002, the Libyan Foreign Ministry dismissed as ridiculous a United States report which said Libya had a poor human rights record. A statement by the Foreign Ministry said the US State Department report was full of lies. According to the US report, Libyan authorities used summary justice to suppress local opposition, torture prisoners and arrest people arbitrarily. The Libyan statement said there was complete freedom in Libya, and accused the US of using human rights as an issue to put pressure on other countries.

At the same time, Libya has made it clear that it would not support any move within the Arab League to propose a peace accord with Israel on the basis of Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah's revival of a 30-year-old proposal to recognize Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 war borders. Arab leaders will decide on whether to adopt a Saudi peace offer to Israel when they meet in Lebanon later in March 2002. Arab foreign ministers in closed-door talks on March 9, 2002, discussed the Saudi proposals to offer Israel peace and recognition in return for withdrawal from Arab lands it captured in the 1967 war. But Libyan African Affairs Minister Ali al-Traiki said that nothing would come from the Arab League talks unless its members challenge Israel like the "Palestinian people ... have done".

African leaders at a summit in Libya on March 7, 2002, had condemned Israel's "state terrorism" and pledged their support for Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat. The community of Sahel-Saharan states (COMESSA) in a final statement, said COMESSA "firmly condemns Israel's state terrorism and calls on the international community to take immediate measures to exert pressure on Israel and lift the blockade imposed on President Arafat".

March 5, 2002

US Pressure Expected on Egyptian Pres. Mubarak Over Libya, WMD

Analysis. By GIS Station, Washington DC. Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak on March 4, 2002, met with a polite but cool reception when he began meetings with US Administration officials in Washington DC during his working visit to the US. He was expected to face a cool reception on a number of issues when he meets with US Pres. George W. Bush in Washington DC on March 5, 2002. Despite careful Egyptian planning — including pre-visit interviews with The Washington Times, CNN and other US media before Pres. Mubarak's departure for the US — the White House said virtually nothing in advance of the visit.

The coolness from the US side is over the perception that Egypt is actively engaged in programs with the DPRK (North Korea) and Libya on developing weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological weapons) and strategic ballistic missiles. The US is also aware that Egypt had been a major source of weapons and ordnance for the Palestinian intifada, despite Pres. Mubarak's inference in his interview in The Washington Times that Egypt had itself attempted to curb this arms flow.

The Bush Administration will not, however, do anything which would signify any break in cordial bilateral relations. On the other hand, certain new weapons requests seem likely to be put on hold, such as the request for Harpoon II anti-shipping missiles.

On March 4, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell called Pres. Mubarak's proposal to host a summit between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Authority Pres. Yasir Arafat an "interesting idea". Sec. Powell, however, said a decision on a summit was ultimately up to Sharon and Arafat.

Sec. Powell, the most optimistic of the US strategic policy team, said that the Bush Administration was redoubling its efforts to halt Arab-Israeli violence, and that a peace proposal by Crown Prince Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud of Saudi Arabia was a positive development. Pres. Mubarak, however, has dismissed the Abdallah proposal as merely being a re-presentation of an idea floated decades earlier in the Arab League, and rejected by all parties as unworkable. The Abdallah proposal calls for a return by Israel to its pre-1967 borders, something which Israel cannot, strategically, afford to consider.

In any event, there are two principal factors weighing on this: firstly, the fact that, even apart from Pres. Mubarak's rejection of the Abdallah concept as being unworkable, Libya and the Iranian/Syrian-sponsored HizbAllah terrorist organization have unequivocally rejected the proposal; and secondly, the fact that Crown Prince Abdallah did not revive the proposal because he thought it would be accepted, but rather to revive US-Saudi relations and to force Israel to reject the idea. Significantly, the proposal did help rekindle some warmth between the US and Saudi Arabia — even though both sides saw the concept as unworkable — because it showed Saudi Arabia to be "working toward peace". But Israel also did not reject the proposal out of hand, instead Israeli Pres. Moshe Katsav said that he was willing to travel to Saudi Arabia to discuss a new peace plan put forward by Crown Prince Abdallah. Alternatively, Pres. Katsav' said that the Crown Prince could come to Jerusalem for talks with the Israeli Government.

The net result is that US-Saudi relations have begun to improve, the Saudi "peace proposal" is going nowhere, and the US has begun to escalate its pressure on Pres. Mubarak.

Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi , on March 2, 2002, meanwhile rejected the Saudi peace plan and threatened to withdraw from the Arab League over its apparent lack of support for his own peace initiative. "Saudi Arabia's proposals would change nothing because a recognition of Israel would bring nothing, but put Arabs at the mercy of Israelis," Qadhafi told a meeting of the General Peoples Congress in the Libyan city of Sirte. An Arab diplomat said that Col. Qadhafi's unexpected move showed that he was angered by some Arab countries' support for the Saudi plan while they ignored Libya's proposals initiated a year earlier. In the same speech on March 2, 2002, Col. Qadhafi urged the Palestinians and Israelis to form a new state called Sartine to end bloodshed in the Middle East. He also offered to give Libya's seat in the Arab League to Sartine if the proposed state was formed. 

He also, the same day at a rally in Sirte to mark the 25th anniversary of the creation of the Jamahiriya, called on Libya's Parliament — which has no authority — to examine Libya's pullout from the 22-member Arab League for its failure to fully support the Palestinians. "I ask the General People's Congress to examine Libya's pullout from the Arab League which has become a masquerade," over its failure to support the Palestinians. 

On March 1, 2002, HizbAllah rejected Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah's offer to trade full normalization of Arab relations with Israel for a total Israeli withdrawal from Arab land conquered in the 1967 Middle East war. HizbAllah's rejection statement was released in Beirut amid reports that Lebanon and Syria have taken cautious stand on the Saudi overture, hoping it would not be tabled before the upcoming Arab summit in Beirut for endorsement as a collective initiative.

The HizbAllah statement said: "The recovery of occupied Arab land can be attained without paying such a heavy price as normalization. The impact the Palestinian intifada is making on the Israeli society makes us certain of glorious victory."

The statement called for "caution and patience" plus redoubled support and assistance to the Palestinians and said the Palestinians were capable to repeat in Palestine what HizbAllah did to Israel in south Lebanon.

Mirroring the official stance of caution taken by Lebanon and Syria, Lebanon President Emil Lahoud said that any initiative to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict should clearly safeguard the right of diaspora Palestinians, including those in Lebanon, to return to their land.

The fact that Saudi Arabia's "peace initiative" was aimed primarily at Washington, rather than at the Israelis, was made clear by the significant upsurge in Saudi "public diplomacy" during late February 2002. In this, the rôle of Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, was lower key than in the past, with other Saudis making the running. Two Saudi officials — Prince Turki Al Faisal, the former head of Saudi Intelligence, and Adel Al Jabir, the Saudi foreign policy adviser — spoke effectively on many US television programs, in flawless English explaining Saudi policy in general and US-Saudi ties, in particular. 

As well, there were a number of other Saudis who visited the US to present Riyadh's viewpoint. This is basically the first time that Saudi Arabia has engaged in such a broadly-based diplomatic effort. In the past it has relied heavily on the activities of its officials in meetings with US officials. Among the Saudis engaged in conferences and media activities in the US during February 2002 were Abdullah A.Y.Z. Alireza, Dr Abdulmohsin Alakkas, Lawyer Ziyad Al Sudairi; Dr Nourah Al Yousef, and Dr Haifa Gamalallay.

The Gulf Times, in Manama, Bahrain, said in an editorial: 

"One wonders why Saudi Arabia has been timid or reluctant in fielding these able, articulate and poised speakers to shield the kingdom or the faith it protects from the stabs of the American media slaughterhouse. There was an urgent need for an adequate and convincing Saudi response after it became apparent that the majority of the suicide bombers responsible for the horrendous events of last September here were youthful Saudis, casting an untoward image about their country and Islam."

"Doubtless, Saudi Arabia has been jolted by the understandable outcry here and consequently it has — five months later — engaged a top public relations firm to handle the bad press. But more importantly, it will be sending many delegations to tour the United States to engage various audiences about the all-important relationship between the two countries. But the smarter move has been the apparent decision to allow more American journalists into Saudi Arabia and, judging by the early reports, the returns have been satisfactory except for the pro-Israeli pundits in the media and think-tanks."

The Gulf Times believed that Crown Prince Abdallah's proposal had "pulled the rug from under the feet of Israeli hawks like Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his unwavering supporters", but this has not proven to be the case. The Abdallah proposal, while recognized as a gesture, only invited an Israeli response calling for substantive talks, and it was recognized as being an old, and demonstrably unworkable offer which had not even been dressed in new clothing. Indeed, the Israelis appear to have moved past the point where recognition from Saudi Arabia is a major goal.

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres had publicly welcomed the plan as "new, interesting and fascinating", but Israeli Cabinet Secretary Gideon Saar ruled out reverting to Israel's old borders. "It must be said that we're speaking of a positive trend," Mr Saar said, but "this does not mean that we agree to the demand for a return to the 1967 borders; it's clear that we won't agree to this."

The United States has also said that Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat must move first to make peace with Israel.

In Saudi Arabia, strong anti-Israeli sentiments were voiced during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and the Saudi Arabian Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, in a sermon accused Israel of killing unarmed Palestinians.

February 19, 2002

Libya's Succession Preparations Continue as Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi Adds al-Qaida and Radicals to His Militia

Exclusive. From GIS Stations Tripoli and Benghazi, and other sources. Highly-reliable senior Libyan sources have indicated that the eldest son of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has begun strengthening his own personal security forces to prepare for his succession to the national leadership. The sources indicated that most of the 44 al-Qaida terrorist/guerilla fighters Libya airlifted from Pakistan to Libya on around February 15, 2002, were destined to be merged with the militia of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the Libyan leader's eldest son and heir apparent. The al-Qaida members had been captured and detained by regional leaders in Afghanistan, before being moved to Pakistan. Saif al-Islam negotiated their release to Libya; most were Libyan nationals, although at least one was a Jordanian national whom Saif al-Islam indicated would be repatriated to his homeland.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 15, 2002: Libya Wins State Department Approval to Deal With US Oil Leases, and Then Takes in al-Qaida Captives.]

As well, some 1,200 or more radical Islamist fighters, who had been imprisoned by the Qadhafi Administration, were in recent months released to the care of Saif al-Islam, and it is understood that they had also been largely incorporated into Saif al-Islam's militia.

Based on what was known of Saif al-Islam's militia before this point, it is now believed that his unit could be at a force level of around 2,500. It is not yet known what the extent is of the unit's equipment. 

Saif al-Islam's militia was first brought to light in the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report on January 7, 2002:

"Saif al-Islam maintains the most important militia unit, of around 1,000 men, and this unit, perhaps more than most, acts as the key mobile armed force designed to provide security for the administration, particularly against a possible military coup. What is significant about Saif al-Islam’s militia is that it is aggressively Wahabbist in style; that is, it is radical and bonded by an approach which, for example, favors the kind of activities undertaken by the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. This particularly sets it at odds with the overall Libyan community."

One younger brother of Saif al-Islam, Sa'adi al-Qadhafi, 28, also maintains his own militia, believed to number around 1,000 men. A third brother, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, had also, until the beginning of 2002, maintained another militia unit, but this was forcibly disbanded after a strong disagreement between Col. Qadhafi and Dr Moatasam, who now lives in exile in Egypt.

Both Saif al-Islam and Sa'adi have been increasing their profile in recent weeks and months. There is, at this stage, no known rivalry between the two, so it is assumed at Sa'adi al-Qadhafi is supporting the claim of Saif al-Islam to the leadership.

The who leadership question is now very much on the table: Col. Qadhafi's illness — advanced cancer in the throat area and leukemia — is such that he is not expected by his doctors to live for more than 18 months to two years. He is already working less and less each day. However, Qadhafi has expressed to a significant number of people who have met him recently that he was extremely disappointed in the way his family had turned out, implying that he may not necessarily support Saif al-Islam's quest for the succession. All of Qadhafi's children were known to have been at odds with the coterie of officials who have been around the Colonel for decades. [See earlier reports by this Service.]

What was emerging, however, was the fact that Libya was not moving further away from the sponsorship or harboring of terrorists, as Qadhafi had attempted to indicate to US and other Western officials dealing with him. And nor was Libya moving away from the development of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and ballistic missile delivery systems. GIS reports had noted the extensive redeployment of CBW research and operational facilities.

At the same time, the Qadhafi Administration was strenuously engaged in suppressing radical Islamist and other opposition forces. On February 18, 2002, the Libyan Islamic Group (LIG) said that two leaders of the banned Libyan Muslim Brotherhood had been sentenced to death and dozens of others to heavy jail terms. LIG said that the death sentences had been handed down on February 17, 2002, to Abdallah Ezzedin and Salem Abu Hanak, two academics teaching in Tripoli and Benghazi. Human Rights Solidarity (HRS), a group based in Geneva, confirmed the death sentences and added that "dozens of life terms" had also been handed down. HRS said that those convicted were arrested in 1998 for belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. 

February 15, 2002

Libya Wins State Department Approval to Deal With US Oil Leases, and Then Takes in al-Qaida Captives

Analysis. From GIS stations in Rome, Tripoli and elsewhere. Libya has continued its relationship with al-Qaida, the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization, by giving safe-haven to some of the group's fighters in Libya, despite a move by the US State Department to relax rules permitting some US oil companies to deal with the Libyan Administration. The US State Department had, on January 22, 2002, given four US oil companies permission to negotiate oilfield contracts with Libya. 

The Libyan Government sent an aircraft to Pakistan to repatriate 44 Arab al-Qaida fighters who had been detained in Afghanistan, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the son of Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, said on February 13, 2002. Saif al-Islam, who heads the Qadhafi Foundation, said that the aircraft had left on February 12, 2002, for Pakistan to repatriate "44 Afghan Arabs, mainly Libyans".  "For humanitarian reasons, the foundation has negotiated their repatriation and paid sums of money to the Afghan groups which were holding them," Saif al-Islam said. He said that Libya had not informed the US of the move, but did not know whether the Pakistani Government had done so. Saif al-Islam refused to say how much had been paid to the Afghan groups to release the captives.

The US State Department had given four companies permission to renegotiate oilfield contracts with Libya that have been frozen since the mid-1980s. Libya in 2001 warned Marathon Oil, Amerada, Conoco and Occidental — the "Oasis" group — that they could be stripped of their Libyan operating licenses unless they returned to the country. "The State Department has reaffirmed the past authority of the Oasis partners to discuss the terms under which we could return to Libyan properties," said a spokesman for Marathon Oil. The companies would not be able to return to Libya until the US dropped the sanctions, the Marathon spokesman added. Nonetheless, the move by the State Department was seen as a move which was supportive of Libya's objectives — the Qadhafi Administration had, in any event, been threatening the US oil companies for some two years — and one which moved around the strong pressures in the US Congress and much of the US Administration leadership to reject any compromise with Qadhafi. Indeed, the move came only a week before US Pres. George W. Bush specifically spoke of his opposition to countries which were developing weapons of mass destruction and harboring terrorists: a description which fitted Libya more closely than almost any other country.

Saif al-Islam, who spearheaded the latest move to retrieve the al-Qaida members, has been increasingly thrust into the limelight in Libya, and as a Libyan representative abroad, in a move to strengthen his credentials to assume the leadership after his father, Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, left office. This has taken on an increasingly active and urgent nature, given the advice from doctors who operated in late 2001 on Qadhafi that he may not live more than 18 months to two years, due to the advanced nature of his cancer. He was operated on around the neck and throat area by Egyptian and Lebanese doctors. Col. Qadhafi is also known to have had leukemia since the 1970s.

Despite Saif al-Islam's activities, neither he nor any of the other Qadhafi children were believed to have a sufficiently-developed power base to succeed their father. 

However, another son of Col. Qadhafi also attempted to move out of the shadows on February 13, 2002, when, in Italy, he slipped into a Juventus football club tracksuit and joined the squad for a workout. Al-Sa'adi al-Qadhafi, 28, was having lunch with Juventus chief executive Antonio Giraudo when he asked if he could join in a team practice. In January 2002, the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company, the financial arm of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's Administration, announced that it had acquired a 5.3 percent stake, worth $20.5-million, in the Turin-based club, making it the No. 2 shareholder. Sa'adi al-Qadhafi maintains his own militia, believed to number no more than 1,000 men, which operates independently of the Armed Forces, and in support of his father. Sa'adi also met in Italy with Fiat chairman Gianni Agnelli.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, on February 4, 2002, in a report entitled Major Changes Continue to Move Libya Into the Forefront of Strategic Focus, noted:

"[W]hat is ... significant is that the paucity of US intelligence assets within the Libyan power structure has led the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to rely on the Italian SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare) in Rome to feed material about Libya via the CIA's Rome Station. This has led to the provision of material known to be highly colored to support the Italian Government's position, and has included attempts to discredit, or undermine, the most significant contender to replace Qadhafi, Prince Idris al-Senussi, the leader of the Sanusi movement or sect of Islam which dominates in Libya. Prince Idris, who has considerable support within the US Congress and the Bush Administration, is thus seen as an obstacle to Libyan and French ambitions to dominate post-Qadhafi Libya, and as a result SISMI has been used to attempt to influence the US State Department and the CIA against him."

Meanwhile, the Pakistan Government had on February 14, 2002, rejected as "totally baseless" claims that alleged al-Qaida terrorists fleeing Afghanistan had found sanctuary in Pakistan. "It is totally unthinkable," Foreign Ministry spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan said commenting on the claims made by Afghan Interior Minister Yunous Qanooni and the Iranian media. "We hope that such statements will gradually disappear," he said. However, it was clear at least some al-Qaida members were moving through Pakistan — perhaps under detention from Afghanistan — in order to be collected by the Libyan transport aircraft.

[The New York Times also said on February 14, 2002, that a young Palestinian who was claimed to personally know most of al-Qaida's recruits had become the terrorist group's new operations chief and was believed to be planning new attacks against the United States. Abu Zubaydah, was, the report said, trying to activate al-Qaida sleeper cells for new strikes against the United States and its allies.]

US State Dept. sources indicated that there was some hope that US-Libyan tensions would, in any event, subside following the issuance of a verdict in the appeal of the Libyan intelligence agent convicted for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, which could happen in March 2002, or shortly after. Presiding Judge William Cullen said the court would give seven days' notice to the parties involved in the appeal by Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, the families of those who died in the bombing of a US jetliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the press. This would not happen "before the beginning of March," he said on February 14, 2002. Megrahi's defense argued that his original conviction in January 2001 over the Lockerbie bombing which killed 270 people was a miscarriage of justice. The Scottish court of five judges on February 14, 2002, heard new evidence from defense witnesses about possible security breaches at London's Heathrow airport the night before PA103 took off on its final flight.

The defense sought to show that the suitcase containing the bomb that brought down the plane could have been smuggled into the Pan Am baggage handling area and loaded on to the Boeing 747 after a padlock securing the area at night was broken. The prosecution asserts that the suitcase was sent as unaccompanied luggage from Malta to London via Frankfurt before being put on the jet which exploded in a fireball over Lockerbie, killing all 259 people on board and 11 on the ground. Senior defense counsel William Taylor told the court it was "a matter of great regret" that the evidence about security was not available earlier. "My position is that this case represents a miscarriage of justice," he added, describing the new testimony as "important and reliable". Megrahi was sentenced to life imprisonment for planting the bomb but a second defendant, fellow Libyan Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, was acquitted.

An acquittal for Megrahi would, some State Department officials believe, lead to the lifting of the unilateral US sanctions against Libya. Other US Administration officials believed, however, that new evidence of ongoing Libyan support for terrorism, and continued development of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, would, whether the sanctions were lifted or not, set the US on a collision course with Libya. 

Meanwhile, in other developments, the governments of Ukraine and Libya were to sign an agreement shortly on cooperation in the aircraft industry. The Ukrainian Government on February 13, 2002, authorized Minister of Industrial Policy Gureyev to sign the accord which  created a legal framework for cooperation between the two countries in the field of selling, repairing and joint production of civilian aircraft and training personnel. Libya has bought two An-124-100 transport aircraft from Ukraine and wants to buy new An-140 and An-74TK-300 transports.

In African issues, Libyan forces in the Central African Republic's capital were facing growing opposition from local residents who have said that they want the foreign troops to leave Bangui because the Libyans did not serve their interests. The troops were first deployed in Bangui to defend President Felix Patasse, following a failed coup attempt in May 2001. Libyan officials said that until a peacekeeping mission was deployed in the Central African Republic its troops would remain. "We want to improve the security in the country," says a Libyan embassy official in Bangui. "If we leave, there would be a coup tonight."

February 4, 2002

Major Changes Continue to Move Libya Into the Forefront of Strategic Focus

Exclusive. From GIS Stations in Tripoli, Rome and elsewhere. A number of highly-reliable, highly-placed sources have advised GIS that there is now considerable momentum being generated because of the probability of a change in the Libyan leadership within two years, largely due to the ill-health of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi. Much of this activity has, or could have, significant strategic ramifications. Some of the key issues include:

1. Key officials surrounding Col. Qadhafi are now attempting to take steps to preserve their positions;

2. At least six initiatives were known to be underway to put a successor in place after Qadhafi, including several initiatives which involve his eldest son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi; some of these initiatives are being sponsored by foreign governments and/or foreign energy companies;

3. A major rift has occurred between Col. Qadhafi and his longtime head of strategic intelligence, Abdullah Senussi, the result of problems with Qadhafi's children and fueled by rivalries which other officials, such as intelligence chief Moussa Koussa (head of the Libyan External Security Organization; ESO), have had for the past two decades with Abdullah Senussi. 

4. A de facto collapse in meaningful negotiations between the US and Libya, despite hints, rumors and leaks from both the US State Department and sources paid-for or close to the Libyan Government that a "settlement" was likely soon between the US and Libya which would see the US lift its unilateral embargo of Libya.

5. The de facto and discreet withdrawal of support for Qadhafi by the Government of Saudi Arabia.

Along with these current factors, sources have reported that Libyan intelligence had recruited a paid agent within the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in around 1980. There was no indication as to whether the alleged agent was still active, or at what level he operated. However, the sources said that the claim of recruitment was made privately at the time by Abdullah Senussi, who for some time had been head of the Jamahiriyya Security Organization (JSO), the over-arching intelligence/security agency in the country which later became the ESO. Abdullah Senussi is a brother-in-law of Col. Qadhafi, having married the Colonel's wife's sister, and he has been unwaveringly loyal to the leader at all times, revering the Colonel as a father figure. [Abdullah Senussi was convicted in absentia by a French court in 1999 for his involvement in the terrorist bombing of UTA DC-10 over Chad in September 1989.]

It is understood that the rift with Col. Qadhafi — which was evident through much of January 2002 — occurred because Abdullah Senussi attempted to intervene with the leader over the inappropriate behavior of the Qadhafi children, all of whom have expressed dislike for Abdullah. Moreover, other officials, such as Moussa Koussa, have long had a rivalry with Abdullah Senussi, envious of his closeness with Qadhafi. 

Meanwhile, US State Department and US intelligence officials, who had been conducting discussions with Libyan officials (Moussa Koussa and others) since early October 2001, have reportedly been anxious to promote the concept that a deal with Qadhafi was feasible, including payment of compensation to the families of victims killed in the 1988 Pan Am PA103 bombing. However, the Bush Administration rejects the notion that any payment from Qadhafi had been agreed, and Col. Qadhafi himself in late January 2002 was understood to have firmly rejected the notion that he would pay compensation which would also connote acceptance of responsibility for the bombing. The leaks therefore appear more likely to have been a stalling mechanism on behalf of some within the US State Department, and possibly the CIA, to forestall a harder line (and confrontation) by the US Bush Administration with Qadhafi.

Even senior State Department officials, however, concede that success depends on Tripoli accepting responsibility for the 1988 bombing of PA103 and compensating the victims' families. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East William Burns said on January 30, 2002: "There are no shortcuts. If the Libyans meet their obligations, the door will start to open for a variety of international interactions with Libya."

However, the State of the Union speech by US President George W. Bush on January 29, 2002, clearly spelled an end to (or at least a limitation of) the "appeasement approach" by those State Department and CIA personnel who favored settling with Qadhafi. While considerable attention was given to Pres. Bush's remarks about the "axis of terror" (DPRK, Iran and Iraq), little attention focused on the fact that the US remained committed to the eradication of governments which continued to undertake the development of chemical, biological and nuclear "weapons of mass destruction". As GIS highlighted in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on November 8, 2001, Libya has persisted with its development of chemical and biological weapons, and continues to maintain a substantial force of deployed strategic ballistic missiles (No Dong-1s). [That report identified the new locations of stockpiles of weapons and materiel, as well as laboratories for the Libyan chemical and biological weapons programs.]

One key Libyan scientist involved in the chemical and biological weapons programs told a GIS source directly on January 22, 2002: "As of today, all the chemical and biological weapons and the laboratories remain in place." 

 The Bush State of the Union speech, therefore, gave the tacit go-ahead for a resumption of US pressure against Col. Qadhafi, and provided the rationale for maintaining the US sanctions in place.

In the meantime, however, Qadhafi's health problems — first alluded to by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily in 2001 — which have become significantly worse since October-November 2001, have given a sense of urgency to considerations of the "post-Qadhafi era". In this regard, however, the US has been less-well prepared than some others. The Italian Government, along with some key Italian companies (such as the oil companies ENI and Medoil, plus Fiat) have been pushed by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to prepare their own agenda to control the Libyan political situation post-Qadhafi. The Italian initiatives include support for former Libyan deputy leader, Major ‘Abd al-Salam Jallud, and Qadhafi's oldest son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. 

But what is perhaps more significant is that the paucity of US intelligence assets within the Libyan power structure has led the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to rely on the Italian SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare) in Rome to feed material about Libya via the CIA's Rome Station. This has led to the provision of material known to be highly colored to support the Italian Government's position, and has included attempts to discredit, or undermine, the most significant contender to replace Qadhafi, Prince Idris al-Senussi, the leader of the Sanusi movement or sect of Islam which dominates in Libya. Prince Idris, who has considerable support within the US Congress and the Bush Administration, is thus seen as an obstacle to Libyan and French ambitions to dominate post-Qadhafi Libya, and as a result SISMI has been used to attempt to influence the US State Department and the CIA against him.

However, the situation now is that Libya is currently producing some 1.4-million barrels of oil per day (bpd), whereas production was at 2.5-million bpd at the time Qadhafi and his colleagues overthrew King Idris I in September 1969. The cost to modernize Libyan oil and gas production to reach the 2.5-million bpd level again is estimated at some $70-billion in infrastructural costs, something which could not be achieved by Italian and French investors. 

Given the strategic necessity for the West to significantly boost Libya's output and prosperity to replace or balance Arabian Peninsula supplies, only a level of national infrastructural development which could be afforded by the US energy industry would suffice. Significantly, much of the US support for Prince Idris as the leader of an interim Government to replace Qadhafi centers around his decades of experience, during his exile, in the international energy industry.

Saudi Arabia's apparent change of opinion about both Col. Qadhafi and Prince Idris are also not without foundation. Saudi leaders are conscious of the fact that it would be politically desirable for them if US forces currently stationed in Saudi Arabia could be gradually and discreetly removed, without bringing about a US-Saudi confrontation. Bringing Prince Idris to power in Libya would result in Libya offering, once again, the use of Wheelus Air Force Base to the US, giving the US a strategic base in the region outside of Saudi Arabia. Thus, the US would have Wheelus to cover North Africa, and would retain its basing in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, and access to facilities in Qatar and Oman. 

The discreet Saudi moves toward supporting (or at least accepting) Prince Idris mark a ceasefire in the major schism which has plagued Sunni Islam: the breach between the Saudi Wahabbists and the Sanusiyyah movement. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 1, 2002: The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam: Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture.]

Despite this profound and strategically pivotal change which is occurring in and around Libya, US intelligence sources and the US State Department have failed to focus on understanding the Libyan situation. Policy-level decisions by the US Bush Administration, however, provide an indication that the "war on terrorism" could move, after Somalia, toward focus on Libya. Certainly, the US does not have the military intention to directly challenge the stated "axis of evil" states: North Korea, Iran and Iraq. However, while the Iranian public is given the support it has sought to move against the clerics, and while pressures are increased against the DPRK, some kind of escalated political and military pressure could well be expected against Libya.

Meanwhile, on January 31, 2002, Italian oil and gas giant ENI said that together with National Oil Corp. of Libya, it had awarded a EUR 1.2-billion contract to three engineering companies for the planning and construction of hydrocarbon treatment plants on the Libyan coast. Total investment is estimated at $4.6-billion, and would guarantee the production of about 98,000 barrels a day of liquid hydrocarbons and 10-billion cubic meters of gas each year, ENI said. Of that total, 2-billion cubic meters would be sold on the Libyan market, with the remaining 8-billion exported to Italy through a dedicated $1-billion transmission system. The system consists of a 32-inch 540 kilometer pipeline connecting the city of Mellitah on the Libyan coast to the Sicilian coast near the city of Gela, and a compression station of 170 megawatts. 

February 1, 2002

The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam
Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture

Analysis. By Alia El Senussi. [see below]. The Sanusiyya and the Wahhabi movements of Islam developed along revivalist/reformist and even Puritanical lines. They grew out of a medieval ideology, that of Ibn Taymiyya, a man who lived in a time in which the “doors of interpretation” were closed. He believed in a traditional view, taqlid, and followed the Sunna and Koran strictly. He vehemently attacked Sufism, and in this, the aforementioned would show their differences. While both movements borrowed much from Taymiyya neither followed him exactly, with the Wahhabi using much of Hanbal’s doctrine and the Sanusi applying Sufi influences to their school. In the end, both religious movements were politicized to form modern Islam-legitimated monarchies. In this paper, I will discuss this development and attempt to explain the reasons and foundations of such movement.

The Sanusiyya movement of what came to be called Libya was the vision of one man: Sayyid Mohamed ibn Ali al-Sanusi, al-Sanusi al-Kabir. His position as a sharif, or descendant of the Prophet Mohamed, lent him standing as a dignitary in his region so to speak. Also, he was an extremely pious individual due to the childhood influences of his aunt, Fatima, who herself was a respected teacher of Islam. A connection between Sanusi and Sufism is made in all the books which I used for my research; undoubtedly there exists elements of the mystical tradition in Sanusi’s teaching but some authors emphasized this more than others leading me to believe that such a strong connection was not conclusive. For instance, Knut S. Vikor in his Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge is determined to make Sanusi a Sufi and sustains this thesis by making connections to it at every possible point, be they conclusive or not. He also discards other influences very easily such as those of Ibn Taymiyya and/or the Wahhabi movement. However, Vikor’s works serve to relay important facts of Sanusi’s life history and mode of thought. He illustrates Sanusi’s strengths/interests as neither a political thinker nor leader but primarily as a scholar of the religious crafts. Vikor also succeeds in pointing out the existence of “a certain number of conceptual polarities through which the development of al-Sanusi’s life may be seen”. They are the antagonism of the ideological/intellectual with the political, the theory of center-periphery, and the harmonious relationship of Sufi and scholar in Sanusi’s ideology.

The first will be very important later on when we examine the differences between Sanusi’s aim and that of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab but is also made particularly relevant through the later transformation of the Sanusi brotherhood (ikhwan) into a political and military movement. The issue of center-periphery deals more with Sanusi’s mindset than with his ideology. Sanusi tended to remain more on the outskirts of society; he enjoyed staying in the remote Bedouin areas but at the same time grew up intellectually in Fez, which is a religious center in its own right. Also, his experiences in Mecca, “center of the peripheries” of the Islamic world yet political vortex, are significant in illustrating the dichotomy that exists in his atmospheres. Vikor points out that we must “think in terms of multiple relationships (geographical relations and distinguish between them in terms of the intellectual, political and economic).” The latter I touched upon before, that Vikor is pre-disposed to draw the connection between Sufi and scholar, a combination often seen in today’s world as antagonistic in Islam. Vikor justifies this by saying Sanusi practiced a “scholarly Sufism” or “esoteric Law” and even questions this by asking “or were they divided into two discrete elements-that he brought Sufism closer to the sharia, that is to the world of the exoteric, non-mystical Islamic scholarship.”

    I stated previously that Sanusi grew up intellectually in Fez; this was documented not only in Vikor’s work but also in those of Nicola Ziadeh, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, et. al. Sanusi was in Fez around 1791 during the respective reigns of Sidi Mohamed and his son, Sulayman. While in Fez, Sanusi was exposed to works of the Hanbali school as well as the Maliki school, for Sidi Mohamed had claimed to be “a Maliki in Law and a Hanbali in doctrine”; he was capable of separating the metaphysical from the physical in law. This fusion of the two distinct orders in one scholarly center served to influence Sanusi in that he would be very open to other modes of thought as he himself described, as translated by Ziadeh in her Sanusiyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam:

“During travels which I had occasion to do…I had the opportunity of meeting a considerable number of illustrious men of sound knowledge and noble character, amongst whom there were great orators, imminent imams…some aspired to follow the road which will bring them as near as possible to the King of Kings; others wished simply to [study and] secure for themselves a license…I met them all over the country…During the various travels and through numerous conversations, with a language which the common people could not comprehend, where the essence of knowledge was discussed…all along I have met with honest groups.”

This honest and straightforward statement of Sanusi’s more than illustrates his desire to learn from all schools and all people. He is seemingly an open and tolerant religious scholar, solely seeking knowledge that will bring him to a better understanding of God and Islam.

In conclusion to this background information of the Sanusi I would like to point out that al-Sanusi al-Kabir was a unique scholar in that he was versed in the three branches/areas of Islam: shari’a, theology, and Sufism. He was never interested in politics as was Wahhab, whom I will talk about later. Rather, Sanusi was looking to preach Islam and spread his ideology to all those around him. This is interesting because his successors, beginning with his son, Mahdi, would end up the political rulers of an area three times the size of modern France. How well versed were those rulers that followed Mohamed in Islam? King Idris I was considered by all accounts an extremely pious and devout person who cared to keep to himself and left the day-to-day ruling to Prince Abdallah Abid. However, it was al-Mahdi who politicized the Sanusi, as did the ikhwan. They maintained the Sanusi ideology but were not desirous to achieve the same goals as those of the founder. The legacy that al-Sanusi has left is a country that would not have existed if not for the Sanusi order and a great-granddaughter that is hoping to learn about the impact he made on Islam and his people, both contemporary and future.

Mohamed b. Abd al-Wahhab was eulogized by Nasir al-Kubaybi as a “true renewer of Islam.” Wahhab strove to restore the “original form of Islam”, that of the Prophet and his contemporaries; for him, true Islam was only the Islam of Prophet Muhammad’s generation and because of that the Arabs could be designated as the only legitimate guardians of Islam. Wahhab only saw validity in what is positively stated in the Koran and the Sunna; this is equally true for Wahhab’s forerunner, Ibn Taymiyya, as well as for Sanusi. Wahhab was not a religious scholar in the same sense as was Sanusi for Wahhab’s movement was very quickly politicized while Sanusi’s wasn’t until after his death. However, I do not agree with the Orientalist (as Bassam Tibi describes him) R. Hartmann when he says:

“Wahhabi movement as a religious movement is nothing more than a natural reaction to the adaptation of Islam to complex cultural circumstances, which had clearly also led to a weakening of the core ideas of the religion’s founder and which denoted a process of Westernization- a reaction based on the most conservative of the four Sunni rites, that of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, that is to be understood in terms of the social conditions prevailing in Arabia, which had hardly altered in any substantial way since the time of the Prophet.”

This is an extremely simplistic notion of the Wahhabi movement, something I see as having complex workings and reasons for existence. It was not simply a reaction to the West but a product of the people’s desires of the time and of a reaction versus icon worshipping that was voiced by Wahhab. As Bassam Tibi states in his Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change, there were “systematic tendencies toward a revival of the “original” form of Islam of the Arabs before Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign and the ensuing monumental reforms of Muhammad Ali”; those tendencies were the movement of the Wahhabi that began in the mid-1700s. However, he goes on to condemn Wahhabism as archaic fundamentalism and it is no wonder that he places R. Hartmann prominently in his work because they both have the same mindset that the past was only a place for ‘bad’ thoughts and backwards modes of expression, products merely of Westernization rather than local culture.

Before reading this next sentence one must be aware that the author Tibi is inclined to find elements of Arab nationalism wherever he can and therefore might not always be accurate, rather, he has a pre-planned agenda and sorts his facts accordingly. Tibi goes on to explain: “[P]otentially nationalistic aspirations were directed against Ottoman foreign rule and found politico-religious expression in the Wahhabi movement.” One would never see such an adjective of “politico-religious” to describe the movement of al-Sanusi al-Kabir in its early days. Wahhab wanted to mobilize the Muslims for this “backward-looking utopia.” That Wahhab wanted to “mobilize” Muslims illustrates his militant tendencies. The mobilization that Wahhab desired was set upon the path to achievement through an alliance with the Banu Saud at its inception and reached its goal when Ibn Saud politically revived the Wahhabis in the 20th Century. Vikor, in a short summary of the Wahhabi movement astutely states “the political situation in Najd and the Hijaz area was conducive to the formation of a political alliance between Wahhab and Ibn Saud because each had his own strength,” respectively, religion and war. This entire theory of politics and religion in Wahhabism is further shown by the development of the paramilitary group, ikhwan, who both missionized and militarily settled the Arabian Desert. They elaborated the “Wahhabi religious dogma into an ideology of mobilization, by means of which they pacified rival tribes.” Gary Troeller agrees with this hypothesis in that he characterizes the ikhwan as a religio-military fundamentalist movement aimed at settling the nomadic Bedouin so as to subordinate them to central government authority. Tibi, however, believes that the ikhwan were traditionalists and not fundamentalists.

Tibi goes on to explain that Saudi Arabia is an Islam-legitimated monarchy. This means that the Al-Sauds were able to establish themselves as muluk through a claim that Islam wanted them that position in order to return to the Islam of the Prophet; their ‘stamp of approval’ from the Wahhabi lent them such a legitimacy in the eyes of the people and they were successful in taking control of what is today the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Tibi thinks that an “answer to the crisis of Islam — a return to the Ur-Islam of the Prophet — arose out of the desert from Wahhab calling for struggle versus the foreign domination of the Ottomans.” This statement is simplifying the Wahhabi movement once again. Tibi seeks to place Islam, as a religion in general, in a “crisis” situation while really it was only Wahhabi that saw this and who wanted to return to the Bedouin society of the Prophet.

Tibi places all of the credit (which sounds more like blame in some instances) on Wahhabi and his desire to preach his thinking. Rather, it was an alliance between the Wahhabi and the Al-Sauds that has brought Wahhabism to the masses and an appropriation by the Saudi Government to make Wahhabism their own. Majid Khadduri presents a very harsh description of the Wahhabi movement or “violent religious reform movement” as he calls it in his Origin and Development of Islamic Law. He summarizes that the aim of the Wahhabi was to “enforce Islamic law exclusively, to abolish the double system of administration of justice, and to outlaw customary and administrative law.” Khadduri seems to be judging the Wahhabi according to today’s standard rather than the contemporary social atmosphere. This is a novice mistake to make and as a result the Wahhabi are treated as backward fundamentalists of the late twentieth century, akin to the Taliban of Afghanistan, rather than a reform movement of the 20th Century.

One of the most important questions I will raise in this paper is just how similar are the foundations and the paths taken by the Sanusiyya and the Wahhabis. Both began with Ibn Taymiyya’s philosophy in mind but both diverged from this to develop distinct characteristics. The Sanusi were undoubtedly influenced by Sufism because al-Sanusi al-Kabir’s “most important influence was Moroccan mystic Ahmad Ibn Idris”, a renowned Sufi scholar. The Wahhabi tended to take a more puritanical and zealous view because they were not as exposed or inbred with a Western power as were the Sanusi with the Italians and the French. The Wahhabi were fighting an internal war while the Sanusi were fighting an external one.

Vikor tends to minimize the Wahhabi influence on the Sanusi and goes so far as to prove that the timelines do not concur. However, I see it as impossible that al-Sanusi al-Kabir was not exposed to the Arabian movement while in Mecca or the surrounding areas. Vikor states an “assumption sometimes made that drive to religious form in Morocco from Sultans and scholars in Fez was a result of the influence of the new reformist movement in Arabia — the Wahhabiya — yet the policies formulated by Sidi Mohamed from 1760-1790 cannot be from Wahhabi-time and influence did not allow it.” This is attempting to undermine the influence they had on Sanusi as his “intellectual upbringing” was in Fez. However, Vikor does say that some of Sanusi’s teachers were in contact with Wahhabis but that anti-Sufi Wahhabis were generally disliked. This shows that Vikor believes that only the ‘left-wing’ Wahhabi were influencing Sanusi and, therefore, can’t be classified as influences at all.

I see Vikor as being very assumptive in his dealings with Sufism and Sanusi. He states, “Whether or not Ibn Idris may be called a Neo-Sufi, a reformist or whatever, it is beyond a doubt that he was a Sufi first and foremost. Thus the Wahhabis acceptance of him means that they did not intend to stop Sufis from teaching.” I believe this to be an untrue statement because although the Wahhabi were unopposed to the Sanusi or Ibn Idris they did prove themselves to be very anti-Sufi and were adamant in their violent opposition to its presence on the Arabian Peninsula. E. E. Evans-Pritchard has a brilliant account of this symbiotic relationship as he says that “alone among the Sufi Orders, they [Wahhabi] have tolerated its [Sanusiyya] presence in the Hijaz.”

A study of Ibn Idris by Vikor and co-editors analyzes his doctrine with respect to the following aspects: his relation to Wahhabism and his attitude to Sufism. Ibn Idris saw the former as sound in its puritanical tendencies; however, he rejected the extremism that was inter-woven in the movement. He also accepted the sober Sufi tradition that is generally associated with Ghazzali. The latter is an interesting point because Ghazzali as well is a prominent influence upon Sanusi’s point-of-view. Ibn Idris also approved the pious dimension of Sufism (ie: the soul’s complete orientation on God) something Ibn Taymiyya rejected. This illustrates the different sources and ideologies that became part of one homogenized movement embodied by Sanusi. Ziadeh’s astute and well-researched work delves into this theme by saying Sanusiyya was a “revivalist movement in Islam within Islam alone. It accepted the pattern of Ibn Taymiyya and had it supplemented with teachings of Al-Ghazzali. In it there was no place for Muslim rationalistic schools of thought.” This tells of the Sanusiyya as a traditional and conventional group. Ziadeh also says: “The Sanusiyya grew out of a need, developed as a result of circumstances and became stronger under pressure.” This is an interesting statement, especially when one compares to the Wahhabi.

One could say that the Wahhabi too grew out of a need, but theirs was more calculated by one man. However, the manner in which they developed was not merely circumstance but due to a pre-arranged alliance and their strength grew out of their alliance with a politico-military power. The Wahhabi were a strictly religious group although theirs is a somewhat political history. I will delve into the religious aspect of it now, as it is more dealing with their perception of Islamic law and schools. Quamruddin Khan in his Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyah attributes Taymiya as the forerunner of the Wahhabi in saying “His works are regarded as having been greatly instrumental in the rise of Wahhabism and reformist movements [ie: Sanusiyya] in general in modern Islam.”  These works include a strong belief in the necessity of a united Muslim Ummah for the defense of Islam and the Muslims.  Also, he advocated Arabic as the lingua franca of the Muslim world, an idea we can see in Wahhabi’s ideology as well. Taymiyya also wanted to unite all Muslim nations in their beliefs and general aims, not necessarily their actual states.  This is a resounding idea with Sanusi in that he wanted to form one Muslim school in which all Muslims believed in the same rather than the “same difference”.

One can see the disillusionment of Khan with the direction of the Muslim state in his statement: “One great weakness was that he didn’t realize that religion was exploited and that it served only as a second fiddle to the state.”  This is an illustration of Khan’s understanding of the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance.  This was a relationship in which a religious movement was overtaken by a military power to further their political position rather than the religious intentions of the Wahhabi.  One can say that Taymiyya was the school that the Wahhabi followed at their inception but not that they grew into as a result of their alliance. In Khadduri’s treatise he discusses Taymiyya’s thoughts on the caliphate and the relationship that the caliph has with the sharia.

“Among the most vigorous critics of this doctrine [which amounted in effect to a complete divorce of the imamate from the sharia and the abandonment of the Law in favor of a secular absolutism] was Ibn Taymiyya, who in his effort to cleanse Islam of its accretions of heresy, deviations, and abuses, and to preach a return to the purity of early doctrine and practice, inevitably attacked the web of juristic argument regarding the caliphate. There is no obligation, he argued … upon all Muslims to recognize a single caliphate. The historic caliphate was a temporary institution.”

What the Wahhabi doctrine became as a result of their partnership with the Al-Saud was very much an antithesis of Taymiyya’s desire for such a school. He was advocating a temporary institution rather than a hereditary monarchy that used the religion to legitimate their rôle. However, Taymiyya’s school was not a thriving one and “from the 14th Century onwards seemed on the point of extinction, until the puritanical Wahhabi movement of the 18th Century, and especially the Wahhabi revival at the beginning of the present century, gave it a new lease on life … The Wahhabis have adopted the special doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya on Islamic theology and law.”

Sanusi too read and approved of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas as proven by the long quotes in his works. The overlap between the reformist movements of the eighteenth century and present centuries is a foundation in the ideology of Ibn Taymiyya. Ziadeh discounts theories made by modern scholars who allege that the Sanusi were merely a copy of the Wahhabi. Rather, she states:

“Similarity of purpose rather than direct borrowing is to be discerned in the two movements. In each case the founder of the movement aimed at approval of the teachings of early Islam in his own times. From an historical, and possibly sociological point of view, it may be said that the founder of Wahhabism, as well as the founder of Sanusiyya, ignored the centuries that had elapsed between the advent of Islam and their own days. They seemed to think only in terms of the basic teachings of their faith.”

Ziadeh’s hypothesis astutely draws the two movements together without making them the same or one the “student” of the other. She does this understanding that the prototype for both movements was Ibn Taymiyya and that within his teachings was the pattern set for the revivalists. He was the one that started the puritan movement and provided the view that Muslims distinguished themselves by faith and their religious practices. Their purpose was the fulfillment of the will of God. These were the beliefs that Sanusi and Wahhab drew from to formulate their own ideas on what Islam should be and what needed to happen for it to attain such goals. King Idris I once told Knud Holmboe that “Senussi only aim at piety and nobility of heart”. This is an illustration of the aspirations of the revivalists in that they wished simply to lead lives according to God’s wishes However, as historians and analysts we must separate the desire from the reality and take an overview of what the two fully encompassed and the entire path taken by them.

Evans-Pritchard goes into great detail in alleging that the movements really weren’t similar except for some resemblance in their development from religious to political. However, nowhere does he mention Ibn Taymiyya or his ideology and thus I believe he was simply ignorant as to this philosophical link between the two. He states:

“[T]he grounds of like Puritanism, literalism and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. No great significance in such common characteristics. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their development from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples; the Ikhwan organization of the two have much in common and both ended in the formation of Emirates, or Islamic states.”

These “grounds” can all be substantiated in Taymiyya’s work as they are the similarities that Sanusi and Wahhab both took from Taymiyya, respectively. Both men were considered reformist in that they both felt the need to change the manner in which people were following Islam. They, especially Wahhab, felt that Muslims had been led astray and had fallen to worshipping icons and taken on other characteristics that were sinful according to his interpretation of Islam. Also, like Ibn Taymiyya both men believed in the supremacy of the Koran and the Sunna. This was not a ‘normal’ belief in their times and, therefore, can’t be seen as a coincidence. The trend that both share was an exposure to and a respect for the beliefs of Ibn Taymiyya. This was a respect that was carried over into each man’s ideology and movement.

“Both movements have created states based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have done only what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind.” (Evans-Pritchard) This quote allows me to connect the above discussion of religion with the modern trend of the state. Both the Sanusi and the Wahhabi movements were developed into state-sanctioned doctrine. The Sanusi became the monarchs of Libya although as Ziadeh points out “whatever political aspirations Sanusi had was a later development (beginning under Mahdi” although Sanusi did express the accepted view that Muslims had no business living under non-Muslim powers (an idea first expressed by ash-Shafi’I). The Wahhabi were enveloped into Saudi doctrine. Tibi, due to his pan-Arab tendencies, treats the movements as fundamentalist and regressive by stating “archaic direction taken by Wahhabi contributed to the formation of the Saudi state: in Libya the archaic Sanusiyya movement also led to the foundation of a state.” While he is rather harsh, Tibi highlights the similar paths of the movements. Both share a foundation and an ending although their body is somewhat different.

Ibn Saud once said: “We Muslims have the one, true faith, but Allah gave you [the West] the iron which is inanimate, amoral, neither prohibited nor mentioned in the Koran. We will use your iron but leave our faith alone.” The Sanusi and the Wahhabi both developed along similar lines although the Wahhabi were much more quickly engulfed in a political environment. “Saudis are a young dynasty whose kingdom was established through a union between the political and the sacral.” They did this from the instigation of the movement so it would survive. The reasons for this are the lack of Western presence on the Arabian Peninsula. As the Sanusi did have to contend with the Italians and the French, they were much more able to mobilize their people to fight the outsiders and so were in less need of another military power to aid them. The Wahhabi were more involved in tribal politics so were in need of an ally that could prove themselves militarily, and this is the beginning of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. As I have stated above, both movements borrowed heavily from Ibn Taymiyya, the Wahhabi more so than the Sanusi; such differences are due to the respective founders. The monarchies that resulted both embodied the desires of the founders, this is shown by the extreme piety of King Idris of Libya and the more nationalistic, although deeply religious, scope of the Al-Sauds.

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The Author:

1. Princess Alia El Senussi is a student in Brown University, in Providence, Rhode Island, USA. As the daughter of HRH Prince Idris El Senussi, the leader of the Sanusiyya movement, she has for most of her life been exposed to studies on the origins of the Sanusi movement and other movements within Islam.

January 24, 2002

False Reports of an Impending Libyan Deal to Compensate PA103 Victims Designed to Cool US Pressures on Qadhafi

Exclusive. From GIS resources in Tripoli and Washington DC. Highly-reliable sources within the entourage of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi in Tripoli and senior US Government sources on January 23, 2002, vehemently denied that an accord had been tacitly agreed between Libya and the United States under which Libya would pay US$6-billion in compensation for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

The report was floated, citing an unnamed US senior official, in the newspaper USA Today on January 23, 2002. One source close to Qadhafi said that while discussion about compensation was being raised during ongoing US-Libyan diplomatic meetings, there was no question of Col. Qadhafi agreeing to any such payment, which would be tantamount to admitting guilt in the bombing incident. The newspaper report had said that a settlement would be announced after the appeal hearing by Libyan intelligence officer Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi, who had been convicted of complicity in the incident by a Scottish court. The outcome of the appeal is not expected for some months.

US intelligence sources speculated that the report may have been inspired by Libyan lobbyists in the US, or by political and/or oil circles keen to see momentum removed from current US Congressional and White House momentum which favors increased pressure on Col. Qadhafi. As well, informed US intelligence officials are aware that Libya was only part of the problem with the PA103 bombing: they want Qadhafi to acknowledge the Iranian and Syrian lead rôles in the incident.

In any event, Libyan sources note, Col. Qadhafi is personally unwilling to accept the concept of compensation for the PA103 victims because he believes that Libya is unjustly accused of the bombing. Despite this, a Libyan-appointed lawyer was meeting in January 2002 with victims' representatives in the US to discuss the concept of compensation. The move fuels the group within the US State Department which is attempting to force the White House and the Congress to accept a negotiated settlement of all accounts with Libya, and its removal from the terrorist list. Opponents of this State Department view in the White House and Congress argue that a settlement on PA103 still does not address other Libyan terrorist acts over the years, even though the State Department indicates that none of these, in the past decade, had been directed against US interests.

January 16, 2002

Qadhafi's Problems Persist, Fueling Belief That Compromise Solutions for the Future May be Possible

Exclusive. From GIS Correspondents in Benghazi, Tripoli and elsewhere. Reports from a number of reliable eye-witness reports have confirmed that Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has been increasingly suffering from poor health, although none of the new reports confirm the earlier reports in GIS to the effect that he could be suffering from leukemia. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 7, 2002: Libya at a Watershed as Qadhafi Attempts to Re-Define His Leadership.] As well, the Libyan leader has been increasingly frustrated by the activities of his children, who have now been reported to be quarreling and interfering with the activities of Qadhafi's traditionally most-important allies, including Minister for African Unity Ali Abdel-Salam al-Traiki.

GIS earlier also reported Col. Qadhafi's problems with one of his sons, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, who is in exile in Egypt. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 8, 2002: Reports of New Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi;  Militia of Qadhafi's Renegade Son Disbanded.]

Col. Qadhafi's health problems appear — apart from any suggestion that leukemia may be to blame — to be related to exhaustion. Instead of acting like a man in his early sixties, several sources have said that he seems more like a man in his late seventies. He has also mentioned his dissatisfaction with the behavior of his sons.

The reports fuel speculation that Col. Qadhafi may be closer to agreeing to a compromise solution which would allow him to retire from office with safety and dignity, possibly in the knowledge that none of his sons — even his eldest and nominated heir, Saif al-Islam — cannot expect to assume power fully in their own right. Increasingly, officials and military officers are claiming allegiance to Libya's traditional Muslim sect, the Sanussi, which places the effective leader of the Sanussiyah, Prince Idris al-Senussi, in a key position to work toward a peaceful transition of power from the Qadhafi era. Prince Idris, currently in Washington DC, has been undertaking a wide range of contacts with key US officials, despite the fact that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has — according to Libyan sources — been quietly supporting a military officer as a potential candidate for power.

The Saudi Government, which once had given extensive financial support to the opposition National Salvation Front, but had not done so for some years, especially since most of the Front's military members had been moved to exile in the US. However, in the past few months, the Saudi Government had apparently resumed some financing of the Front. Significantly, the Front has now become avowedly Sanussi in its orientation, and it was understood that the Saudi leadership (ie: those around Crown Prince Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud) had now moved toward support for Prince Idris al-Senussi as the next Libyan leader. 

At the same time, however, Qadhafi has expressed optimism that he is "making a breakthrough" in negotiations with the United States Government, despite the recent extension of the unilateral US embargo against Libya. And while he has claimed that the recent contacts with US officials represent progress, US officials, including the key State Department officer charged with overseeing the contacts, Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, have indicated that no progress was likely to be made on easing relations with Libya until the Libyan Government agreed on compensation for the victims of the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103.

Libya cannot afford, however, to make the compensation offer without implying acceptance of the charge that it was responsible for the PA103 bombing, and as yet it is not ready to give details — which Western officials know that it has — of the real sponsors of the PA103 bombing: Iran and Syria. Nonetheless, despite refraining from implicating Syria and Iran, Qadhafi's position among some Middle Eastern leaders is also suffering at present. Some Middle Eastern media reports — particularly in Al-Hayat newspaper — in mid-January 2002 indicated that Qadhafi would be "assassinated" if he visited Lebanon. There is particular vitriol among Shi'ites in Lebanon toward Qadhafi for his alleged involvement in the alleged assassination of a Lebanese Shi'ite cleric, Imam Musa al-Sadr, the founder of the AMAL militia, in 1978. [Musa al-Sadr disappeared during a visit to Libya, although Libyan authorities claim that he had, in fact, left for Lebanon, where he never arrived.]

This almost certainly accounted for the rationale behind the statement by Arab League Secretary General Amr Mousa on January 13, 2002, that a number of Arab countries had supported Libya's demand to hold the upcoming Arab League summit in Cairo instead of Beirut. He said Arab leaders were quietly consulting each other to resolve this issue. Mousa told reporters in Beirut that there was a consensus on holding the summit in March 2002 but the Libyans have "officially proposed moving the summit from Beirut to Cairo". Mousa said "some Arab countries have approved the Libyan point of view" but he refused to name them.

In other, related events, US Federal agents on January 9, 2002, arrested a German pilot accused of offering to buy military cargo aircraft and aircraft engines for Libya. Klaus Ernst Buhler of Dusseldorf, Germany, was taken into custody, according to a criminal complaint filed in federal court on January 10, 2002. Before his arrest, Buhler said his Libyan connections, including a best friend whom he described as a personal assistant to Qadhafi, offered to buy six CH-47C Chinook helicopter engines —  2,796-kW (3,750-shp) T55-L-11 turboshaft engines — and parts for $5.6-million. Libya's CH-47Cs are among the few in the world yet to be upgraded to CH-47D status. He said he also wanted two entire Lockheed Martin C-130 cargo aircraft and other parts in the future, although a price was not discussed. The Libyan Air Force currently operates seven Lockheed C-130H Hercules, two Lockheed L-100-20 Hercules, two Lockheed L-100-30 Hercules transports, and has had difficulty obtaining spares.

Libya is also suffering from significant economic problems following the protracted low price of oil. Libya's devaluation in early January 2002 of the dinar rate has made the purchase of consumer goods — all of which must be imported — considerably more difficult for Libyans. Libya confirmed that it had devalued the rate of the dinar by 51 percent to 1.3 dinars to the dollar, from 0.65 previously. The Central Bank has claimed that it undertook the devaluation to more realistically value the currency and to thereby undermine black market currency operators.

The arrival in Tripoli on January 11, 2002, of a Libyan envoy arrived in Islamabad, Pakistan, was ostensibly to convey Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's concern about the rising tensions between Pakistan and India. Envoy Salem Ibrahim Ben-Amer was to deliver the message for Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf on January 12, 2002, and was expected to convey Col. Qadhafi's concern at the build-up of troops on the Indo-Pakistani borders and to urge for a de-escalation of the tension. However, it was also known that Libya had been negotiating with Pakistan for the release of some Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida officials into Libyan custody.

January 8, 2002

Reports of New Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi;  Militia of Qadhafi's Renegade Son Disbanded

Exclusive. From GIS Station Benghazi and other sources. There were, at the beginning of January 2002, disturbances around Benghazi which the Government attributed to the disbanding of the 77th Militia, the group which was the private militia of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's son, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, who is currently in exile in Egypt. The militia resisted break-up and had to be forcibly disbanded, which did, in fact, lead to the establishment of road blocks around Benghazi. However, at about the same time, and totally separately, a group in Benghazi reportedly attempted a coup against Qadhafi. This apparently occurred in early January 2002, and failed. Arrests were subsequently made in Benghazi, Tobruq, Misratah, Tripoli and Tarquna. No details as yet as to who may have initiated the coup, but the fact that it occurred from a Benghazi base indicates a Sanussiyyah connection.

There were also unsubstantiated reports in late December 2001 of another attempted assassination of Col. Qadhafi. This, however, may have been the same incident for which reports were received at the beginning of January 2002. While there may have been an attempt, it was clearly unsuccessful. Col. Qadhafi’s entire approach to leadership consists of relying to the least degree possible on personal trust of any officials, and on constantly re-structuring what has always been an amorphous and fluid form of government. His trust of family members is only marginally greater, in some instances, than his trust even of Gadadfa tribal loyalists. His mistrust has been well placed: In 1998 or 1999, one of his sons, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, reportedly attempted to kill him in an issue over a girl. Nonetheless, Dr Moatasam, currently residing in Egypt, had maintained his own militia (believed to be less than 1,000 men), originally devoted to protecting his father’s administration. This militia, known as the 77^th Militia, was disbanded at the beginning of 2002, by order of Col. Qadhafi, although many members of the militia resisted the disbandment order.

Saif al-Islam — the eldest son of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, and his nominated heir — maintains the most important militia unit, of around 1,000 men, and this unit, perhaps more than most, acts as the key mobile armed force designed to provide security for the administration, particularly against a possible military coup. What is significant about Saif al-Islam’s militia is that it is aggressively Wahabbist in style; that is, it is radical and bonded by an approach which, for example, favors the kind of activities undertaken by the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. This particularly sets it at odds with the overall Libyan community.

A third brother, Sa’adi, also maintains a militia believed to number no more than 1,000 men, also functioning to support his father.

A fourth brother, Engineer Mohammed, who is from a different mother to Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha (whose mother, Safiya, comes from the key Bara’asa tribe, near Beida), is regarded as the most conservative of Qadhafi’s sons, and is understood not to control his own militia.

Hannibal, the youngest son of Qadhafi, does not maintain his own militia, but essentially works directly with Col. Qadhafi, maintaining control over his immediate security.

Aisha, Qadhafi’s daughter, is understood to have no direct rôle in the leadership.

January 7, 2002

Libya at a Watershed as Qadhafi Attempts to Re-Define His Leadership

Analysis. With input from GIS stations and sources in Tripoli and elsewhere. Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi undertook a number of key movements of key officials in the latter days of 2001, amid reports — disputed by some sources — that his health was now questionable. GIS undertook an overview study on the Libyan situation, now believed to be at a watershed, with a view to determining possible events in, and connected with, the country.

1. Notes on Sources and Methods: This report was compiled in Washington DC. Extensive use was made of the GIS internal research files in Washington, accumulated from open and sensitive sources since 1972. Extensive use was also made of our Libyan network of regular informants and specialists, mostly Libyan citizens based inside the country but also using our own and other networks of Libyans controlled from outside the country. These include both dissidents and pro-leadership sources, including sources extremely close to the leadership. Senior officials of several other countries with close relations with Libya, and who have been known to us for many years, were also engaged for unwitting (ie: with no knowledge of purpose) input into the following distillation of information and analysis.

1. Observations on the Current Libyan Situation: Libya’s current situation is not only extremely complex, but has, since in the latter part of 2001, entered a unique new phase which has exacerbated and further complicated the risk/opportunity equation. Control of the country is essentially a function of tribal balances, despite the fact that a coup d’etat by junior military officers in 1969 placed Qadhafi in power, replacing King Idris I. Suppression of the Libyan Armed Forces is, in many ways, as concerted as suppression of the Libyan population, which is why Qadhafi has never taken a rank higher than colonel, and has suppressed all formal systemic structures within the country as far as feasible.

The fact that Qadhafi is known as "Brother Leader" or "Brother Colonel", and has eschewed any formal leadership titles, starts to give an indication of the combination of dictatorial and anarchic style — combining fear with uncertainty — with which Qadhafi controls Libya. The result is a situation of extreme fragility which has persisted and been exacerbated literally since the coup of 1969. The fact that the condition has endured for three decades does not diminish its essential fragility, but does help explain the gradual and — under present conditions — persistent decline in the efficiency of the country’s sole industry: the energy sector. Qadhafi essentially and deliberately, starting in the late 1970s, began a process of "dismantling the state", so that there is, in fact, no formal government, and it is this which makes systemic change difficult (given that there is no formal system other than the decrees of the Brother Leader). He created a new pseudo-concept for the country, that of what he called the Jamahiriyya, which is not to be confused with the Arabic word "Gomhouria", which sounds similar and means "republic". Jamahiriyya, the word created by Qadhafi, is meant to mean, essentially "rule of the masses", but in reality, in Libya, means the rule by fiat or whim of Qadhafi.

On Revolution Day, September 1, 1988, Col. Qadhafi announced that the Army and Government bodies were to be dismantled. Instead of the traditional army, a voluntary "Jamahiri Guard" was to be installed by the people, a plan which met with problems. Likewise, the Government bodies would be replaced by organizations set up by the people. The "People’s Guard", as it is also known, consists of conscripted officers and the police, thus not affecting the top five positions of the Army, which sources state have remained the same. The Air Force and the Navy were to be exempt from the dismantling process due to the difficulty of training volunteers on a part-time basis. The Guard is employed on a voluntary basis, on full pay.

Libya's General People’s Congress (parliament) on December 28, 2001, named Shokri Ghanem as the new Economy and Foreign Trade Minister, replacing Abdessalam Ejuweir. Shokri Ghanem had worked in recent years as director of research of OPEC at its headquarters in Vienna. The next day, an entirely new Cabinet was named, ostensibly by the People’s Congress, but in reality by Col. Qadhafi. It was listed as follows:

Prime Minister: Mubarak al-Shamekh
Deputy Prime Minister: Abdullah al-Badri
Deputy Prime Minister for Production: Baghdadi Mahmudi
Deputy Prime Minister for Services: Ammar Altaef
Minister of Justice and General Security: Mohammed Mosrati
Minister for African Unity: Ali Abdel-Salam al-Traiki
Foreign Minister: Adel-Rahman Shalgam
Finance Minister: Ajili Brini
Minister of Economy and Trade: Shokri Mohammed Ghanem.

The appointment of the new Finance Minister, Ajili Brini, was also significant. The new Minister earned his PhD in the United States, and his appointment is considered a gesture to the international investment community.

2. National Underpinnings: Re-Emerging to Determine Future Shape. Libya is a Muslim country, but in its form of Islam is essentially and diametrically opposed to the form of Islamic practice of, for example, Saudi Arabia. Libya’s indigenous Senussi form of Islam is moderate, accommodating/tolerant and Sufic, deriving from the same origins as Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism; both sects sprang from the same concept of restoring Islamic legitimacy. However, Wahabbism evolved as extreme, intolerant, proselytizing and aggressive. The Saudi-Libyan connection today is critical, because of Col. Qadhafi’s essential opposition to, and suppression of, the Sanussiyyah, whose leadership (King Idris I; Idris al-Sanussi) he overthrew in 1969. Some imported "Islamist" (ie: essentially Wahabbist) militants who had mounted hostility toward Qadhafi, and had been implicated in some attempted assassinations of him, were briefly supported by some within the Sanussiyyah majority — particularly in the devout Eastern sector around Benghazi — only out of frustration with Qadhafi. However, Qadhafi had effectively in recent years paid off the Islamists (and continues to do so with financial support for al-Qaida-related groups through the end of 2001), leaving the Sanussiyyah continuing in their opposition quite separately from any taint of Islamism.

The Sanussiyyah movement embraces virtually all the tribes of Libya, including the Gadadfa,¹ the tribe of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi. Thus, the two critical elements underpinning the pivotal power struggles now underway in Libya are the Sanussiyyah and the tribes. The reasons for the resurgence of the power struggles are explained below. In essence, however, virtually all the tribes, including the Gadadfa (who have benefited significantly from their proximity to Qadhafi), are now ready to see Qadhafi removed under certain conditions (which vary from tribe to tribe), and there has been a concurrent and related rise in the authority of the Sanussiyyah movement, now led by a grand nephew of King Idris, Prince Idris al-Senussi,² currently operating from exile. The inclusion now of the Gadadfa in the opposition to Qadhafi completes the jigsaw.

3. Resurgent US Opposition to Qadhafi. The Government of the United States was seen as the spearhead of the international community’s move to contain and restrain Libya through United Nations-sponsored sanctions which resulted from Libyan involvement in international terrorism. This was correct, but in reality, other than maintaining the sanctions, the US did little to actually destabilize Qadhafi since the end of the Reagan Administration. However, it was the events during this period, specifically in 1986, which have a major bearing on oil and gas exploration and exploitation today in the Gulf of Sidra.

Major events in Libya in 1986 involved a confrontation with the United States, which had branded Libya as a major supporter of international terrorism. In March, the US Sixth Fleet conducted maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, deliberately violating Qadhafi’s "line of death" at 32 deg. 30 min. North, covered by three aircraft carriers, the Saratoga, Coral Sea, and America. When Libya fired surface-to-air missiles (including its newly-received SA-5s), US Navy aircraft hit the SA-5 base at Sirte and attacked Libyan naval vessels in the Gulf. The US exercise, code-named Prairie Fire, appeared to have been deliberately designed to provoke Libya. [This affair remains of pre-eminent importance to the Libyan oil and gas industry, as noted below in Point 10. The Libyan Oil and Gas Industry.]

The March 1986 confrontations undoubtedly provoked a stepped-up Libyan campaign of subversion abroad; in any event, when evidence linked Libya to the bombing of a Berlin discotheque, which was patronized by US servicemen, the US struck back. On the night of April 14-15, US naval aircraft combined with Air Force F-111s staging out of the UK struck at Tripoli and Benghazi. Among the targets was the Bab al ‘Aziziyya barracks and Qadhafi’s headquarters, and the Libyan leader’s personal quarters were hit. The attack on Qadhafi’s home led to speculation that the US was trying to target the Libyan leader personally. In any event, Qadhafi retreated inland to Sebha and remained out of sight for most of the Summer, while the old Revolutionary Command Council survivors emerged again into prominence.

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) then supported the opposition National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), which it arranged to be financially supported by Saudi Arabia and then-ally Iraq. This armed movement was based in Chad. The Libyan National Army was largely moribund inside Chad until 1990, when a change of government in Chad meant that they were no longer welcome. They were airlifted out of Chad by the US Air Force, operating in support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to Nigeria, then to Zaïre and then to Kenya, before finally being brought to the US for resettlement. Significantly, the NFSL, although re-settled in the US by the CIA, is no longer CIA-supported, and, under new leadership, has signified in late 2001 for the first time that it supports and is part of the Sanussiyyah opposition to Qadhafi, and supportive of Prince Idris al-Senussi.

The UN sanctions against Libya were lifted in 1999, as the internal report correctly stated. However, unilateral US sanctions against Libya remained in place and were, in November 2001, reaffirmed by the US Bush Administration. The internal report said that the US in June 2000, under the Clinton Administration, reclassified Libya from "rogue state" to a "state of concern". This was an entirely semantic distinction, and did not alter US attitudes at all. The reaffirmation of the unilateral US sanctions in November 2001 is, however, highly significant and means that, despite the UN waiver, any firm doing business in Libya essentially cannot also do business in the US. The US position further hardened in November and December 2001, when key US officials, particularly Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, reiterated that Libya, as a state which harbored or sponsored terrorism, would be a target of the US in the "war on terrorism". Essentially, however, the attitude of the US Department of State and CIA remained one of "no action", despite the revival of strong and seemingly unequivocal rhetoric from the Bush Administration. State and CIA resisted any move to translate this into specific actions. That position, however, began to change in late December 2001, not because of any change of attitude in State or the CIA, but because the Administration had now become insistent.

At the same time, Col. Qadhafi had been for some time attempting to find an intermediary who could help him have the US sanctions lifted. He sent a message of condolence to the US after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, and pushed through the Government of Nigeria to have direct meetings with US officials. US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East William Burns, as a result, met in London (along with British Secret Intelligence Service [SIS] and Foreign & Commonwealth Office [FCO] and US CIA officials) with Libyan intelligence chief Moussa Koussa³ in early October 2001. This meeting has variously been reported as a major breakthrough (by those in the US who want to see a normalization of bilateral relations so that US participation in the Libyan energy sector can resume), and as a disaster (by Assistant Secretary Burns, speaking privately). In any event, no substantive progress was made because the Libyans would not agree to compensation for the victims of Pan Am flight 103. Libya’s pending appeal against the conviction of one of its intelligence officials for complicity in the PA103 terrorist attack of 1988 meant that it could/would not discuss compensation which would be an admission of culpability. Without such a commitment, however, the US would not, in any event, lift the sanctions. Libyan officials saw the talks as a success simply because they happened, creating an opening for further discussion.

Meanwhile, however, during the November 2001 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) emergency summit in Doha, Qadhafi, in a private gathering of delegates, said that Osama bin Laden was a hero for attacking the US, and essentially ensured through this that the US would not give him the benefit of the doubt.

That is not to say that the US Government and the US oil and gas industry is not anxious for a resolution of the Libya problem. There is renewed concern within the Bush Administration over the potential for instability in Saudi Arabia which could jeopardize stability in energy markets. The major oilfields of Libya, Nigeria, Angola and Venezuela, and the lesser Atlantic producers, are now of prime concern to the US. The US oil infrastructure in Libya, virtually all mothballed when seized by Qadhafi, lies unproductive, and those concessions and the equipment associated with them cannot be exploited by Libya. Any foreign producer which takes over a US concession or US systems in Libya is subject to US legal remedies, which means that none of the majors currently working in Libya are prepared to access this important niche of the Libyan energy resources. The German producer, Wintershall, deeply involved in Libyan oil production, sought in 2001 to take over some of the US assets in Libya and was informed by the US Government that it would be sued for US$15-billion if it attempted to seize the assets which Washington still regarded as US property.

4. The Health of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi. Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has for some years reportedly been suffering from what had been believed to have been an undiagnosed illness. In fact, it seems likely that the Colonel’s reported illness has been known for some time: Leukemia. The specific type of leukemia is, however, not known. He underwent a complete blood change in Germany in 1978, but has only in the past two years reportedly exhibited increasingly severe symptoms of the disease. He was reported to have suffered, during 2001, at least four or five major collapses, during which he went into comas lasting sometimes longer than five hours. During the latter months of 2001 he has been noticed by close family and colleagues to have been showing signs of constant fatigue, a symptom often associated with leukemia as white cell counts diminish energy levels. It has been reported that he faints regularly. His health outlook, based on these reports, seems at best uncertain, although he has gone to great lengths to disguise symptoms of his condition.

However, equally highly-placed sources said at the end of December 2001 that they believed that Col. Qadhafi’s "illness" was, in fact, feigned, and that the reports of his illness had been leaked as part of a disinformation campaign. The purpose of such a disinformation campaign is uncertain, and, indeed, those well-placed sources who report noting symptoms of the alleged illness claim that the reports of a "disinformation campaign" were in fact disinformation, designed to discredit the reports of the illness. Clearly, however, questions have been raised as to Col. Qadhafi’s health.

Meanwhile, secret British official papers from 1971, released on January 2, 2002, in London, showed that the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) thought that Col. Qadhafi had lost control of the Revolutionary Council in Tripoli in 1971 and was about to be overthrown. British diplomats reported that Qadhafi had twice been the target of assassination attempts, he had had a severe nervous breakdown, and had at one stage tried to kill himself. The files were released at the Public Record Office at Kew in south-west London. A 1971 Foreign Office file has reports from British diplomats that the colonel spent three weeks in a Cairo clinic, staffed by Belgian doctors, being treated for a complete breakdown, in February and March of that year. The Libyan people were told that he was in a remote area of Libya looking at farm projects.

5. The Issue of Leadership Succession. Col. Qadhafi has said repeatedly during recent years that he wanted his eldest son, Saif al-Islam, to succeed him as Libyan leader. However, Col. Qadhafi has resisted giving Saif al-Islam significant leadership responsibility, and Saif al-Islam has equally demonstrated in some of his dealings that he lacked the leadership presence and strength of his father. Nonetheless, Saif al-Islam has been entrusted with diplomatic and political missions of increasing responsibility in late 2001. He was the key official engaged in actions in 2001 by Qadhafi to pay off key terrorist leaders, ostensibly for releasing kidnapped hostages in the Philippines (Abu Sayyaf: paid US$25-million) and Afghanistan (Taliban/al-Qaida). Qadhafi’s claims that he was using his good offices to resolve tense confrontations between terrorist groups and host or opposing governments has, however, been seen as merely providing another method in which Qadhafi could funnel monies to the terrorist groups. This has reinforced the belief that he has not abandoned his support for terrorist organizations. [Indeed, as late as July 2001, Qadhafi funneled US$25-million to an al-Qaida affiliated organization. In November 2001, he paid the Taliban (and/or al-Qaida; it remains unclear) substantial monies to release missionaries and others inside Afghanistan. Saif al-Islam undertook this mission ostensibly to help the German Government.]

Despite his growing activity, Saif al-Islam is aware that he lacks sufficient powerbase and parental support to take over the reins of leadership as long as his father wishes to remain in charge. He is known to wish to effect a change as soon as possible, and has entered into communications to that effect through Saudi Arabian and other conduits. He has signaled that he would entertain a partnership with Sanussiyyah leader Prince Idris al-Senussi, and although Prince Idris has not responded to this initiative, it is known that the Saudi Government (or at least part of it, under Crown Prince Abdullah, who now effectively represents the Saudi leadership) has acted to attempt to facilitate this. The three other sons of Qadhafi, discussed below [see: Domestic Security Issues, Point 7, below], basically have no real power base to enter the succession situation as things presently stand.

One of the things which has been discussed in some circles is some kind of condominium arrangement in which either Saif al-Islam becomes leader and Prince Idris becomes Prime Minister or some special portfolio holder; or in which Prince Idris succeeds to the Libyan throne and Saif al-Islam becomes Prime Minister. There is no indication that Prince Idris would accept either solution, and nor is there real expectation that Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi would accept such options, despite the fact that he has himself proposed Prince Idris’ return to head up a special portfolio designed to help restore Libyan acceptability internationally and to use Prince Idris’ special contacts with world oil companies to start bringing back US investment. Qadhafi has made comments from time to time indicating that he wanted Saif al-Islam to succeed him, but all close to Qadhafi note that he changes his mind with stunning rapidity and would likely repudiate any transfer of power, even to his son, even on his deathbed. Saif al-Islam is clearly (from his comments) aware of this and has hinted that he would be prepared to give a nudge to his father at the appropriate time.

"The appropriate time" may well be approaching, if reports of Col. Qadhafi’s deteriorating health prove to be correct.

Late December 2001 saw a number of key people connected with Libya scrambling to prepare for Qadhafi’s death or removal through ill health. It is generally conceded that Saif al-Islam could not retain power by himself, and there are few other candidates currently within the country who are known to be in a position to be acceptable to all factions. Prince Idris, by virtue of his leadership of the Sanussiyyah, has, over the past 20 years, built up the greatest consensus of support among the various tribes (including the Gadadfa), the Armed Forces, and the Libyan community. He is presently (December 27, 2001) in the United States, having moved from his Rome residence in November 2001 to work with US leaders to prepare for a possible opportunity in Libya.

Saif al-Islam was, as at December 24, 2001, in Pakistan, where he was working to press the Government of Pakistan to release to his care (for transport back to Libya) any al-Qaida members who had been detained crossing into the country.

The unknown factors include:

• (i) The prospect of a middle-level or junior-level military coup if and when Qadhafi’s illness or death provides an opportunity. This would hold the most chance of success and durability, but may not have international acceptance, which may diminish its prospects;
• (ii) The prospect of an attempted putsch by Saif al-Islam, perhaps in cooperation with one or more of his brothers, to pre-emptively retire Qadhafi before his illness removes their chances of succession;
• (iii) The prospect that one or other military or family candidates could be assisted in forcing a transition (or capitalising on the death of Qadhafi) by the Government and Armed Forces of Egypt. Egypt [see: Egypt, below] remains a key factor in the Libyan situation, and the Egyptian Government is clearly aware of Qadhafi’s health condition and the possibility of imminent change;
• (iv) The prospect that Qadhafi, resisting any erosion of his power (which is currently the case) would himself pre-emptively attempt to remove potential suitors for succession. Qadhafi has already, in November 2001, undertaken purges of officials — particularly those from Benghazi, in Cyrenaica, the hotbed of the Sanussiyyah — on a variety of pretexts, almost all usually involved allegations of "corruption";
• (v) The prospect that, assuming Qadhafi retains control for a further six months to a year, the United States would undertake military strikes against Libya in a way which would affect the behavior of either Qadhafi or potential successors.

1. Domestic Security Issues: There were unsubstantiated reports in late December 2001 of another attempted assassination of Col. Qadhafi. While there may have been an attempt, it was clearly unsuccessful. Col. Qadhafi’s entire approach to leadership consists of relying to the least degree possible on personal trust of any officials, and on constantly re-structuring what has always been an amorphous and fluid form of government. His trust of family members is only marginally greater, in some instances, than his trust even of Gadadfa tribal loyalists. His mistrust has been well placed: In 1998 or 1999, one of his sons, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, reportedly attempted to kill him in an issue over a girl. Nonetheless, Dr Moatasam, currently residing in Egypt, maintains his own militia (believed to be less than 1,000 men), devoted to protecting his father’s administration.

Saif al-Islam maintains the most important militia unit, of around 1,000 men, and this unit, perhaps more than most, acts as the key mobile armed force designed to provide security for the administration, particularly against a possible military coup. What is significant about Saif al-Islam’s militia is that it is aggressively Wahabbist in style; that is, it is radical and bonded by an approach which, for example, favors the kind of activities undertaken by the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. This particularly sets it at odds with the overall Libyan community.

A third brother, Sa’adi, also maintains a militia believed to number no more than 1,000 men, also functioning to support his father.

A fourth brother, Engineer Mohammed, who is from a different mother⁴ to Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha (whose mother,⁵ Safiya, comes from the key Bara’asa tribe, near Beida), is regarded as the most conservative of Qadhafi’s sons, and is understood not to control his own militia.

Hannibal, the youngest son of Qadhafi, does not maintain his own militia, but essentially works directly with Col. Qadhafi, maintaining control over his immediate security.

Aisha, Qadhafi’s daughter, is understood to have no direct rôle in the leadership.

Apart from the "family militias", the Armed Forces are effectively divided into units which have little more capability than militias. This accounts to a large extent for the poor performance of the Libyan Army in conflicts with Chad and Chadian-based rebels. However, such "divide and rule" policies tend to make it more difficult for the Armed Forces to stage a coup. It has been a long-standing practice to divide the military units not only from ammunition for their weapons, but also from any significant transport capability. By dividing troops from ammunition and mobility, their ability to stage a coup is minimized, but at the same time any effective suppression of uprisings is made more difficult.

Qadhafi has attempted, where possible, to "buy off" opponents, constantly making offers to opponents in exile, even though by now it is apparent that he rarely intends any real rapprochement. Attempted encroachments by radical Islamists, who originally came in from Sudanese support bases (funded and trained, in many instances, by Iran), were ultimately minimized by Qadhafi’s ongoing payments to many of the groups (including al-Qaida), and a strong working relationship with the clerical leadership of Iran, with whom Qadhafi worked to assist in the destruction of Pan Am flight 103, among other things.

However, despite (and because of) Qadhafi’s care in constantly shaking up and dividing the armed forces, he has built little or no loyalty in the Services. One of his sons, in 2001, in front of many officers, insulted one of the three Service chiefs and slapped his face.

7(a) The NFSL. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), which was persuaded to leave Chad in 1990, has been regarded as no longer being a factor in Libyan internal security. However, this is a mistake. Many NFSL members, while now residing in the US, have maintained and strengthened their ties back into Libya, and effectively provide a network which links into the Armed Forces. The long-standing NFSL leader, Dr Mohamed Megariaf, retired in 2001, and was replaced by a more flexible leader, Ibrahim Sahad, a follower of the Sanussiyyah.

7(b). The Position of Maj. ‘Abd al-Salam Jallud. The coup of 1969 put in place what seemed initially to be a duumvirate between Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi and ‘Abd al-Salam Jallud, although Jallud was seen in a secondary rôle (Qadhafi promoted himself to Colonel; Jallud to Major). Jallud, who was very close to the Italian leaderships and intelligence services for many years, was seen as fairly profligate (financially and to an even great extent than Qadhafi, sexually), was increasingly seen as a challenge to Qadhafi. Jallud’s tribe, the Megarha, felt that Jallud was being marginalised and, essentially, declared war on the Gadadfa tribe of Qadhafi in the 1980s. The result was that Jallud’s power eroded completely and he was confined under house arrest.

There were indications in late 2001, however, that Maj. Jallud was again in a position of greater flexibility (ie: he may no longer be under house arrest), and attempting to restore some access to power. It may be that Qadhafi will entertain some greater rôle for Jallud in order to win support from the Megarha, but it is unlikely that he will ever regain any real power.

2. International Security Issues: There is growing evidence to suggest that Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, starting in about October 2001, began using the Western preoccupation with the war against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan to redouble his overt and covert efforts to assume a position of strategic dominance in Africa and to a lesser extent in the Middle East.

Equally, there is evidence that he has not diminished his antagonism toward the United States and United Kingdom, despite overtures to both countries to support their "war on terrorism". As well, there is strong evidence to suggest that the Libyan chemical and biological warfare and ballistic missile programs have in no way been curtailed, but have, in fact, been re-located and expanded.⁶

High-level Libyan sources in Tripoli, Benghazi and elsewhere have also indicated that Col. Qadhafi believes that the US and UK now need him and will move toward a normalization of political, diplomatic and trade relations without Libya having to abandon its new political, intelligence and military penetrations of sub-Saharan Africa. While discussing with the US the prospect of bringing moderates into his Government, Col. Qadhafi has, the sources say, moved to expand the purge on potential adversaries, and particularly to imprison under a variety of charges officials from the Benghazi district of Cyrenaica region, traditionally the home of the moderate Sanussi Muslim movement and opponents of Qadhafi.

The Qadhafi Administration has for several years been attempting to reach out to the UK, US and European governments to devise a rapprochement, and at the same time had been making overtures to key opponents abroad, ostensibly for the same purpose. However, he has been actively involved, concurrently, in attempting to purge Libya of his opponents, often — as with the current case of his "anti-corruption" drive — under the guise of pursuing legality and honesty in government.⁷

During the first week of October 2001, the head of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), Moussa Koussa³ and several other Libyan officials, met in London with US and British diplomatic and intelligence officials. [US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) officers were involved in the meetings.] The meetings, arranged partially through the communications good offices of a neutral African state, was ostensibly to discuss — according to the US State Department — "Libya’s response to the remaining requirements of the UN resolutions on Lockerbie, in particular to accept responsibility for the actions of its officials and to pay appropriate compensation". A UK Foreign Office spokeswoman described the meeting as "positive and constructive". However, the fundamental purpose of the meeting was, from the Libyan perspective, to ensure that the US and UK removed the last major barriers to normalization of relations, so that Libya could pursue major US oil company participation in the country.

Ostensibly, also, the Libyan delegation offered to supply intelligence to the US and UK on radical Islamist organizations, although what was offered or provided was carefully crafted to target those groups which had opposed Qadhafi himself, such as the Fighting Islamic Group (FIG), which claimed responsibility for two attempts on Col. Qadhafi’s life in 1995 and 1998. The UK-based newspaper, The Sunday Times, On October 7, 2001, said that "A Libyan intelligence official was welcomed in London last week by the Foreign Office as part of the coalition against terrorism. Moussa Koussa, head of Libya’s external security organization, held talks with MI6 and the Central Intelligence Agency. Mohammed Azwai, the Libyan ambassador in London, said Koussa had handed over a list of more than a dozen Libyans operating in Britain suspected of links to Osama Bin Laden." Significantly, however, as Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted on October 31, 2001, Col. Qadhafi had, in July 2001, still been sending payments to support the activities of affiliates of al-Qaida, the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. At that time he sent $25-million.

At the same time, the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report of October 31, 2001, said, Col. Qadhafi had told a private meeting of delegates to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Doha, on October 10, 2001, that he thought that Osama bin Laden had proven himself a "true hero" through his attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. He also told the OIC gathering in its private session — which he had requested — that the rest of the Muslim world should be ashamed of themselves for not having done something similar earlier.

The US, in its search to find new allies in the war against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida had, US sources confirmed, deliberately turned a blind eye to ongoing Libyan radical or terrorist-related activities around the world, and particularly in Africa. The US had, according to media reports (including a BBC report of October 31, 2001), been in high-level contact with officials from Syria and Sudan, as well as Libya, to seek their cooperation in the "war on terrorism".

Libya’s efforts have not been wasted. On November 5, 2001, a former senior US official, Robert Pelletreau, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs from 1994 to 1997 and a former ambassador to Egypt and Tunisia, presumably acting on the basis of information received, indicated that the US could ease sanctions against Libya in 2002 as part of a broader effort to reform a unilateral sanctions policy and in return for recent cooperation against terrorism. Libya, he indicated, had provided intelligence on al-Qaida terrorist network to US Government officials and had cooperated with the UN in the Lockerbie [Pan Am 103 bombing] trial. "The stage seems set for further progress," Pelletreau said in remarks at the US-Africa Business Summit. US oil company executives’ hopes of meeting Libyan representatives at the African-US business summit were dashed because the US State Department did not allow Libyans to attend the summit. "An application was indeed made by the Libyans and was turned down by the State Department," Pelletreau said. Amb. Pelletreau, however, although a former career diplomat, was a Clinton Administration appointee and is clearly not representative of the current Bush Administration thinking [indeed, from conversations, he is clearly unaware of current White House thinking], although he does reflect some institutional attitudes within the Department of State.

Col. Qadhafi had, on October 23, 2001, described the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US as "horrifying" and called for an international conference to define terrorism and then fight it. "We must sit down at any level without emotions ... and after we define terrorism we agree on fighting terrorism," Qadhafi said in an interview with Qatar’s al-Jazeera television. He described the attacks as "horrifying, destructive" and said they had caused enormous loss of life and economic damage that had affected all countries. Qadhafi evaded answering direct questions on US military attacks on Afghanistan. Earlier, Col. Qadhafi had indicated that the US itself was a sponsor of terrorism.

The international diplomatic offensive by Qadhafi continued throughout Europe, in particular with France and Germany. On November 6, 2001, the chief aide of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder met with Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi in Berlin for talks on "consolidating the international coalition against terrorism". Saif al-Islam told Chancellery chief Frank-Walter Steinmeier that Libya condemned the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and was ready to work together with the international community in the fight against terrorism. The meeting between the two men came ahead of a verdict expected on November 13, 2001, in the trial of five people charged for the bloody 1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque. The prosecution has said that Libya was behind the anti-US attack.

Russia and Libya were also, in early November 2001, preparing a summit between Col. Qadhafi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but had not finalized the details yet. The planned summit "is on the agenda of bilateral relations" and the sides "are working actively for the success of the meeting," Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said on October 31, 2001, after conferring with his Libyan counterpart Abdel-Rahman Shalgam. Shalgam forecast that 2002 would witness a big leap in economic exchanges between Moscow and Tripoli. Despite that, however, very senior level Russian sources, within the National Security Council, have indicated that the Russian Government favors a situation which would transition Qadhafi out of power.

8(a). Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Libyan intelligence and front organizations have been active throughout Africa, on an increasing basis during 2000-2001. GIS is aware of the fact that numerous senior government and former government officials in many countries were, as at late 2001, receiving regular payments from the Libyan Government for unspecified activities.

As part of Libya’s overt activities in sub-Saharan Africa, Libya has throughout much of 2001 acted to support Central African Republic (CAR) Pres. Ange-Felix Patasse, who has faced two recent coup attempts. On November 6, 2001, as reported in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of November 7, 2001, Libyan-backed Government forces went on the offensive, attacking the barracks where the former Army chief, General François Bozize, was believed to be holed up on the fourth day of fighting in the CAR capital, Bangui. Libya already had 100 troops in Bangui, and a further 60 arrived on November 6, 2001. Libya now had strong influence in Chad and the CAR, and further south in Zimbabwe.

On December 25, 2001, Libyan Minister for African Unity Ali al-Traiki said that mediators were close to resolving tensions between Chad and the CAR. Speaking after meeting with Gabon's President Omar Bongo, Ali Traiki said: "We are headed towards a negotiated solution." Al-Traiki’s visit to Gabon came amid heightened tensions between Chad and the CAR, where Tripoli deployed some 200 troops in the wake of the failed November 2001 coup. As well, on December 25, 2001, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) appealed to Libya, which is mediating between it and N’djamena, to "undertake all the measures needed to settle their dispute". MDJT is an armed movement led by Youssef Togoimi, a former Chadian Defense Minister, who has been fighting the Chadian Government since 1998 from bases inside Libya. MDJT seems likely to be a Libyan instrument designed to put pressure on the N’Djamena Government.

As part of Libya’s covert activities in sub-Saharan Africa, a unit of more than 20 senior Libyan intelligence officers arrived in Zimbabwe in mid-October 2001 to support President Robert Mugabe’s security and intelligence system as the nation moved towards the 2002 presidential election, only five months away. They were understood to be training Zimbabwean intelligence personnel and President Mugabe’s close security unit. As with the case of Pres. Patasse in CAR, Zimbabwe President Mugabe is wary over his security — and does not trust many of his own security personnel — in the event of losing the next election which pits his 38-year-old ZANU-PF party against the two-year-old opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). A British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, said at the same time that "hundreds of Libyan troops", part of Qadhafi’s élite forces, "known for their terror tactics, were being housed in secret locations scattered across the country" [Zimbabwe]. The Daily Telegraph, quoting intelligence sources, said there was a growing number of intelligence officers turning against Mugabe, forcing him to turn elsewhere for protection. The Libyans were to be issued with Zimbabwean passports by the Registrar-General’s office to help Mugabe’s presidential election campaign, the newspaper said.

Libya has substantially escalated its activities in Zimbabwe since those reports, and South African President Thabo Mbeki has said privately in late December 2001 that he felt that Qadhafi was attempting to stimulate a civil war in Zimbabwe. This would almost certainly foster a strong revival of UK and US concern over Qadhafi, and would serve to hasten the prospect of direct military and political action against him. On December 20, 2001, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe was in Libya for talks with Col. Qadhafi on possible further aid to help ease Zimbabwe's crippling fuel shortages. The Zimbabwean Energy Minister said that under a deal agreed earlier this year, Libya was supplying 70 percent of Zimbabwe's fuel requirements. Traditional suppliers such as Kuwait have cut off oil because of Zimbabwe's acute shortage of the hard currency needed to pay for it.

Other press reports from South Africa in mid-October 2001 suggested that PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), a Libyan-funded vigilante group which campaigns against drug lords in the Cape Town Flats, in South Africa, would be unleashed on Zimbabwean white commercial farmers in a terror campaign. At the same time, the Zimbabwe Government itself had become obligated to the Libyans after it sought a US$340-million loan to purchase fuel. The Independent, a Zimbabwe newspaper, reported in October 2001 that Libya was about to acquire major stakes in the country’s two financial institutions and a major hotel group in addition to receiving 8,000ha of land for industrial and farming purposes.

As part of Libya’s covert actions in sub-Saharan Africa, The Washington Post confirmed on November 3, 2001, that the terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden had reaped millions of dollars from the illicit sale of diamonds mined by rebels in Sierra Leone. The report quoted US and European intelligence officials. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was quoted by the newspaper as saying that key operatives in bin Laden’s al-Qaida network worked with diamond dealers to buy gems from Revolutionary United Front rebels and sell them for large profits in Europe. The diamond dealers were selected by Ibrahim Bah, a Libyan-trained former Senegalese rebel and the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) principal diamond dealer. The report implicated Libya directly with the RUF, the Liberian Government of Charles Taylor, the Government of Burkina Faso, and others, in the illicit sale of "blood diamonds" as a transaction commodity to fund weapons and subversion.

8(b). Chemical and Biological Weapons Activities

Historic Development of Libyan CBW: Since seizing power in a military coup d’etat on September 1, 1969, Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has launched a relentless systematic campaign to produce biological and chemical weapons to help him in his undeclared war against the US and the West.

Libyan sources confirm that Qadhafi had begun planning, early in 1970, for the acquisition of a weapon with which to face the US and UK, as those powers were negotiating the conditions to leave their military bases in Libya. He initially planned on acquiring nuclear power and approached the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea), India and Pakistan, in that order. He was harshly rebuffed and in many instances dismissively. During President Anwar as-Sadat’s term of office in Egypt, he turned to some former members of the Egyptian intelligence service (Mukhabarat el-Aama) who had served under President Sadat’s predecessor, President Gamal Abdel Nasser. These officers had been expelled by Pres. Sadat and instructed to stay away from Egyptian affairs. They subsequently went to work for Col. Qadhafi. Their advice to him was to stay away from nuclear power and concentrate instead on building a chemical and biological weapons arsenal, advising him that this was easier, cheaper, more accessible, and could be done without the knowledge of the US.

Qadhafi ordered the hiring of experts and scientists in this specialized field mainly from the Soviet bloc countries, but several others from Europe, the US, UK, and Canada. Additionally a team of about 450 specialists was sent to him by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. He formed a special task force in the Army to undertake the research and production of biological and chemical weapons. The task force was headed by two Army officers: Captain Noun Asyamen and Captain Gaith Ibrahim Aizawi. Large quantities of materials were bought directly from India, Russia, and the West. During the UN boycott, Qadhafi smuggled thousands of tons of chemical and biological materials and stored them all over Libya, particularly in: South-Western Tarhouna, south of Bani Walid; Al Sara military barracks; the Air Force base on the way to Otizou near Chad; storage in Am Ohazal near Tobruq; and a storage facility on kilometer 20 on the way to Ghadas. It is believed that Qadhafi produced over 84 different grades of chemical material and 43 different biological ingredients.

In 1972, the Qadhafi Administration initiated practical steps to produce chemical and biological weapons after it received reports about Israel’s ability to produce such weapons. These reports were delivered by Fathi El-Zeeb, Egypt’s then-President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s consultant at the time, and from the Palestinians. Large budgets were allocated in order to face Israel in the fields of biological, chemical and atomic warfare. The Arab Development Institute and the Atomic Energy Authority were established in Tripoli, in order to attract experts from the West and communist countries with a stress on those of Arab origin. Omar Muheishi, of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), was put in charge of those projects.

In July 1972, a committee called "The Commission For Chemical Support" was established within the Arms Department headed by Captain Gaith Ibrahim, who was aided by two Libyan officers, two Egyptian experts, a Pakistani, a Yugoslav, and an expert from South Africa residing in Monte Carlo.

From that time, serious efforts were undertaken to build an effective chemical weapons program to counterbalance what Israel was trying to do and in accordance with Col. Qadhafi’s plans. Manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons was done in parallel ways with more attention being paid to the chemical side. However, in 1982, chemical as well as biological manufacturing were given equal importance until today.

The famous Rabta plant was built in the south of Tripoli, and there large quantities of Mustard gas (or nerve gas as the Libyans called it) were produced. However, after the big international media uproar which engulfed the plant and the danger it posed to the Administration, and subsequent to the embargo directed by the United Nations Security Council, secrecy was strictly applied thereafter in the manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons. In early 1992, a larger number of experts in chemical and biological fields were contracted from Iraq after the second Gulf war, and from Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism, as well as from North Korea, Vietnam, and with Armenians from the remnants of the Soviet Army. In 1992, the chemical manufacturing units were transferred from the Rabta plant to the following locations:

• In south-east Tarhunah in specially-designed underground bunkers still operating until some time in 2001;
• The Jallo barracks in the area of the oilfields in Jallo city (where there is an important chemical weapons unit under the supervision of Captain-chemist Saeed Ibrahim Alzewi, who graduated from the School of Science Chemistry Department, before he joined the Military Officers College);
• A secret location inside a farm south of Souk Al-Alalika in Sabrata operated by technicians brought in from the Abu Kammash Chemical Complex. This location also holds a special division for biological weapons and warehouses with operational equipment to store the products.

Other warehouses: There are other locations to store the products away from the manufacturing plants as follows:

• Underground warehouse 45km south of Tarhunah (1,250 barrels, 200 liters capacity of chemical materials transferred from Rabta plant);
• Adjacent warehouse to the main weapons storage in Jihanam, Sirte Province, which includes 1,300 barrels transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah. This warehouse also includes biological material of unknown quantity. Captain Massoud Khamis Abdel Salam Al-Qadhafi supervises this warehouse;
• Warehouse in Al-Nawaqiyya district near Benghazi supervised by Captain Mohamed Muftah Al-Oraibi and includes 1,100 barrels of chemical materials;
• Warehouse in Al-Kafra area on the road to Al-Sara military camp which includes 1,800 barrels of chemical material and other biological materials which was transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah;
• Warehouse near Ain Ghazal town in Tobruq district which includes 1,350 barrels of chemical materials and other biological materials;
• Warehouse near ‘Afiah region in Black mountains which includes 1,450 barrels transferred from the Rabta plant in 1992;
• Warehouse in Ghat military camp containing 2,000 barrels;
• Warehouse near Al-Kara military camp with 2,700 barrels.

The stored materials are made of different kinds of chemicals most importantly Mustard and Nerve gas (which may be the same thing, in Libyan parlance).

Research and studies are still underway to produce new kinds and develop existing chemicals. A central plant in the military farm near Tajoura’ is working closely with the Industrial and Agricultural Studies Centres and Chemical and Biology Departments at the College of Science, Tripoli University. The team of this center consists of 83 experts and analysts, helped by 91 technicians of different nationalities. All of those were contracted by the University to Tripoli, the Industrial and Agricultural Research Center, Abu Kammash Chemical complex, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture as a cover for their actual mission for biological and chemical research.

There were special units for biological warfare operating in the following locations:

• A centre adjacent to Beir Al-Sata Milad camp south-east of Tripoli;
• Strategic Industries complex in Taminhint, east of Sabha. Products developed by this center were stored in weaponry warehouses in Jabat `Areef, north-west of Sabha;
• Complex near Massah town north-west of Al-Baida city in the Green Mountain. A warehouse was annexed to this complex near Wadi Al-Koof main bridge.

Very large quantities of chemical and biological weapons were produced during the past 10 years and several plants were built to produce lethal biological materials. Raw materials were smuggled out of Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and Brazil. Others were imported from North Korea, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine. Experts came from Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, the former East Germany, North Korea, South Africa, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

Libyan military intelligence managed and arranged the transfer of chemical and biological materials to the following countries:

Jordan: In 1999 and 2000, Jordan received 45 barrels shipped under the disguise of car lubricants in empty containers which were returned to Jordan from Libya. A bribe was paid to some operators in ‘Aqaba port. These barrels which were carrying the symbol of Al-Buraiqa Company for Oil Marketing were stored in Jordan with Jordanian nationals of Palestinian origin, who work with Libyan Intelligence representatives.

Egypt: In 1998, the Egyptian Government approved the shipment of chemical material which was stored in a warehouse near Siwah district.

Sudan: In 1998, 1999 and 2000, the Sudan Government demanded and received 10 tons of Libyan chemical (and perhaps some biological) material, the last of which, two tons, was shipped by road to Al-Abiad city in the first week of August 2000.

Chad: In 1999, large quantities of chemical materials were shipped by road and stored near Mao city north of Chad. Other materials were shipped north of N’djamena and stored in a house owned by the Libyan Embassy. The operation was undertaken by Colonel Massoud Abdul Hafiz and the Libyan Qareen Saleh Qareen Alfeer in Chad and Mansour Bin Wadda’ah, a member of Libyan Intelligence. This quantity was estimated to be about 100 tons shipped from Al-Sara warehouse, and a military camp north of Ouzzo.

Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Liberia: Chemical materials were shipped in 1999 and 2000 to Burkina Faso for onward transfer to Liberia and Sierra Leone in cooperation with some diplomats and government employees from Ghana.

Central America: Five tons of chemical material and a number of cartons filled with biological complexes weighing 10kg were shipped by a Lebanese national to Belize and the Dominican Republic. The shipment was stored by some cooperatives of the Libyan Government of Indian origin.

Another Lebanese residing in Venezuela arranged to transfer chemical materials to the leftist insurgents in Colombia.

Subsequently, in late October 2001, this Service received information that the Libyan Government had moved its chemical and biological research and production facilities within the country to further cover their activities. As noted in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of October 31, 2001:

High-level and authoritative sources within the Libyan Government have told the Global Information System (GIS) that the Administration of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has now completed the re-location of the country’s chemical and biological weapons production plants, and had not dismantled his chemical and biological weapons production capabilities. As well, these sources reported, Libya had in 1999 moved much of its chemical (and possibly biological) weapons and materiel stockpiles out of the country to such places as Belize and numerous other locations.

… The chemical and biological weapons research and production facilities had previously been located in Az-Zawiyah, Sawfajjin, Sirte, Ajdabiya, Tobruq, Sabha, Ghadamis and Murzuq municipalities of Libya. They had now moved to Al-Jufrah municipality.

It was understood from the preliminary report from the GIS [Global Information System] sources — who had proven extremely reliable in the past — that a major chemical weapons facility had been moved to Hun, in northern al-Jufrah municipality. That facility was reportedly under the command of Adam Alkimawi, with other officers involved there being Col. Khaled Bayudh, Lt.-Col. Muftah Jaballah, and Maj. Mohammed Abdulfadil.

Another facility, involved in both chemical and biological weapons, had reportedly been moved to Sukna in al-Jufrah, not far from Hun. That facility was under the command of Col. Joni Mohammed Alghadi. [Note: all personnel names transliterated phonetically.]

A third chem. and bio. facility was reportedly sited in Sukna City proper and Ferjan in south-west Sukna, in al-Jufrah municipality. A fourth facility had been established in Hamam, in the north of Sukna, and a fifth reportedly in the Aafia Mountains.

Test Runs: In early 1980, Qadhafi needed to test his production of chemical and biological warfare, and had the opportunity for the first time during his war against Chad where whole villages were sprayed with chemical substances. The military campaign was led by his uncle, Colonel Hassan Ishkaal (died in December 1985), and Colonel Mufiah Asbieh (died during the war in Chad in 1987). Those two gave the orders to practically wipe out the inhabitants of several villages in Tisna and Zag in northern Chad, with a death toll of over 4,500 mostly children, women, and elderly.

Subsequently, Qadhafi used his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons on his own people. In 1993 he sent his army to subdue the rebels in Soussa, about 200km East of Benghazi on the Mediterranean Sea. The rebels were bombarded from helicopters with sprays of nerve gas and mustard gas whose traces can still be detected today on trees and rocks in the area.

Chemical Weapons Gifts: Qadhafi has been generous in donating his chemical weapons production to many of his friends. He supplied all parties in the war in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In March 2000, he rewarded the new military Government of Gen. Robert Guei in Côte d’Ivoire, which had succeeded in overthrowing the previous Government, with a large shipment of chemical material. The shipment was smuggled through Mali and was delivered by Colonel Saeed Owaidat and Colonel Abou Bakr Ali Mohammed Qadhafi. The Sudanese Government also received Qadhafi’s gift of chemical materials in November of 1999. Five 20 ft. containers each were shipped to Sudan by road to help in its war against the South.

Somalia’s war Chief Ali Hussein Aideed was the recipient of some chemical and conventional weapons in 1998. They were smuggled through the Libyan Embassy in Zimbabwe by Captain Mohamed Ajaz and Captain Muttafi Dallhil Qadhafi.

In March 2001, the Zimbabwe Government also received some conventional weapons supplied with chemical warheads.

In June 2001, the Central African Republic received a shipment of concentrated chemicals.

Overseas Stockpiles: As part of his strategy to destabilize the US and create havoc, Qadhafi planned to store his weapons as close as possible to US land. He managed to hide large amounts of chemical and biological weapons in secret locations around the globe. It is a known fact that he controls storage tanks in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean countries, as noted above. The materials were smuggled with the help of individuals, organizations, and political parties that received substantial amount of financial assistance

Meanwhile, an unidentified Libyan chemist was implicated in preparations for bio-terrorist attacks planned by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida organization, the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera said on October 21, 2001. The man’s rôle came to light in a conversation between a Tunisian and another Libyan intercepted by Italy’s DIGOS anti-terror squad. The newspaper reported that the Tunisian, identified as Essid bin Khemais, had been held in April 2001 in Milan. The other person on the telephone, Libyan national Lased bin Heni, was arrested in mid-October 2001 in Munich. According to the newspaper, bin Khemais was heard saying: "The Libyan, a chemistry teacher ... has the formula ... they’ve found a way of mixing the product with explosive ... it’s easy."

Public Posture on CW: Libya’s public position on chemical weapons is far different from its private posture. On Saturday, December 22, 2001, Col. Qadhafi notified diplomats in the Netherlands that he was ready to sign an international treaty banning chemical weapons. Qadhafi's "decision" followed private consultations with intermediaries for the West. Among them were former South African President Nelson Mandela and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the US. Jose Bustani, the Brazilian diplomat charged with implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, said on December 22, 2001, from his headquarters at The Hague that he had received a private commitment from Libya that it would sign the accord in the coming weeks. Despite problems with South African President Thabo Mbeki, Qadhafi maintains close ties with Mandela. Similarly, the rôle of Saudi Arabia in attempting to "mend fences" between Qadhafi and the West — by helping bring about Libyan adoption of the Chemical Weapons Treaty — is highly significant.⁸

8(c). Ballistic Missile Developments

GIS sources confirmed that the attempts to develop derivatives of Scud rockets and ballistic missiles were still underway by the Libyan Government. The Libyan authorities had contracted with Iraqis, Russians, North Koreans, and Indians for this operation. The Libyan Government is focusing on buying spare parts and equipment from different sources in the black market at the highest prices. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on November 8, 2000, carried the following report:

Highly-reliable sources confirmed that the Israeli national intelligence service, Mossad, on November 6, 2000, formally warned the states of southern Europe — Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey — that Libya recently deployed newly-acquired NoDong-1 SSMs in operational posture. These SSMs can now reach targets in these countries, as well as Israel.

The missiles are deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a Central HQ in the Tripoli area. It is not clear whether this deployment is a part of the Arab military build-up against Israel, or Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s reaction to the French moves to indict him for the 1989 in-flight bombing of the UTA DC-10 over Niger, or both.The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad’r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.In early 1999, reliable sources confirmed that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had told Col. Qadhafi that Libya "owed Egypt" because of the decisive Egyptian contribution to the lifting of the sanctions on Libya. [In fact, it is not true that Egyptian pressures were influential in raising the Libyan sanctions.] However, as a result of the Mubarak pressure — and shortly after the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on Libya — Qadhafi, in April 1999, dispatched a high-ranking delegation from the Libyan Army’s procurement directorate to the DPRK. The delegation included Egyptian and Iraqi experts.

The joint delegation visited the Chongchengang Corporation — the "company" responsible for the DPRK’s weapons and technology exports — and negotiated a comprehensive deal for North Korean assistance in the ostensibly "Libyan" acquisition of NoDong-type SSMs. Comparable deals were concluded with other states. For example, in the Fall of 1999, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) agreed to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya. The specifications of the wind tunnel ensured it could be used for missile design and flight. Several Libyan technicians (as well as Egyptian and Iraqi with Libyan documents) traveled to the PRC for missile-related technical training and engineering education.The DPRK, which had been a major contributor of technology and sub-systems to the Egyptian ballistic missile program, was to deliver key components to the reincarnated "Libyan" Bad’r/Condor program. This aspect of the program collapsed in the Summer of 1999 when Indian Customs authorities seized a North Korean ship with a concealed consignment of NoDong components, guidance and navigation systems. Initially, the Indians suspected that the shipment was destined for Pakistan, however subsequent investigation in cooperation with the US concluded that the cargo was on its way to Libya, via Malta.The failure of this procurement effort prompted a thorough re-evaluation of the Libya-based SSM program. The Egyptian and Iraqi program managers concluded that their cooperation with experts from Iran and Yugoslavia had so far failed to resolve the severe development problems. On top of this, Pyongyang reported it would take several months to replicate the special parts ordered by "Libya". Therefore, a few scientists from the former East Germany (GDR) were invited to Libya to audit the entire missile program. The Germans, all of them veterans of the Iraqi missile program, opined that it would take too long to revive the Bad’r/Condor to meet an urgent requirement for operational SSM for the anticipated crisis in the Middle East.Therefore, in the late Summer of 1999, Cairo and Baghdad urged Tripoli to purchase North Korean NoDong-1 SSMs on their behalf with the idea that Libya would keep a few of them for its own use. At the behest of Pres. Mubarak and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, Col. Qadhafi instructed General Abu-Bakr Jabir, the Libyan Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff — who also holds overall responsibility for the Libyan missile program — to personally devise a more direct way to acquire these missiles. Desperate for hard currency, Pyongyang expressed willingness to deliver numerous NoDong-1 SSMs the moment hard currency was delivered in a "safe laundered method". A North Korean delegation arrived in Tripoli to discuss the operational requirements and, in October 1999, General Abu-Bakr Jabir signed a deal with them for the supply of NoDong-1s and related technological expertise. In the Tripoli negotiations, the Libyans stressed the imperative to have the missiles deployed operationally immediately after their arrival in Libya.The eventual October 1999 deal was for the delivery of seven mobile launchers, 50 "missile systems" (each missile system includes several SSMs which can be carried on the support vehicles escorting the mobile launcher to a forward position), and related support vehicles. The North Koreans also agreed to construct the infrastructure required for the maintenance and storage of these missiles, as well as to train "Libyans" in all aspects of missile technology over a period of five years. The first consignment of missiles and launchers was to be delivered as soon as possible and the rest were to be delivered in three further consignments over the next two years.Pyongyang notified Tripoli that the missiles would be ready in the early Summer of 2000. The financial aspects of the deal were conducted by a Syrian arms merchant living in Marbella, Spain. Libyan agents paid him US$600-million (including a 15 percent commission). The money was laundered through banks in Madrid and Basle in Switzerland. The transaction was completed in Switzerland in July 2000.In August 2000, Libyan Il-76 transport aircraft delivered to Tripoli 36 NoDong-1 missiles, a few launchers and 11 North Korean experts. Two were senior officials overseeing the Libyan-North Korean cooperation and nine were missile engineers and technicians who will remain in Libya for two years in order to help bring the missiles to operational status as well as retain their operability.In late-September 2000, the first missiles and their launchers were deployed along the Mediterranean Sea coast. The location of these deployments and related targeting activities suggest they are pointed at NATO’s bases in southern Europe. Although Israel is within the NoDong-1’s range, little activity related to Israel was noticed. The NoDong-1 SSMs supplied to Libya can be equipped with both conventional and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) warheads. Although Libya has stocks of chemical and biological weapons hidden in underground stores in the desert, mainly the Sabha area, there is no indication that there are unconventional warheads with the SSMs.Meanwhile, the Libyans and their partners are most satisfied with the NoDong-1s and the North Korean support system. In late October 2000, Qadhafi initiated a new round of negotiations with Pyongyang for the acquisition of a larger number of SSMs, including newer models. Two Libyan envoys arrived in Marbella to conclude arrangements with the Syrian arms merchant for the laundering of additional funds. A Libyan official bragged that the new acquisition program would make Libya "one of the best-armed countries in the Mediterranean region".

8(d). The Special Relationship With Egypt: Egypt’s "special relationship" with Libya is worth noting, because it has been this which has contributed significantly to Egypt’s own "special relationship" with the United States. Apart from the Camp David-related aspects of the US-Egyptian alliance (which originated with the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel), it has been Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak’s commitment to the US to "keep Qadhafi under control" which has (a) helped maintain the ongoing defense supply relationship between the US and Egypt, and (b) helped keep US policymakers from taking aggressive action against Qadhafi.

Pres. Mubarak, at least once each six months, meets Qadhafi for what Egyptian officials privately call "attitude adjustment" sessions with the Libyan leader. Those meetings take place inside Egypt, mostly at Mersa Metruh, not far from where Qadhafi maintains extensive property holdings, including a large farm.

There is no question but that the Egyptian leadership feels that Libya falls under the Egyptian strategic umbrella. Libya has consistently over several decades provided an enormous employment zone for Egyptian nationals, and the Egyptian Government has strenuously resisted any US attempts or desires to replace Qadhafi, promising to "keep him under control".

Several factors now promise to affect this situation: (a) growing US disenchantment with Egyptian Pres. Mubarak, largely because of his "unproductive" rôle in the current Arab-Israeli dispute; (b) because of Pres. Mubarak’s insistence on placing his son in a position to succeed him in the Presidency; and (c) because of Egypt’s discreet strategic moves, using Libya as a conduit, to move outside the US-Egyptian military relationship by acquiring North Korean ballistic missile technology, among other things. The former US Clinton Administration paid little heed to these factors, but the new US Bush Administration is not taking the matters so lightly. This new situation will contribute in some way toward US policies vis-à-vis both Egypt and Libya.

1. The Monarchy and the Sanussiyyah Movement: The Libyan monarchical movement centers around the al-Senussi family, which led the Sanussiyyah movement — sometimes known as the Senussi Brotherhood — in the fight to rid Libya of foreign occupation and create the federated state which today forms Libya. The leader of this movement at the time was King Idris I, whose Government was overthrown on September 1, 1969, by (then) Lt. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in a coup while the King was in Greece seeking medical attention. The leader now is the King’s great-nephew, Prince Idris al-Senussi. Another claimant to the throne, who has no following and lacks the support of the Sanussiyyah religious leaders, is Prince Mohammad, the London-based son of the late Crown Prince.

The Sanussiyyah movement is an Islamic sect following a moderate line of the faith. The Senussi leaders, as descendants of the Prophet Mohammad, are Sharifs and, as such, command a considerable following through much of the Muslim world. The al-Senussi movement and the monarchy began, in 1990, to act as an umbrella for many of the opposition figures. Some 4-million Nigerians regard themselves as Sanussiyyah, for example, as do most of the Muslims in Niger, Chad and many others in the region.

The movement aims to restore democratically-elected government to Libya, with the King as a constitutional monarch. It is committed to the restoration of a market economy in Libya, with safeguards for foreign investors. It is pledged to the dismantling of Libya’s chemical and biological weapons capacity and of its strategic ballistic missile forces.

Structure: The movement is based around the leader, who is the claimaint to the Libyan throne. He is supported by an Advisory Council, in exile. The movement has links to several armed cells inside Libya, as well as to armed and non-armed opposition groups inside and outside Libya. The monarchy has retained military links inside the country since around 1970, when Prince Abdullah al-Senussi, the father of the present Heir Apparent, undertook the only credible military operation against Qadhafi inside Libya. The Italian Servizio Informazioni Difesa (Defense Information Service), which was privy to the plan, notified Qadhafi’s security services which in turn thwarted the bid.

Key personnel: Leader: Prince Idris al-Senussi. Prince Idris, who is in his forties, has a considerable background in the oil and gas industry, and is close with many key Middle Eastern leaders. He is married to Princess Anna-Maria, of Spain; she is the cousin of King Juan Carlos. They have one son; Prince Idris has a daughter from an earlier marriage, Princess Alia al-Senussi attends university in the US.

2. The Oil and Gas Industry. There is no doubting the centrality of the oil and gas industry to Libya’s economy. Oft-stated claims that Libya was moving toward diversifying the economy, particularly in agriculture, are largely rhetorical; little has been done, and, with the lack of any coherent organisational structure or power in the Government, it is likely that nothing will be done as long as Qadhafi remains in power. It is worth noting, however, that the $5,000 per capita oil and gas income for Libyans has not contributed to the strengthening of the national infrastructure. Much of this income has been diverted to the enhancement of Qadhafi’s foreign policy vision and military procurement, leaving both the national populace and the civil and energy infrastructure largely unimproved. Those areas of the energy infrastructure controlled by the Qadhafi Administration have been seriously neglected, and Libya’s current oil outflow of some 1.4-million bpd is about one-quarter of the national capacity. There has been a lag in exploration and exploitation of oil and gas reserves.

Several European countries — principally Italy, France and Spain — dominate the Libyan energy exploitation arena, and these countries (particularly Italy) are sensitive to any threats to change the Libyan leadership. They are also less than enthusiastic about the restoration of normalized relations with the US, which would immediately revive and modernize its assets which had been mothballed in Libya, and which would immediately fund greater exploration.

But the key outstanding issue is the question of sovereignty in the Gulf of Sidra. It will be recalled that Qadhafi had indicated in 1986 that a "line of death" at 32 deg. 30 min. North had been established across the Gulf of Sidra, indicating that the area below that was Libyan sovereign waters. The US then deliberately violated that "line of death" with its carriers to denote that these were international waters. This "line of death" extended more-or-less from the city of Benghazi (capital of Cyrenaica) in the East to Misrata on the Western shores of the Gulf. The Libyan Government has attempted since 1986, virtually unsuccessfully, to sell oil and gas exploration-exploitation concessions in the heart of the Gulf of Sidra. Not surprisingly, there is a significant question mark over Libya’s right, under international law, to sell such concessions in this area, known to be rich in, particularly, natural gas reserves.

It is likely — even probable — that the US would help broker the inclusion of the Gulf of Sidra into Libyan sovereign territory should the bilateral relationship be satisfactorily restored (ie: following the end of the Qadhafi era).

But the Gulf of Sidra is not the only major area of oil and gas territory remaining unexplored. The central strip of Libya, extending south from Misrata, remains untapped.

3. Conclusions:

1. A change of leadership can be expected in Libya within one to five years; possibly within one year, but almost certainly within five years.
2. Any foreseen scenario for a change of leadership in Libya within the next five years is likely to occur with minimal, or contained, violence, with very little consequence for the energy infrastructure in the country. Some disruption to the movement of foreign nationals, to communications, shipping, air transport, etc. would be likely for a period of one to three months, depending on the nature of the change of power. For assets located outside the major cities (Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirte, etc.), it is likely that there would be only a slight direct effect, or no direct effect, other than the need, during a transition period, to keep expatriate employees contained.
3. Given the possible (even probable) illness of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, it is possible that the transfer of power in the country could occur suddenly, leaving a scramble for power. For this reason, the current feelers about a possible power-sharing arrangement between Saif al-Islam and Prince Idris al-Senussi are critical to a smooth transition. However, it is possible that several other pretenders for power could arise. The US Central Intelligence Agency had, in the past, promoted the interests of a former Libyan Army colonel, for example, and it is probable that some others will seek power if a vacuum appears. However, most contenders lack both adequate military resources and legitimacy to retain control of the country. It is likely that, assuming a Saif al-Islam/Idris Senussi combination comes to power, that a power struggle between them would occur within a very short period of time. In that event, the Sanussiyyah movement becomes critical.
4. Any foreign investment in buying concessions from the Qadhafi Administration in the Gulf of Sidra — outside the 12 mile offshore sovereignty limit — would, at present, be of a high-risk nature, given the questionable sovereignty of Libya over this region at present. Such investment could be curtailed or disrupted at considerable cost to the investor.
5. It is possible that, in the event that Qadhafi is not marginalised due to ill-health over the coming 12 months, that the US will escalate indirect political and covert action against him and his Administration as part of the "war on terrorism". This would initially take the form of steps to constrain Libya’s international freedom of action, through financial or banking measures, and then by other means. Further escalation by the US would be determined by Qadhafi’s reaction to initial steps. Such US pressures could also hasten a transition of some sorts by Qadhafi to Saif al-Islam. A variety of factors then comes into play, including the attractiveness of various "exit options" for Qadhafi. The prospect of escalated US political/covert action against Qadhafi in the coming 12 months is considered "High".
6. It is possible that, in the event of Libyan resistance to US political pressures, Washington could again find a rationale to undertake direct military strikes against Libyan targets within 12 months to two years. The likelihood of such action must be considered "Medium-to-High". Such attacks, however, should also not target or directly affect energy industry infrastructure or personnel.

Footnotes:

1. Gadadfa, the tribe of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, alternately referred to, less correctly, as the Al-Qadhafa tribe or Qadhafiyyah peoples.

2. The Senussi name is transliterated variously — and all equally acceptably — as Sanusi, Sanussi, Senusi, Senussi, etc. Prince Idris, the current leader of the Sanussiyyah movement, uses the "Senussi" transliteration. GIS officials have had extensive knowledge of Prince Idris over some 20 years. See the section entitled The Monarchy and the Sanussiyyah Movement, below.

3. Alternately transliterated as Musa Kusa. Moussa Koussa, a long-standing intelligence leader for Qadhafi and head of the External Security Organization (ESO), was involved in the killing of a British policewoman in the 1980s, leading to the break in Libyan-UK relations. His return to the UK for the meetings was, therefore, of real significance. Moussa Koussa is not believed to have any independent power base within the security apparatus in Libya, and is totally dependent on Qadhafi for his authority.

4. Not long after the coup which put Qadhafi in power, Qadhafi forced the daughter of a key Royalist general, Kheidy Khaled, to marry him as a condition to release the general. This woman is the mother of Eng. Mohammed.

5. The mother of Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha comes from the Bara’asa tribe, near Beida. This tribe was traditionally close to the late King Idris I. The sister of this key wife of Qadhafi is married to Abdullah Senussi, who had been a key advisor to Qadhafi. There was, however, in 2001 a significant falling out between Qadhafi and this formerly powerful advisor.

6. On missile issues, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily [published by the International Strategic Studies Association, in the US], November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel, and later reporting. On chemical and biological weapons, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 31, 2001: Qadhafi Continues Development of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Moves Production Facilities and Stockpiles; Praises Bin Laden. These reports are quoted below in this study.

 7. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 7, 2001: Libyan Leader Undertakes New Purge of Officials.

8. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the US, has been trying to personally mend fences with Qadhafi. Under the US Clinton Administration, Bandar carried a message to Qadhafi that the US was interested in improving relations, but none of Clinton’s promises eventuated. Now, Bandar is also trying to ensure his usefulness to both the new US Administration and to mend fences with Qadhafi. Getting Qadhafi to sign the Chemical Weapons Treaty would be a sign that Libya was ingratiating itself with the West. In fact, however, there is little evidence that Libya would comply with the Treaty.

November 8, 2001

Libya's Qadhafi Seizes Opportunity to Move Out of Isolation While Expanding Radical Activities, Including CBW Development

Much of the following material has come from long-established Global Information System (GIS) direct sources.

Analysis. From GIS analysts and sources in Tripoli, Benghazi and elsewhere. There is growing evidence to suggest that Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi is using the current Western preoccupation with the war against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan to redouble his overt and covert efforts to assume a position of strategic dominance in Africa and to a lesser extent in the Middle East.

Equally, there is evidence that he has not diminished his antagonism toward the United States and United Kingdom, despite overtures to both countries to support their "war on terrorism". As well, there is strong evidence to suggest that the Libyan chemical and biological warfare and ballistic missile programs have in no way been curtailed, but have, in fact, been re-located and expanded. 

[On missile issues, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel, and later reporting. On chemical and biological weapons, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 31, 2001: Qadhafi Continues Development of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Moves Production Facilities and Stockpiles; Praises Bin Laden]

High-level Libyan sources in Tripoli, Benghazi and elsewhere have also indicated that Col. Qadhafi believes that the US and UK now need him and will move toward a normalization of political, diplomatic and trade relations without Libya having to abandon its new political, intelligence and military penetrations of sub-Saharan Africa. While discussing with the US the prospect of bringing moderates into his Government, Col. Qadhafi has, the sources say, moved to expand the purge on potential adversaries, and particularly to imprison under a variety of charges officials from the Benghazi district of Cyrenaica region, traditionally the home of the moderate Sanussi Muslim movement and opponents of Qadhafi.

The Qadhafi Administration has for several year been attempting to reach out to the UK, US and European governments to devise a rapprochement, and at the same time had been making overtures to key opponents abroad, ostensibly for the same purpose. However, he has been actively involved, concurrently, in attempting to purge Libya of his opponents, often — as with the current case of his "anti-corruption" drive — under the guise of pursuing legality and honesty in government. 

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 7, 2001: Libyan Leader Undertakes New Purge of Officials.]

During the first week of October 2001, the head of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), Musa Kusa and several other Libyan officials, met in London with US and British diplomatic and intelligence officials. [US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) officers were involved in the meetings.] The meetings, arranged partially through the communications good offices of a neutral African state, was ostensibly to discuss — according to the US State Department — "Libya's response to the remaining requirements of the UN resolutions on Lockerbie, in particular to accept responsibility for the actions of its officials and to pay appropriate compensation". A UK Foreign Office spokeswoman described the meeting as "positive and constructive". However, the fundamental purpose of the meeting was, from the Libyan perspective, to ensure that the US and UK removed the last major barriers to normalization of relations, so that Libya could pursue major US oil company participation in the country.

Ostensibly, also, the Libyan delegation offered to supply intelligence to the US and UK on radical Islamist organizations, although what was offered or provided was carefully crafted to target those groups which had opposed Qadhafi himself, such as the Fighting Islamic Group (FIG), which claimed responsibility for two attempts on Col. Qadhafi's life in 1995 and 1998. The UK-based newspaper, The Sunday Times, On October 7, 2001, said that "A Libyan intelligence official was welcomed in London last week by the Foreign Office as part of the coalition against terrorism. Musa Kusa, head of Libya's external security organization, held talks with MI6 and the Central Intelligence Agency. Mohammed Azwai, the Libyan ambassador in London, said Kusa had handed over a list of more than a dozen Libyans operating in Britain suspected of links to Osama Bin Laden." Significantly, however, as Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted on October 31, 2001, Col. Qadhafi had, in July 2001, still been sending payments to support the activities of affiliates al-Qaida, the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. At that time he sent $25-million. 

At the same time, the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report of October 31, 2001, said, Col. Qadhafi had told a private meeting of delegates to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Doha, on October 10, 2001, that he thought that Osama bin Laden had proven himself a "true hero" through his attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. He also told the OIC gathering in its private session — which he had requested — that the rest of the Muslim would should be ashamed of themselves for not having done something similar earlier.

The US, in its search to find new allies in the war against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida had, US sources confirmed, deliberately turned a blind eye to ongoing Libyan radical or terrorist-related activities around the world, and particularly in Africa. The US had, according to media reports (including a BBC report of October 31, 2001), been in high-level contact with officials from Syria and Sudan, as well as Libya, to seek their cooperation in the "war on terrorism".

Libya's efforts have not been wasted. On November 5, 2001, a former senior US official, Robert Pelletreau, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs from 1994 to 1997 and a former ambassador to Egypt and Tunisia, presumably acting on the basis of information received, indicated that the US could ease sanctions against Libya in 2002 as part of a broader effort to reform a unilateral sanctions policy and in return for recent cooperation against terrorism. Libya, he indicated, had provided intelligence on al-Qaida terrorist network to US Government officials and had cooperated with the UN in the Lockerbie [Pan Am 103 bombing] trial. "The stage seems set for further progress," Pelletreau said in remarks at the US-Africa Business Summit. US oil company executives' hopes of meeting Libyan representatives at the African-US business summit were dashed because the US State Department did not allow Libyans to attend the summit. "An application was indeed made by the Libyans and was turned down by the State Department," Robert Pelletreau said.

Col. Qadhafi had, on October 23, 2001, described the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US as "horrifying" and called for an international conference to define terrorism and then fight it. "We must sit down at any level without emotions ... and after we define terrorism we agree on fighting terrorism," Qadhafi said in an interview with Qatar's al-Jazeera television. He described the attacks as "horrifying, destructive" and said they had caused enormous loss of life and economic damage that had affected all countries. Qadhafi evaded answering direct questions on US military attacks on Afghanistan. Earlier, Col. Qadhafi had indicated that the US itself was a sponsor of terrorism. 

The international diplomatic offensive by Qadhafi continued throughout Europe, in particular with France and Germany. On November 6, 2001, the chief aide of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder met with the Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, a son of Col. Qadhafi, in Berlin for talks on "consolidating the international coalition against terrorism". Saif al-Islam told Chancellery chief Frank-Walter Steinmeier that Libya condemned the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and was ready to work together with the international community in the fight against terrorism. The meeting between the two men came ahead of a verdict expected on November 13, 2001, in the trial of five people charged for the bloody 1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque. The prosecution has said that Libya was behind the anti-US attack.

Russia and Libya were also, in early November 2001, preparing a summit between Col. Qadhafi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but had not finalized the details yet. The planned summit "is on the agenda of bilateral relations" and the sides "are working actively for the success of the meeting," Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said on October 31, 2001, after conferring with his Libyan counterpart Abdel-Rahman Shalgam. Shalgam forecast that 2002 would witness a big leap in economic exchanges between Moscow and Tripoli.

Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Libyan intelligence and front organizations are active throughout Africa, on an increasing basis during 2000-2001. GIS is aware of the fact that numerous senior government and former government officials in many countries were, as at late 2001, receiving regular payments from the Libyan Government for unspecified activities.

As part of Libya's overt activities in sub-Saharan Africa, Libya has throughout much of 2001 acted to support Central African Republic (CAR) Pres. Ange-Felix Patasse, who has faced two recent coup attempts. On November 6, 2001, as reported in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of November 7, 2001, Libyan-backed Government forces went on the offensive, attacking the barracks where the former Army chief, General François Bozize, was believed to be holed up on the fourth day of fighting in the central African capital, Bangui. Libya already had 100 troops in Bangui, and a further 60 arrived on November 6, 2001. Libya now had strong influence in Chad and the CAR, and further south in Zimbabwe.

As part of Libya's covert activities in sub-Saharan Africa, a unit of more than 20 senior Libyan intelligence officers arrived in mid-October 2001 to support President Robert Mugabe's security and intelligence system as the nation moved towards the 2002 presidential election, only five months away. They were understood to be training Zimbabwean intelligence personnel arid President Mugabe's close security unit. As with the case of Pres. Patasse in CAR, Zimbabwe President Mugabe is wary over his security — and does not trust many of his own security personnel — in the event of losing the next election which pits his 38-year-old ZANU-PF party against the two-year-old opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). A British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, said at the same time that "hundreds of Libyan troops', part of Qadhafi's élite forces, "known for their terror tactics, were being housed in secret locations scattered across the country" [Zimbabwe]. The Daily Telegraph, quoting intelligence sources, said there was a growing number of intelligence officers turning against Mugabe, forcing him to turn elsewhere for protection. The Libyans were to be issued with Zimbabwean passports by the Registrar-General's office to help Mugabe's presidential election campaign, the newspaper said.

Other press reports from South Africa in mid-October suggested that PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), a Libyan-funded vigilante group which campaigns against drug lords in the Cape Town Flats, in South Africa, would be unleashed on Zimbabwean white commercial farmers in a terror campaign. At the same time, the Zimbabwe Government itself had become obligated to the Libyans after it sought a US$340-million loan to purchase fuel. The Independent, a Zimbabwe newspaper, reported in October 2001 that the Libyans were about to acquire major stakes in the country's two financial institutions and a major hotel group in addition to receiving 8,000ha of land for industrial and farming purposes.

As part of Libya's covert actions in sub-Saharan Africa, The Washington Post confirmed on November 3, 2001, that the terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden had reaped millions of dollars from the illicit sale of diamonds mined by rebels in Sierra Leone. The report quoted US and European intelligence officials. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was quoted by the newspaper as saying that key operatives in bin Laden's al-Qaida network worked with diamond dealers to buy gems from Revolutionary United Front rebels and sell them for large profits in Europe. The diamond dealers were selected by Ibrahim Bah, a Libyan-trained former Senegalese rebel and the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) principal diamond dealer. The report implicated Libya directly with the RUF, the Liberian Government of Charles Taylor, the Government of Burkina Faso, and others, in the illicit sale of "blood diamonds" as a transaction commodity to fund weapons and subversion. 

Chemical and Biological Weapons Activities

Historic Development of Libyan CBW: Since seizing power in a military coup d'etat on September 1, 1969, Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has launched a relentless systematic campaign to produce biological and chemical weapons to help him in his undeclared war against the US and the West.  

Libyan sources confirm that Qadhafi had begun planning, early in 1970, for the acquisition of a weapon with which to face the US and UK, as those powers were negotiating the conditions to leave their military bases in Libya. He initially planned on acquiring nuclear power and approached the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea), India and Pakistan, in that order. He was harshly rebuffed and in many instances dismissively. During President Anwar as-Sadat's term of office in Egypt, he turned to some former members of the Egyptian intelligence service (Mukhabarat el-Aama) who had served under President Sadat's predecessor, President Gamal Abdel Nasser. These officers had been expelled by Pres. Sadat and instructed to stay away from Egyptian affairs. They subsequently went to work for Col. Qadhafi. Their advice to him was to stay away from nuclear power and concentrate instead on building a chemical and biological weapons arsenal, advising him that this was easier, cheaper, more accessible, and could be done without the knowledge of the US.

Qadhafi ordered the hiring of experts and scientists in this specialized field mainly from the Soviet bloc countries, but several others from Europe, the US, UK, and Canada. Additionally a team of about 450 specialists was sent to him by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. He formed a special task force in the Army to undertake the research and production of biological and chemical weapons. The task force was headed by two Army officers: Captain Noun Asyamen and Captain Gaith Ibrahim Aizawi. Large quantities of materials were bought directly from India, Russia, and the West. During the UN boycott, Qadhafi smuggled thousands of tons of chemical and biological materials and stored them all over Libya, particularly in: South-Western Tarhouna South of Bani Walid, Al Sara military barracks, the Air Force base on the way to Otizou near Chad, storage in Am Ohazal near Tobruq, and a storage facility on kilometer 20 on the way to Ghadas. it is believed that Qadhafi produced over 84 different grades of chemical material and 43 different biological ingredients.

In 1972 the Qadhafi Administration initiated practical steps to produce chemical and biological weapons after it received reports about Israel's ability to produce such weapons. These reports were delivered by Fathi EI-Zeeb, President Gamal Abdel Nasser's consultant at the time, and from the Palestinians. Large budgets were allocated in order to face Israel in the fields of biological, chemical and atomic warfare. The Arab Development Institute and the Atomic Energy Authority were established in Tripoli, in order to attract experts from the West and communist countries with a stress on those of Arab origin. Omar Muheishi, of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), was put in charge of those projects.

In July 1972, a committee called "The Commission For Chemical Support" was established within the Arms Department headed by Captain Gaith Ibrahim, who was aided by two Libyan officers, two Egyptian experts, a Pakistani, a Yugoslav, and an expert from South Africa residing in Monte Carlo.

From that time, serious efforts were undertaken to build an effective chemical weapon program to counterbalance what Israel was trying to do and in accordance with Col. Qadhafi's plans. Manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons was done in parallel ways with more attention being paid to the chemical side. However, in 1982, chemical as well as biological manufacturing were given equal importance until today.

The famous Rabta plant was built in the south of Tripoli, and there large quantities of Mustard gas (or nerve gas as the Libyans called it) were produced. However, after the big international media uproar which engulfed the plant and the danger it posed to the Administration, and subsequent to the embargo directed by the United Nations Security Council, secrecy was strictly applied thereafter in the manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons. In early 1992, a larger number of experts in chemical and biological fields were contracted from Iraq after the second Gulf war, and from Eastern Europe after the collapse of the communism, as well as from North Korea, Vietnam, and with Armenians from the remnants of the Soviet Army. In 1992, the chemical manufacturing units were transferred from the Rabta plant to the following locations:

• 1. In south-east Tarhunah in specially-designed underground bunkers still operating until some time in 2001;

• 2. The Jallo barracks in the area of the oilfields in Jallo city (where there is an important chemical weapons unit under the supervision of Captain-chemist Saeed Ibrahim Alzewi, who graduated from the School of Science Chemistry Department, before he joined the Military Officers College);

• 3. A secret location inside a farm south of Souk Al-Alalika in Sabrata operated by technicians brought in from the Abu Kammash Chemical Complex. This location also holds a special division for biological weapons and warehouses with operational equipment to store the products.

Other warehouses: There ertr other locations to store the products away from the manufacturing plants as follows:

• Underground warehouse 45km south of Tarhunah (1,250 barrels, 200 liters capacity of chemical materials transferred from Rabta plant);

• Adjacent warehouse to the main weapons storage in Jihanam, Sirte Province, which includes 1,300 barrels transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah. This warehouse also includes biological material of unknown quantity. Captain Massoud Khamis Abdel Salam Al-Qadhafi supervises this warehouse;

• Warehouse in Al-Nawaqiyya district near Benghazi supervised by Captain Mohamed Muftah Al-Oraibi and includes 1,100 barrels of chemical materials;

• Warehouse in Al-Kafra area on the road to Al-Sara military camp which includes 1,800 barrels of chemical material and other biological materials which was transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah;

• Warehouse near Ain Ghazal town in Tobruq district which includes 1,350 barrels of chemical materials and other biological materials;

• Warehouse near 'Afiah region in Black mountains which includes 1,450 barrels transferred from the Rabta plant in 1992;

• Warehouse in Ghat military camp containing 2,000 barrels;

• Warehouse near Al-Kara military camp with 2,700 barrels.

The stored materials are made of different kinds of chemicals most importantly Mustard and Nerve gas (which may be the same thing, in Libyan parlance).

Research and studies are still underway to produce new kinds and develop existing chemicals. A central plant in the military farm near Tajoura' is working closely with the Industrial and Agricultural Studies Centers and Chemical and Biology Departments at the College of Science, Tripoli University. The team of this center consists of 83 experts and analysts, helped by 91 technicians of different nationalities. All of those were contracted by the University to Tripoli, the Industrial and Agricultural Research Center, Abu Kammash Chemical complex, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture as a cover for their actual mission for biological and chemical research.

There were special units for biological warfare operating in the following locations:

1. A Center adjacent to Beir Al-Sata Milad camp south-east of Tripoli;
2. Strategic Industries complex in Taminhint, east of Sabha. Products developed by this center were stored in weaponry warehouses in Jabat `Areef, north-west of Sabha;
3. Complex near Massah town north-west of Al-Baida city in the Green Mountain. A warehouse was annexed to this complex near Wadi Al-Koof main bridge.

Very large quantities of chemical and biological weapons were produced during the past 10 years and several plants were built to produce lethal biological materials. As the raw materials were smuggled out of Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and Brazil. Others were imported from North Korea, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine. Experts came from Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, the former East Germany, North Korea, South Africa, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

The Libyan military intelligence transferred chemical and biological materials to the following countries:

Jordan: In 1999 and 2000, Jordan received 45 barrels shipped under the disguise of car lubricants in empty containers which were returned to Jordan from Libya. A bribe was paid to some operators in Aqaba port. These barrels which were carrying the symbol of Al- Buraiqa Company for Oil Marketing were stored in Jordan with Jordanian nationals of Palestinian origin, who work with the Libyan Intelligence representatives.

Egypt: In 1998, the Egyptian Government approved the shipment of chemical material which was stored in a warehouse near Siwah district.

Sudan: In 1998, 1999 and 2000, the Sudan Government demanded and received 10 tons of Libyan chemical (and perhaps some biological) material, the last of which, two tons, was shipped by road to Al-Abiad city in the first week of August 2000.

Chad: In 1999, large quantities of chemical materials were shipped by road and stored near Mao city north of Chad. Other materials were shipped north of N'djamena) and stored in a house owned by the Libyan Embassy. The operation was undertaken by Colonel Massoud Abdul Hafiz and the Libyan Qareen Saleh Qareen Alfeer in Chad and Mansour Bin Wadda'ah, a member of Libyan Intelligence. This quantity was estimated to be about 100 tons shipped from Al-Sara warehouse, and a military camp north of Ouzzo.

Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Liberia: Chemical materials were shipped in 1999 and 2000 to Burkina Faso for onward transfer to Liberia and Sierra Leone in cooperation with some diplomats and government employees from Ghana.

Central America: Five tons of chemical material and a number of cartons filled with biological complexes weighing 10kg were shipped by a Lebanese national to Belize and the Dominican Republic. The shipment was stored by some cooperatives of the Libyan Government of Indian origin.

Another Lebanese residing in Venezuela arranged to transfer chemical materials to the leftist insurgents in Colombia.

Subsequently, in late October 2001, GIS received information that the Libyan Government had moved its chemical and biological research and production facilities within the country to further cover their activities. As noted in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of October 31, 2001:

High-level and authoritative sources within the Libyan Government have told GIS that the Administration of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has now completed the re-location of the country's chemical and biological weapons production plants, and had not dismantled his chemical and biological weapons production capabilities. As well, these sources reported, Libya had in 1999 moved much of its chemical (and possibly biological) weapons and materiel stockpiles out of the country to such places as Belize and numerous other locations. 

Furthermore, the sources said that Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi had been sending funds to the Osama bin Laden organization as recently as July 2001, when US$25-million was sent to support bin Laden's activities. Other sources, present at a closed-door session called by Qadhafi at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Doha, Qatar, in October 2001, said that Qadhafi had praised bin Laden as a "true hero", for his terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Only the Lebanese, Iranian and Syrian representatives at the meeting reportedly opposed Qadhafi for his remarks, with at least one leader reportedly calling him a coward for not having made his remarks in public.

The chemical and biological weapons research and production facilities had previously been located in Az-Zawiyah, Sawfajjin, Sirte, Ajdabiya, Tubruq, Sabha, Ghadamis and Murzuq municipalities of Libya. They had now moved to Al-Jufrah municipality. 

It was understood from the preliminary report from the GIS sources — who had proven extremely reliable in the past — that a major chemical weapons facility had been moved to Hun, in northern al-Jufrah municipality. That facility was reportedly under the command of Adam Alkimawi, with other officers involved there being Col. Khaled Bayudh, Lt.-Col. Muftah Jaballah, and Maj. Mohammed Abdulfadil.

Another facility, involved in both chemical and biological weapons, had reportedly been moved to Sukna in al-Jufrah, not far from Hun. That facility was under the command of Col. Joni Mohammed Alghadi. [Note: all personnel names transliterated phonetically.]

A third chem. and bio. facility was reportedly sited in Sukna City proper and Ferjan in south-west Sukna, in al-Jufrah municipality. A fourth facility had been established in Hamam, in the north of Sukna, and a fifth reportedly in the Aafia Mountains.

Test Runs: In early 1980, Qadhafi needed to test his production of chemical and biological warfare, and had the opportunity for the first time during his war against Chad where whole villages were sprayed with chemical substances. The military campaign was led by his uncle, Colonel Hassan Ishkaal (died in December 1935), and Colonel Mufiah Asbieh (died during the war in Chad in 1987). Those two gave the orders to practically wipe out the inhabitants of several villages in Tisna and Zag in northern Chad, with a death toll of over 4,500 mostly children, women, and elderly.

Subsequently, Qadhafi used his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons on his own people. In 1993 he sent his army to subdue the rebels in Soussa, about 200km East of Benghazi on the Mediterranean Sea. The rebels were bombarded from helicopters with sprays of nerve gas and mustard gas whose traces can still be detected today on trees and rocks in the area.

Chemical Weapons Gifts: Qadhafi has been generous in donating his chemical weapons production to many of his friends. He supplied all parties in the war in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In March 2000, he rewarded the new military Government of Gen. Robert Guei in Côte d'Ivoire, which had succeeded in overthrowing the previous Government, with a large shipment of chemical material. The shipment was smuggled through Mali and was delivered by Colonel Saeed Owaidat and Colonel Abou Bakr Ali Mohammed Qadhafi. The Sudanese Government also received Qadhafi's gift of chemical materials in November of 1999. Five 20 ft. containers each were shipped to Sudan by road to help in its war against the South. 

Somalia's war Chief Ali Hussein Aideed was the recipient of some chemical and conventional weapons in 1998. They were smuggled through the Libyan Embassy in Zimbabwe by Captain Mohamed Ajaz and Captain Muttafi Dallhil Qadhafi. 

In March 2001, the Zimbabwe Government also received some conventional weapons supplied  with chemical warheads. 

In June 2001, the Central African Republic received a shipment of concentrated chemicals.

Overseas Stockpiles: As part of his strategy to destabilize the US and create havoc, Qadhafi planned to store his weapons as close as possible to US land. He managed to hide large amounts of chemical and biological weapons in secret locations around the globe. It is a known fact that he controls storage tanks in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean countries, as noted above. The materials were smuggled with the help of individuals, organizations, and political parties that received substantial amount of financial assistance

Meanwhile, an unidentified Libyan chemist was implicated in preparations for bio-terrorist attacks planned by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida organization, the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera said on October 21, 2001. The man's rôle came to light in a conversation between a Tunisian and another Libyan intercepted by Italy's DIGOS anti-terror squad. The newspaper reported that the Tunisian, identified as Essid bin Khemais, had been held in April 2001 in Milan. The other person on the telephone, Libyan national Lased bin Heni, was arrested in mid-October 2001 in Munich. According to the newspaper, bin Khemais was heard saying: "The Libyan, a chemistry teacher... has the formula ... they've found a way of mixing the product with explosive ... it's easy."

Ballistic Missile Developments

GIS sources confirmed that the attempts to develop derivatives of Scud rockets and ballistic missiles were still underway by the Government. The Libyan authorities had contracted with Iraqis, Russians, North Koreans, and Indians for this operation. The Libyan Government is focusing on buying spare parts and equipment from different sources in the black market at the highest prices. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on November 8, 2000, carried the following report:

Highly-reliable sources confirmed that the Israeli national intelligence service, Mossad, on November 6, 2000, formally warned the states of southern Europe — Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey — that Libya recently deployed newly-acquired NoDong-1 SSMs in operational posture. These SSMs can now reach targets in these countries, as well as Israel.

The missiles are deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a Central HQ in the Tripoli area. It is not clear whether this deployment is a part of the Arab military build-up against Israel, or Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's reaction to the French moves to indict him for the 1989 in-flight bombing of the UTA DC-10 over Niger, or both.

The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad'r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.

In early 1999, reliable sources confirmed that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had told Col. Qadhafi that Libya "owed Egypt" because of the decisive Egyptian contribution to the lifting of the sanctions on Libya. [In fact, it is not true that Egyptian pressures were influential in raising the Libyan sanctions.] However, as a result of the Mubarak pressure — and shortly after the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on Libya — Qadhafi, in April 1999, dispatched a high-ranking delegation from the Libyan Army's procurement directorate to the DPRK. The delegation included Egyptian and Iraqi experts. 

The joint delegation visited the Chongchengang Corporation — the "company" responsible for the DPRK's weapons and technology exports — and negotiated a comprehensive deal for North Korean assistance in the ostensibly "Libyan" acquisition of NoDong-type SSMs. Comparable deals were concluded with other states. For example, in the Fall of 1999, the People's Republic of China (PRC) agreed to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya. The specifications of the wind tunnel ensured it could be used for missile design and flight. Several Libyan (as well as Egyptian and Iraqi with Libyan documents) technicians traveled to the PRC for missile-related technical training and engineering education.

The DPRK, which had been a major contributor of technology and sub-systems to the Egyptian ballistic missile program, was to deliver key components to the reincarnated "Libyan" Bad'r/Condor program. This aspect of the program collapsed in the Summer of 1999 when Indian Customs authorities seized a North Korean ship with a concealed consignment of NoDong components, guidance and navigation systems. Initially, the Indians suspected that the shipment was destined for Pakistan, however subsequent investigation in cooperation with the US concluded that the cargo was on its way to Libya, via Malta.

The failure of this procurement effort prompted a thorough re-evaluation of the Libya-based SSM program. The Egyptian and Iraqi program managers concluded that their cooperation with experts from Iran and Yugoslavia had so far failed to resolve the severe development problems. On top of this, Pyongyang reported it would take several month to replicate the special parts ordered by "Libya".
Therefore, a few scientists from the former East Germany (GDR) were invited to Libya to audit the entire missile program. The Germans, all of them veterans of the Iraqi missile program, opined that it would take too long to revive the Bad'r/Condor to meet urgent requirement for operational SSM for the anticipated crisis in the Middle East.

Therefore, in the late Summer of 1999, Cairo and Baghdad urged Tripoli to purchase North Korean NoDong-1 SSMs on their behalf with the idea that Libya would keep a few of them for its own use. At the behest of Pres. Mubarak and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, Col. Qadhafi instructed General Abu-Bakr Jabir, the Libyan Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff — who also holds overall responsibility for the Libyan missile program — to personally devise a more direct way to acquire these missiles. Desperate for hard currency, Pyongyang expressed willingness to deliver numerous NoDong-1 SSMs the moment hard currency was delivered in a "safe laundered method". A North Korean delegation arrived in Tripoli to discuss the operational requirements and, in October 1999, General Abu-Bakr Jabir signed a deal with them for the supply of NoDong-1s and related technological expertise. In the Tripoli negotiations, the Libyans stressed the imperative to have the missiles deployed operationally immediately after their arrival in Libya.

The eventual October 1999 deal was for the delivery of seven mobile launchers, 50 "missile systems" (each missile system includes several SSMs which can be carried on the support vehicles escorting the mobile launcher to a forward position), and related support vehicles. The North Koreans also agreed to construct the infrastructure required for the maintenance and storage of these missiles, as well as to train "Libyans" in all aspects of missile technology over a period of five years. The first consignment of missiles and launchers was to be delivered as soon as possible and the rest were to be delivered in three further consignments over the next two years.

Pyongyang notified Tripoli that the missiles would be ready in the early Summer of 2000. The financial aspects of the deal were conducted by a Syrian arms merchant living in Marbella, Spain. Libyan agents paid him US$600-million (including a 15 percent commission). The money was laundered through banks in Madrid and Basle in Switzerland. The transaction was completed in Switzerland in July 2000.

In August 2000, Libyan Il-76 transport aircraft delivered to Tripoli 36 NoDong-1 missiles, a few launchers and 11 North Korean experts. Two were senior officials overseeing the Libyan-North Korean cooperation and nine were missile engineers and technicians who will remain in Libya for two years in order to help bring the missiles to operational status as well as retain their operability.

In late-September 2000, the first missiles and their launchers were deployed along the Mediterranean Sea coast. The location of these deployments and related targeting activities suggest they are pointed at NATO's bases in southern Europe. Although Israel is within the NoDong-1's range, little activity related to Israel was noticed. The NoDong-1 SSMs supplied to Libya can be equipped with both conventional and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) warheads. Although Libya has stocks of chemical and biological weapons hidden in underground stores in the desert, mainly the Sabha area, there is no indication that there are unconventional warheads with the SSMs.

Meanwhile, the Libyans and their partners are most satisfied with the NoDong-1s and the North Korean support system. In late October 2000, Qadhafi initiated a new round of negotiations with Pyongyang for the acquisition of a larger number of SSMs, including newer models. Two Libyan envoys arrived in Marbella to conclude arrangements with the Syrian arms merchant for the laundering of additional funds. A Libyan official bragged that the new acquisition program would make Libya "one of the best-armed countries in the Mediterranean region".

January 12, 2001

Collapse of Lockerbie PA103 Case Changes Strategic Disposition of Libya

European Union governments and the United States incoming Bush Administration are facing uncertainty as to how to deal with the Libyan Government of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi following the virtual collapse of the terrorism case against two Libyans who had been charged in connection with the bombing of Pan Am Flight PA103 over, Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988. The allegations of Libyan responsibility for the crime were the ostensible basis for Western trade and political embargoes against Libya for more than a decade.

Now, as Col. Qadhafi is once again engaging Libya in strategically significant defense arrangements with Iraq and other countries opposed to the US and EU states, the US and EU may be vulnerable to Libyan legal claims amounting many billions of dollars as a result of the economic damage done to Libya by the embargoes. This could significantly increase Libya's strategic capability and freedom at a time when — because of Libyan deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) targeting Southern Europe — there is growing, rather than declining, concern over Col. Qadhafi's intentions.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily exclusive of November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel.]

The Scottish judges hearing the case in the Netherlands against two Libyans suspected of the Lockerbie bombing have been told it would be "unreasonable and unsafe" to convict them, according to reports from the court on January 11, 2001. The two accused are Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi, 48, and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, 44. The accused have alleged that Palestinian terrorists carried out the bombing, and Bill Taylor QC (Queen's Counsel: a barrister, or trial lawyer), for the defense, said that the prosecution had failed to dismiss that possibility. Mr Taylor indicated that a cell of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) was likely to have been the responsible organizer of the bombing.

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs sources reported shortly after the bombing that Iranian-backed Syrian and Palestinian elements were involved in organizing the bombing and that the Libyans, if involved, were only marginally connected with the crime. Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988, killing all 259 people on board and another 11 on the ground. 

As he made his closing submission at Camp Zeist, in the Netherlands, the judge said that it would have been an "extraordinary coincidence" if Palestinian terrorists based in Germany had not planted the bomb which blew up Pan Am flight 103.

Mr Taylor, for the defense, said: "Whilst the defense cannot prove responsibility it can show the court that there is some relevant information which points away from the Crown [UK Government Prosecution] theory and the alleged guilt of the two accused. The PFLP-GC German terror cell had access to similar, but not identical, Toshiba radios which experts believed contained the Pan Am bomb, and a raid on their base discovered they had stocks of different kinds of trigger devices. There would still need to be an extraordinary coincidence that a group using such material in such a way in October 1988 in Germany was not responsible for the bombing of a flight which passed through Germany two months later."

Mr Taylor said that, before the court could find the two men guilty, it would need to dismiss that coincidence. He told the judges: "It would be unreasonable and unsafe to take that course."

Once Mr Taylor completes his case, Mr Richard Keen, QC, defending Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, will also insist his client is innocent and urge the judges to acquit.

On Tuesday, January 9, 2001, the Crown dropped two of the three charges faced by the Libyans. They had been initially charged with murder, conspiracy to murder and contravening the aviation security acts. Now they face one charge of mass murder. On Wednesday, January 10, 2001, prosecutors closed their case and said the evidence before the court demonstrated that the accused were responsible for the bombing. But the Crown case closed with an admission that it was not known how the suitcase containing the bomb which destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 was placed on board the Boeing 747.

Advocate deputy Alistair Campbell, QC, said it was not essential to say how the bomb had got on board.

The judges on the panel were expected to retire for about a week before delivering their verdict to the court at Camp Zeist.

December 10, 2001

Qadhafi’s Health at Issue as Libyan Future Debated

Exclusive. From GIS Correspondents in Tripoli, and elsewhere. Highly-reliable sources inside the Libyan leadership indicate that there are growing concerns over the health of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi who has now undergone several collapses which have left him in comas lasting up to five hours. No medical explanations have yet been found for the illnesses. 

At the same time, Col. Qadhafi has embarked on a series of initiatives designed to overcome the re-imposition of US sanctions against Libya which, despite the lifting of the UN sanctions, penalizes European or other non-US companies from doing business in the US if they work with Qadhafi. But despite attempts to ingratiate himself with the West, Qadhafi has also embarked on a series of new initiatives in Southern Africa, where he has provided extensive funding and security support for embattled Zimbabwean Pres. Robert Mugabe, and launched initiatives to undermine South African Pres. Thabo Mbeki who “stole” the crown of being the founding President of the new African Union.

The Union will hold its first summit in early 2002 in South Africa, not Sirte, Libya, where Qadhafi had intended the first such summit should be.

November 8, 2000

Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel

The following report includes material from GIS stations in various Middle Eastern states.

Exclusive. By Yossef Bodansky, GIS. Highly-reliable sources confirmed that the Israeli national intelligence service, Mossad, on November 6, 2000, formally warned the states of southern Europe — Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey — that Libya recently deployed newly- acquired NoDong-1 SSMs in operational posture. These SSMs can now reach targets in these countries, as well as Israel.

The missiles are deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a Central HQ in the Tripoli area. It is not clear whether this deployment is a part of the Arab military build-up against Israel, or Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's reaction to the French moves to indict him for the 1989 in-flight bombing of the UTA DC-10 over Niger, or both.

The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad'r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.

In early 1999, reliable sources confirmed that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had told Col. Qadhafi that Libya "owed Egypt" because of the decisive Egyptian contribution to the lifting of the sanctions on Libya. [In fact, it is not true that Egyptian pressures were influential in raising the Libyan sanctions.] However, as a result of the Mubarak pressure — and shortly after the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on Libya — Qadhafi, in April 1999, dispatched a high-ranking delegation from the Libyan Army's procurement directorate to the DPRK. The delegation included Egyptian and Iraqi experts. 

The joint delegation visited the Chongchengang Corporation — the "company" responsible for the DPRK's weapons and technology exports — and negotiated a comprehensive deal for North Korean assistance in the ostensibly "Libyan" acquisition of NoDong-type SSMs. Comparable deals were concluded with other states. For example, in the Fall of 1999, the People's Republic of China ( PRC) agreed to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya. The specifications of the wind tunnel ensured it could be used for missile design and flight. Several Libyan (as well as Egyptian and Iraqi with Libyan documents) technicians traveled to the PRC for missile-related technical training and engineering education.

The DPRK, which had been a major contributor of technology and sub-systems to the Egyptian ballistic missile program, was to deliver key components to the reincarnated "Libyan" Bad'r/Condor program. This aspect of the program collapsed in the Summer of 1999 when Indian Customs authorities seized a North Korean ship with a concealed consignment of NoDong components, guidance and navigation systems. Initially, the Indians suspected that the shipment was destined for Pakistan, however subsequent investigation in cooperation with the US concluded that the cargo was on its way to Libya, via Malta.

The failure of this procurement effort prompted a thorough re-evaluation of the Libya-based SSM program. The Egyptian and Iraqi program managers concluded that their cooperation with experts from Iran and Yugoslavia had so far failed to resolve the severe development problems. On top of this, Pyongyang reported it would take several month to replicate the special parts ordered by "Libya". Therefore, a few scientists from the former East Germany (GDR) were invited to Libya to audit the entire missile program. The Germans, all of them veterans of the Iraqi missile program, opined that it would take too long to revive the Bad'r/Condor to meet urgent requirement for operational SSM for the anticipated crisis in the Middle East.

Therefore, in the late Summer of 1999, Cairo and Baghdad urged Tripoli to purchase North Korean NoDong-1 SSMs on their behalf with the idea that Libya would keep a few of them for its own use. At the behest of Pres. Mubarak and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, Col. Qadhafi instructed General Abu-Bakr Jabir, the Libyan Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff — who also holds overall responsibility for the Libyan missile program — to personally devise a more direct way to acquire these missiles. Desperate for hard currency, Pyongyang expressed willingness to deliver numerous NoDong-1 SSMs the moment hard currency was delivered in a "safe laundered method". A North Korean delegation arrived in Tripoli to discuss the operational requirements and, in October 1999, General Abu-Bakr Jabir signed a deal with them for the supply of NoDong-1s and related technological expertise. In the Tripoli negotiations, the Libyans stressed the imperative to have the missiles deployed operationally immediately after their arrival in Libya.

The eventual October 1999 deal was for the delivery of seven mobile launchers, 50 "missile systems" (each missile system includes several SSMs which can be carried on the support vehicles escorting the mobile launcher to a forward position), and related support vehicles. The North Koreans also agreed to construct the infrastructure required for the maintenance and storage of these missiles, as well as to train "Libyans" in all aspects of missile technology over a period of five years. The first consignment of missiles and launchers was to be delivered as soon as possible and the rest were to be delivered in three further consignments over the next two years.

Pyongyang notified Tripoli that the missiles would be ready in the early Summer of 2000. The financial aspects of the deal were conducted by a Syrian arms merchant living in Marbella, Spain. Libyan agents paid him US$600-million (including a 15 percent commission). The money was laundered through banks in Madrid and Basle in Switzerland. The transaction was completed in Switzerland in July 2000.

In August 2000, Libyan Il-76 transport aircraft delivered to Tripoli 36 NoDong-1 missiles, a few launchers and 11 North Korean experts. Two were senior officials overseeing the Libyan-North Korean cooperation and nine were missile engineers and technicians who will remain in Libya for two years in order to help bring the missiles to operational status as well as retain their operability.

In late-September 2000, the first missiles and their launchers were deployed along the Mediterranean Sea coast. The location of these deployments and related targeting activities suggest they are pointed at NATO's bases in southern Europe. Although Israel is within the NoDong-1's range, little activity related to Israel was noticed. The NoDong-1 SSMs supplied to Libya can be equipped with both conventional and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) warheads. Although Libya has stocks of chemical and biological weapons hidden in underground stores in the desert, mainly the Sabha area, there is no indication that there are unconventional warheads with the SSMs.

Meanwhile, the Libyans and their partners are most satisfied with the NoDong-1s and the North Korean support system. In late October 2000, Qadhafi initiated a new round of negotiations with Pyongyang for the acquisition of a larger number of SSMs, including newer models. Two Libyan envoys arrived in Marbella to conclude arrangements with the Syrian arms merchant for the laundering of additional funds. A Libyan official bragged that the new acquisition program would make Libya "one of the best-armed countries in the Mediterranean region".

May 1, 2000

An Unstable Qadhafi Seen Ready to Use Window to Pursue Strategic Agenda

EXCLUSIVE. A new report, completed on April 30, 2000, by the Global Information System (GIS), indicates that Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is marshaling his forces as rapidly as possible to resume an offensive strategic agenda, inimical to Western and moderate African and Middle Eastern states, within the next six to 12 months.

The report, produced below but sanitized of references to sensitive sources, indicates that Col. Qadhafi is also suffering from severe psychological problems, which he has acknowledged, and for which he is receiving medical treatment. It also highlights the fact that Col. Qadhafi has committed the newly-available and much-increased oil revenue of Libya to reviving his overall strategic weapons programs which include: longer-range ballistic missiles to replace or upgrade his Scud-B fleet, new biological and chemical weapons, and a revived nuclear weapons program.

The report shows that Col. Qadhafi has also expanded his acquisition program for conventional weapons, and is using them as aid as part of his revived strategic diplomacy program.

The report highlights the involvement of the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Iraq, as well as other states, in helping with the strategic weapons program, as part of an increasingly-formal alliance of anti-Western states supported by Beijing.

The text of the report, minus sourcing and sensitive material, is as follows:

April 30, 2000

Overview: Libya’s Renewed Development of Strategic Weapons Combine With Qadhafi’s Erratic Medical Condition to Create Regional Instability

1. Numerous, detailed intelligence reports from a variety of sources have confirmed that the Libyan Administration of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has, since mid-1999, significantly escalated its focus on the development of deliverable chemical weapons and the creation of a significant medium-range ballistic missile capability. It is also known that the Libyan Administration has also resumed work on the development of deployable biological weapons to be used in conjunction with ballistic missile delivery systems based on a significant evolution of the former Soviet-designed Scud family of theater ballistic missiles. The extent of revived Libyan interest in nuclear weapons development is as yet unknown, other than the fact that it has once again resumed.

2. Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is known to be suffering from, and is being medically treated for, a psychological disorder which involves significant mood swings from severe depression to great excitability.

3. There is evidence of the involvement of a number of major foreign partners in the development of the Scud-derived ballistic missiles, particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iraq. There is also evidence of the involvement of other supporting partners which cannot be disclosed here, both in the missile and in the weapons development arenas. Libya has, in the past, used extensive foreign assistance, particularly from Germany and Croatia, in its chemical and nuclear weapons programs.

4. There is documented evidence of Libyan involvement during 1999 and 2000 in major programs to enhance its conventional weapons inventory, and to procure new conventional weapons systems to be used to assist client states and organizations, such as Eritrea and certain Somali clans (but also others) in Africa.

5. The renewed involvement of Germany, Croatia and Iraq in the revived Libyan strategic weapons programs was an anticipated development. The renewed involvement of the PRC and DPRK, however, in the face of strenuous US warnings to those states against such activities, indicates a renewed attempt by Beijing to bring Libya into the increasingly formal alliance of anti-Western states which Beijing is fostering. This comes at a time when Libya has successfully worked to reduce the international embargoes which had for many years kept the country in isolation, making its access to weapons technology and expertise more difficult and its access to trade and investment revenues equally problematic. Now, Libya’s freedom to move strategically has been enhanced; and Western hostility and caution with regard to the Qadhafi Administration has, in large part, declined. More specifically, foreign power (US, European) interest in a Libyan threat has declined due to preoccupation with other problems. There is no evidence, however, that Col. Qadhafi’s strategic ambitions have in any way lessened, as a result of his superficial rapprochement with the international community, other than the fact that he now appears to be more oriented toward Africa than toward the Middle East. However, it should be stressed that his significant commitment to securing a position in the Red Sea littoral (by working with Eritrea and the Somali clans) indicates an ongoing commitment — very much in evidence since the 1970s, and articulated by Col. Qadhafi — to controlling Red Sea/Suez maritime trade. This, de facto, maintains Libya’s rôle in Middle Eastern politics, as does his current relationship with Iraq over the mutual development of strategic weapons.

6. There is a credible body of evidence which suggests that the PRC, DPRK and Libyan administrations feel that they have the greatest scope to expand their strategic activities during the period of the Clinton Administration in the United States, and that the next US Administration, which takes office in January 2001, would be less likely to give either (PRC or Libyan) leadership as much leeway. This means that the PRC Government, for example, is likely to seriously consider any moves it is likely to make against Taiwan, militarily, before the change of US Administration. If, as now seems certain, there is the belief in Tripoli that the West’s ability to contain Libya is on the wane, and that the West will be preoccupied with the China-Taiwan strategic issue, Colonel Qadhafi is likely to attempt to consolidate his position which ultimately would be, once again, anti-Western and destabilizing to moderate interests in Africa (and the Red Sea).

7. The fact that such an alliance of anti-Western states, led by the PRC, is once again evolving, means that the flow of technology to Libya will equally benefit the Iraqi Government of President Saddam Hussein. Essentially, some aspects of the strategic weapons program of Iraq are, in fact, being conducted in Libya, where Iraqi engineers and scientists are now known to be working. Although there is some strategic common ground between Libya, Iraq and the PRC with radical Islamist causes and states (and particularly Iran), there is a different, core bond between the three: fear of radical Islamism.

8. The extent of the geo-strategic ramifications of the current developments cannot be fully assessed even by the protagonist states: the PRC, Iraq and Libya. However, it is feasible that the ramifications could easily involve a renewed, consolidated schism over the coming months between the anti-Western states and the moderate states in Africa and the Middle East, extending into Turkey and Turkic areas. This will be particularly clearly defined if the PRC-US confrontation polarizes, as expected, before the end of 2000. Even without such a confrontational polarization, it is clear that Libya is quietly becoming a key component of the anti-Western alliance, even though the source of Libya’s flexibility — its revenue base — is oil sales to Western clients. Given its renewed access to revenues, particularly with the now-open ability to sell oil internationally, coupled with the significant escalation of oil prices, Libya has once again become a major strategic player in the region. What is equally clear is the fact that Col. Qadhafi’s ambitions and enmities have remained unchanged: he is committed to a radical course of action which aligns with the PRC’s global agenda, and against that of the West and the moderate African and Middle Eastern states.

9. Japan’s decision in late April 2000 to un-freeze Libyan assets and to resume normal trade relations was a further significant step in enhancing Libya’s ability to fund its strategic ambitions. Visits in April and May 2000 by senior French and British officials are also likely to expand Libya’s freedom of movement in the strategic arena.

Aspects and Ramifications of Libya’s Strategic and Conventional Weapons Expansion

1. Libya’s revived efforts to develop longer-range variants of the Soviet-designed Scud theater surface-to-surface missile (SSM) have been noted publicly during 2000. Twice thus far in 2000, the Libyan Government has been accused of trying to smuggle Scud missile parts through Europe. On April 13, 2000, Swiss authorities found alleged missile components in the luggage of a 44-year-old Taiwanese man at Zurich airport. The man was arrested after authorities received a tip he was headed for Libya via Hong Kong and Switzerland. Earlier in 2000, British authorities seized suspected missile parts from a British Airways aircraft which had traveled as far as Malta before they were detected. A significant volume of additional trade in missile technology to Libya has gone unreported and unchecked.

2. On April 13, 2000, the United States Defense Department went public in noting that Libya was seeking help from "Asian and other countries" to develop a longer-range ballistic missile, but it would not confirm a published report that the PRC had provided such assistance. The Washington Times reported on April 13, 2000, that the PRC had been providing Libya with missile technology since March 1999. The newspaper said that Lt.-Gen. Michael Hayden, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), had outlined the technology transfer in a classified US Government report dated March 2, 2000. Kenneth Bacon, chief spokesman for US Defense Secretary William Cohen, said when asked about The Washington Times report that it was well known Libya wanted to build missiles of longer range than the Scud-B missiles it currently has. "They do not have the indigenous technological capability to do that, so they have been trying to work with other countries in the world in order to gain that capability," Bacon said. "And beyond that, I’m not going to comment on specific intelligence reports, but those countries are in Asia and other parts of the world." The PRC is not a party to the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which limits transfers of missile-building technology and components, but Bacon said that the PRC had pledged not to provide other countries with finished missiles.

3. Libya has in the past been involved in programs to extend the capacity of the Scud-B, and this has, since the earlier Libyan programs, now become relatively well-known technology. The involvement of the PRC and the DPRK, as well as Iraq, means that the critical aspect will involve actual production development of Scud-based Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) of the No-Dong variety. Extending the existing 800km range of Libyan missiles is now well within Qadhafi’s grasp, with the probability — given the new ease of moving shipments into post-embargo Libya — that such an initial capability could be achieved before the end of 2000. The demonstration of this capacity would significantly escalate Libya’s political leverage in the region.

4. There is no strategic viability in a major commitment to the development of a new MRBM capability without matching the missiles to strategic weapons. This means that the new missiles would be devoted to biological or nuclear weapons, or at least chemical weapons. It is important to note, however, that biological or nuclear weapons would make the most cost-effective use of an expensive long-range missile system. Given that the Libyan nuclear program is believed to be less well-advanced than the missile program, it is likely that biological and chemical weapons are the main initial priority. However, the technology would also be available to other allied states, such as Iraq, which would also use the missile capability for strategic weapons.

5. There is evidence, which cannot be fully addressed in this paper, that the Libyan Administration has begun work, once again, on biological weapons, apart from its already sophisticated work on certain chemical weapons. It is known that work is now being conducted in Libya, with the help of Iraqi scientists, on yeast and bacteria cultures for the development of weaponized forms of:

1. Anthrax;

2. Botulinum toxins;

3. Aflatoxins; and

4. Smallpox (with privately-recruited Russian scientists).

1. There is widespread evidence of the revived procurement by Libya of conventional Eastern European weapons systems, particularly from Bulgaria, and routed via Burkina Faso. This has meant that Libya could modernize its existing systems, while dispensing used and some new equipment to its client states in the region, particularly Eritrea and Somalia. This has been extensively documented during the past six months, and is an indication of the commitment by Qadhafi to a revival of his power projection ambitions. The new acquisitions include, among other things, heavy towed artillery systems and small arms and ammunition. As a result, there has been a transshipment of weapons from Libya to Eritrea and on to Somalia. It must be expected that, as part of this process, Libya has also benefited from the major influx of new, sophisticated weapons directly into Eritrea. It is probable that some of the funding of Eritrea’s new weapons also came from Libya, and that some systems and spares will have been passed on to Libya from Eritrea.

 The Impact of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s Psychological Condition and the State of Libyan Society and Systems

1. Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s personal condition has been observed during recent months to be erratic and unstable. Wide mood swings have been observed, affecting his decisionmaking. He fluctuates from periods of depression to exuberant excitability. The subject knows that this is not a short-term or passing phenomenon himself. He has voluntarily enlisted medical help to treat the depression. A Rome-based psychiatrist, Dr Koukopoloulos Atanasios, of Via Crescenzio 42, Rome [tel. 06-6874475], is currently treating Col. Qadhafi for this condition. The doctor has prescribed medication to treat the condition.

2. It is not known whether Col. Qadhafi’s current mental condition is connected with (ie: was triggered by) the assassination attempt on him in the Cyrenaica region during 1999, when it was reported that he had suffered some personal injuries plus the loss of one or more close bodyguards. Given that the psychological instability was not reported before that incident, it is possible that a connection exists.

3. Fundamental profiling of Col. Qadhafi, based on observations of his behavior and recent Libyan strategic actions which could only have been undertaken at his instigation, at this point reveals within him:

1. Renewed enthusiasm for high-risk strategic enterprises, designed to involve him in the manipulation of regional affairs, despite the fact that these efforts previously resulted in his isolation and confrontation with major Western powers;

2. Continued and very deliberate opposition to the major Western powers, but now more carefully disguised than in the past;

3. Continued distrust of subordinates;

4. A belief that he has defeated and survived his major Western detractors, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, and that their leaders no longer posed a serious threat to him;

5. A belief that Egypt no longer poses a threat to him;

6. A belief that, within Africa, he has an innate superiority in dealing with other African leaders, whom he believes must now regard him as their natural leader. This has been particularly evident in his recent public dealings with the Sierra Leonean and Rwandan situations. For this reason, he has become increasingly involved in African affairs, rather than Middle Eastern mainline issues, given that Middle Eastern political success has constantly eluded him and fundamentally embarrassed him. This dichotomy — a feeling of success in African issues and a feeling of frustration in Middle Eastern issues — is likely to dictate near-term actions: a desire to achieve signal success in some African enterprises, coupled with a desire to punish or show his importance to Middle Eastern leaders. How this will be exhibited remains open to opportunity and will be equally influenced by his increasingly erratic approach.

1. All indications are that Col. Qadhafi will, within the coming 12 months, initiate actions which will be destabilizing to a number of African states, and will continue to be involved in the escalation of military activities in the Horn of Africa (in support of Eritrea and current Somali allies). Almost certainly, Col. Qadhafi will attempt to utilize the time between now and the end of the Clinton Administration in the US in January 2001 to make significant and irreversible strategic headway. Among the probable initiatives which he is expected to undertake, in addition to the Eritrean and Somali ongoing ventures, are the following:

1. Sierra Leone: Involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war which is expected, quite apart from any Libyan aspect, to regain momentum during the latter part of 2000. However, with Libyan intervention it is expected to escalate more than would otherwise be the case. However, the manner of the Libyan involvement is now unpredictable, given the fact that the relationship with former ally Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has broken down. It is possible that Qadhafi could favor incumbent President Ahmed Tejan Kabba, or, more likely, forces around former RUF field commander Sam Bockerie.

2. Côte d’Ivoire: Involvement with current military leader Gen. Robert Guei, leading to a refusal by that leader to move toward elected government in Côte d’Ivoire. Qadhafi on April 19, 2000, offered Gen. Guei [then in Tripoli for a two-day visit] financial aid during the "transition" to democracy, but the aid provides the Ivoirian leader with a strong alternative to dependence on Nigeria during this period. Apart from the example of defiance which this would set to regional leader Nigeria, such an act would also move Côte d’Ivoire for the first time into a position of increasing isolation and radicalization from the moderate world community, which could be remedied only by a French-led or French-sanctioned military operation to reverse the present military leadership. Such a move, while possibly one of the few viable options if Gen. Guei stays firm in an alliance with Qadhafi, would further polarize the political environment in West Africa.

3. Rwanda: There is likely to be Libyan support for the otherwise increasingly isolated Kagame Administration, further polarizing the domestic situation in the country and further increasing the likelihood of a resumed civil war. This, coupled with the situation in the Eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), means that the entire regional situation from Uganda to the Atlantic will remain unstable, with consequences for all regional players from the Southern Africa Development Council (SADC) region as well as for Uganda’s own stability.

4. Kenya: Libyan support for the Somali clans is already destabilizing for Kenya, given the weapons and guerilla force movements across Kenyan borders. This relates to the Libyan-Eritrean-Somali actions against Ethiopia as well as to the intra-Somali conflict. Destabilization of Kenya, even without other Libyan hostility, has significant ramifications for the region, including the conflict within the Sudan, the Ethiopian situation, and other issues.

5. Western Sahara: Libya is expected to become actively involved in the Western Sahara issue, particularly if current negotiations moving toward a resolution do not meet with Qadhafi’s expectations.

There are a wide range of other significant issues in which Qadhafi will feel either compelled to become involved, or which he feels are part of his mission. The above are cited merely as examples. Qadhafi’s relationship with Egypt will be significant, but at present this does not appear to be a primary focus, largely because Egypt and Libya share a common threat in the radical Islamist forces.

1. New Libyan Irregular Warfare Approaches: It is known that Qadhafi has personally overseen the development of 72 élite combatants who have been conditioned to a level of obsessive hatred of the United States and the West. They have been issued with a variety of passports, and one of their principal weapons is chemical incapacitants which can be delivered by aerosol spray.

2. Col. Qadhafi’s attitudes have alienated a growing sector of the Libyan population, according to a range of reports received. This has been particularly the case since the recent changes in the General People’s Congress, and the fact that, despite the recent opening of the country in the wake of the removal of international embargoes, there has been no improvement in the situation of the average Libyan, either economically or in terms of personal liberties. The changed situation has, however, brought about a renewed restlessness which has been further spurred by the insurrection of some radical Islamists in the normally religiously moderate Cyrenaica region. There has been a growing perception within many sectors of the Armed Forces and public that the time has come for major change. Coupled with this has been the general breakdown in State institutions. Some sources have indicated that a total collapse of the system is possible even without external intervention, but this could — if allowed to occur —result in the seizure of power by other radical forces, including Islamists. There has, as a result, been an increasing amount of contact from Libyan Armed Forces personnel who feel that the time is right for strong action by more nationalist Libyan forces, supporting the restoration of traditional leadership in the form of the Senussiyah leadership. Without going into detail, the level of commitment by many members of the Armed Forces at all ranks to the restoration of Senussi leadership, under Prince Idris el-Senussi, is now at its highest level. As well, key individuals close to Qadhafi have indicated to this Service their readiness to work with Prince Idris.

1. Conclusions and Recommendations

   1. It is evident that Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is moving as quickly as he feasibly can to regain the momentum of his strategic power projection position which was lost during the years of international isolation under the UN embargo. There is every indication that Qadhafi’s strategic posture remains unchanged from the pre-embargo period:

1. He remains hostile to the West, and particularly the United States;

2. He remains committed to strategic weapons development and the acquisition of an arsenal disproportionate to any normal requirement for Libyan defense;

3. He remains committed to the use of weapons as part of a tool to develop strong control or influence over client states;

4. He remains committed to obtaining a position of influence over strategic Red Sea/Suez Canal traffic, only now the level of Egyptian fear of this position has subsided, or has been lulled to sleep;

5. He remains committed to involvement with and influence over radical African movements and governments;

6. He remains concerned over the spread of radical Islamism, but finds himself, as before, in alliance with radical Islamists in certain areas;

7. He has revived his program of strategic weapons cooperation with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

1. There is now an urgency in the nature of the escalation of Col. Qadhafi’s strategic plans, perhaps to make up for the time lost during the embargo era, but perhaps also due to the nature of his psychological problems. There is also evidence that the "window of opportunity" which he and his allies see in the remaining tenure of the US Clinton Administration is a factor in the urgency of his actions. And while the psychological issue makes Qadhafi presently unpredictable, his unpredictability extends only to where and how he will act against moderate interests. His mercurial nature, partly attributable to his disorder, seems unlikely to include any transformation of his objectives to include, for example, a true rapprochement with the West or moderate African or Middle Eastern states.

2. Libya’s new "respectability", caused by the diplomatic efforts which ended the international embargo of the country, coupled with the significant increase in oil prices, have given Libya a momentum which it has not seen for perhaps two decades. At the same time, the coincidence of global affairs have made Libya a significant ally for the People’s Republic of China and Iraq at this time. There is no doubt that the PRC will exploit Libya to help consolidate an anti-Western position in Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, particularly over the coming six months.

3. Libya will develop as a major threat to the stability of parts of Africa, the Red Sea/Suez sea lanes and to parts of the Middle East, if it is allowed to consolidate along the lines Qadhafi envisages over the coming six to 12 months. It will, as part of this, almost certainly resume the funding and support of international terrorist movements, aimed at moderate African states, the Middle East (including Israel and Egypt), and the West, largely because this is one of the avenues which Qadhafi can pursue with relative immunity and without direct confrontation of the West. Unless Qadhafi is removed from office within the coming six to 12 months, it seems likely that Libya will become a major strategic factor again, and with Qadhafi’s position once again assured.

4. The US Clinton Administration and the US Congress are clearly not in ignorance of the evolving nature of the Libyan situation, but, given the difficulty for the US Administration to move directly during an election year, would clearly support a change in Libya should it be able to be brought about by other means. There seems to be a belief in the Qadhafi Administration that the US has dropped its guard with regard to Libya, and that it would not support an attempt to remove Qadhafi. And while the US Administration and Congress have indeed been preoccupied with other issues, it is not true to assess them as being disinterested.

5. There is a distinct possibility that, unless action is taken rapidly, Libyan popular discontent, coupled with the collapse of the normal working infrastructure of the State, could lead to a chaotic situation in the country. This would, unless urgent preventative measures are taken, benefit only radical Islamist forces which could result in a situation which is as destabilizing to the region as the present Qadhafi Administration. It is also possible that a major strategic thrust by Qadhafi to achieve his regional ambitions could, in fact, be the trigger for a final collapse of the domestic infrastructure, leading immediately to both regional and domestic chaos, with long-term entrenched difficulties as a result.

6. The only option readily available and viable to replace Qadhafi, with popular and Armed Forces support, is the Senussi leadership under Prince Idris el-Senussi. That option has been in development for many years and is clearly ready to move, provided it has sufficient external support."

September 8, 1999

Libyan Leader, 30 Years Into His Rule, is Given New Lease of Life

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor: The lifting this year of most international sanctions against Libya has re-launched Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi onto the Middle East and African stage with a vengeance. Col. Qadhafi had spent many of the years since the international embargoes were arranged, in 1988, promised almost any diplomat who would listen that he had reformed, and that he would no longer back “international terrorism”. But when the time came for the sanctions to be lifted, Qadhafi reverted to his traditional strategic line: a mixture of diplomacy and coercion.

This week he hosted a Pan-African celebration of the 30th anniversary of his coming to power. More than two dozen heads of state looked on as soldiers from countries which have been involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) conflict joined a contingent of women fighters from Eritrea. The two conflicts — the DRC war and the Eritrea-Ethiopia war — were highly symbolic: in both wars Qadhafi is intimately involved.

Despite Qadhafi’s renewed involvement in African military affairs, often as a provocateur, Britain restored diplomatic ties with Libya in July after he surrendered two Libyan suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland. Qadhafi, who toppled King Idris I on September 1, 1969, staged this week’s celebration on the eve of a special Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit to discuss his vision of a United States of Africa.

Predictably, the OAU event was an opportunity for Qadhafi to re-assert his newly-rediscovered “legitimacy”, but the new energy — and the new sophistication — of his regional proselytization belies the fact that many of his neightbors view his return with caution. Many of the governments who this week sent delegates, or heads of government, to the Libyan OAU summit privately express concern over Qadhafi’s new activities in funding DRC President Laurent Kabila and Eritrean President Isayas Afewerke’s war against Ethiopia. There is concern, too, that Qadfhafi is interfering, with funds and weapons, in other African conflicts.

The Libyan opposition, too, is beginning to re-group, and the major world powers, while honoring commitments to drop embargoes because of the release of the two low-level suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing, are almost in harmony as to their wish to see the Qadhafi era come to an end. But, for the moment, Qadhafi has a free hand.

Libyan officials said this week’s military parade, grouping soldiers from more than 20 African countries, was unprecedented on the continent. Among those watching were the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia, who have still to resolve their war. Congo's President Laurent Kabila and the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Namibia, all of whom have troops in the Congo, were also present.

Qadhafi himself sat between Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the current OAU chairman, and Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema. Africa's longest serving leader and the millennium OAU chairman. South African President Thabo Mbeki sat with them.
Missiles, rocket-launchers and a range of armored vehicles were on parade. Libyan Air Force fighters demonstrated that the years of parts denial had not affected their operational readiness, at least to a degree. Naval patrol craft and a single Libyan submarine stood offshore.

Qadhafi proposed the two-day special OAU summit — scheduled to start today, September 8, 1999 — in his home town of Sirte, saying African countries had to unite if they were to survive in an increasingly globalized world.
Liberian President Charles Taylor — wo has had close ties with Qadhafi during Taylor’s long guerilla war to seize power — yesterday decided to attend the OAU meeting and traveled there on Tuesday, September 7, 1999. Taylor had decided on Sunday not to go because of continued fighting in the north of Liberia and sent his vice-president, Enoch Dogolea, instead. Dogolea has subsequently been recalled.

The OAU meeting on September 8 and 9 was officially called by Qadhafi to examine ways of forging greater unity among the 53 OAU member states.

Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika also left Algiers for Libya on Tuesday, September 7, 1999. Col. Qadhafi on Monday, September 6, 1999, called for the establishment of an African union modeled after the United States, the former Soviet Union or the European Union. “I've been impatiently waiting for this day,” Qadhafi told African foreign ministers at the opening session of the four-day extraordinary gathering. “We have no future without unity.” Qadhafi called for the extraordinary summit in July at the OAU's annual meeting which was held in Algeria to discuss a long-overdue restructuring of the organization's charter.

Gambia's foreign minister, Mohamed Sedat Jobe, said Africans would like to reconstruct the OAU charter”`to make it a much more functional charter that would reflect the strengths of the continent.” Indeed, the proposal is one which finds considerable support among African leaders.

Qadhafi said he found the 1991 Abuja Treaty, which called for the setting up of an African economic community by 2025, to include all elements of unity, such as the establishment of an African congress, a bank and a court. Abuja is the headquarters of what could be considered a pilot project for the scheme, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has successfully deployed combined armed forces to stop regional conflicts, as well as helping regulate economic and financial matters between member states.

“There's Europe uniting under a treaty similar to the Abuja Treaty,” said Qadhafi. “The Abuja Treaty is so complete I couldn't find anything to add to it.”

The OAU meeting is the first such summit to be held in Libya. In the early 1980s, Libya hosted two attempts at an annual OAU summit. They both failed because not enough heads of state arrived to reach a quorum.