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March 21, 2003

Initial Iraq War Indications: Scuds and Other SSMs Active; ABM Systems Operational

Note: GIS will note devote itself to day-to-day coverage of operational aspects of the US-led war against Iraq, given that this is covered extensively in the open source media. It will focus on emerging “lessons learned” and strategic trends emerging from the conflict. GIS has a number of correspondents in the area, although it withdrew its correspondent from Baghdad on March 19, 2003.

Initial analysis of early operations in the US-led Coalition war against Iraq indicates:

• 1. Iraq’s operational launches against Kuwait on March 20-21, 2003 [the last attack was at 00.30hrs local on March 21], confirmed that the Iraqi Army had Scud-type theater ballistic missiles in stock and in service in violation of UN accords, and utilized at least two of them on March 21, 2003, in launches against Kuwait. This accorded with earlier GIS analysis that Iraq had as many as 200 unaccounted Scud-type weapons based on an analysis of its inventory, post-1991, and subsequent documentation of stock destruction. It almost certainly has additional weapons of this type, although it should be anticipated that most would be devoted, if feasible, to launches against Israel.
• 2. Iraq’s operational launches against Kuwait on March 20-21, 2003, almost certainly confirmed that a substantial number of al-Samoud-2 short-range (200km) SSMs remained available to Iraqi forces, despite the slow destruction program for the type ordered by UN Weapons Inspector Dr Hans Blix. GIS had reported that at least one al-Samoud-2 battery equipped with chemical warheads was deployed adjacent to the Kuwait border. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 26, 2003: Saddam’s Further Preparations For War: Forces in Position; Commanders Named; Early Start Options Open.]
• 3. The operational efficacy of the newer models of Raytheon Patriot SAMs seems to have been established, although the model used against the incoming Iraqi weapons has not been revealed, by the fact that it appeared that the missiles destroyed were hit in mid-flight, and not at their terminal stage. This is a critical improvement in that it minimizes the risk of dispersal of a possible chemical or biological warhead over the intended target area.
• 4. Official Kuwaiti denials that the incoming ballistic missiles fired on March 20-21, 2003, had chemical warheads should not be taken at face value. The Kuwaiti Government has attempted to calm its public, who are confined to a vulnerable area, and, absent any damage from a successful chemical attack, has obviously been anxious to calm public concerns. As it was Kuwaits in large numbers donned gas masks and chemical warfare suits and headed for makeshift shelters as air raid sirens were activated.

The initial response of the Iraqi forces to the selective US attack, targeting Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, on March 20, 2003, was sufficient, however, to demonstrate that Iraq had been in violation of UN sanctions, despite the inability of the UN weapons inspectors to find that evidence earlier. There were no Kuwaiti casualties from the March 20-21, 2002, ballistic missile attacks. The last two missiles were both intercepted over the country by Patriot missiles, while the first two crashed into the Mutlaa desert, 40km (25 miles) north of Kuwait, around 10:30hrs local. US sources said that all the missiles launched had conventional warheads. One source said that 10 ballistic missiles had been launched by Iraq; one struck 300m from a US staging camp.

US and British troops, meanwhile, crossed into southern Iraq on March 20, 2003, capturing the main sea port at Umm Qasr. More than 1,000 troops of the US First Marine Expeditionary Force and the US Army Third Infantry Division followed a fierce artillery barrage by crossing the desert border with tanks and armor at about 20.00hrs local. Some 180,000 US and UK troops were preparing for engagement. Special forces units from the US, UK and Australia were already in Iraq, and had been there for some time. Harrier fighters reportedly engaged Iraqi mobile Scud launchers, presumably targeted by Coalition special forces.