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April 14, 2004

New Iranian Deployments in Iraq; Sadr’s Mahdi Army Tests Coalition Forces; Questions Surround Syrian WMD Movement

Analysis. By Jason Fuchs, GIS UN Correspondent. GIS sources noted in mid-April 2004 growing evidence of Iranian involvement in the Iraqi anti-Coalition “resistance” and described Iran as now being the “driving force” behind the burgeoning “Iraqi Intifadah”. In addition, GIS sources exclusively reported new Iranian deployments into Iraq over February and March 2004, which included a mix of some 500 to 1,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC: Pasdaran), HizbAllah “expert terrorists”, and Iranian-trained Iraqi Shi’ite Islamists. Many, the sources said, had been moved across the Iran-Iraq border under cover of night during the two-month period. The February-March 2004 deployment by Tehran increased the total number of Iranian or Iranian-sponsored forces dispatched to Iraq since January 2004 to between 5,650 and 6,200.

GIS sources added that the Iraqi Shi’ite cleric, Moqtada Sadr’s, Mahdi Army now fielded close to 10,000 fighters; this included between several hundred and a few thousand “foreign experts”, including Iranian Pasdaran, HizbAllah operatives, and Afghan Shi’ites. Sadr is a relative of HizbAllah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and openly declared on April 4, 2004, that his movement was an extension of the Iranian-sponsored, Lebanese group. Sadr had already said in September 2003: “There is no harm in my being an extension of the Khomeini revolution.” As one GIS Iranian source noted in April 2004: “Sadr is a chess-piece in the hands of Tehran.”

Syria had also been active. In addition to its support for the Iraqi insurgency, Damascus had moved on multiple fronts:

1. In the event that Washington decided to focus international attention of Syrian WMD programs in the near future, Damascus undertook a major concealment and dispersal effort. GIS sources confirmed an April 9, 2004, Middle East Newsline report that the Syrian Defense Ministry had, since January 2004, been moving WMD components along with Scud-C and Scud-D extended-range missiles on civilian airliners to warehouses in Khartoum. Contrary to initial reports, though, GIS sources identified strong indications that Sudanese Pres. Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir was, in fact, aware of the shipments or, at the very least, purposefully unaware. GIS sources acknowledged the possibility that some Iraqi WMD matériel may have been included in these shipments, but stressed this had yet to be confirmed.

[See Appendix, below: a 1998 report to the US Congress, entitled The Iraqi WMD Challenge: Myths and Reality.]

2. GIS sources confirmed that the Syrian Mukhabarat (Military Intelligence) had been involved in a joint al-Qaida-HizbAllah operation that had been prevented by Jordanian security forces in early April 2004. Jordanian authorities had captured four members of the cell involved in the planned attack on March 31, 2004, as they entered Jordan from Syria at the Rahmtha crossing in a pickup truck loaded with hundreds of kilos of explosives. Interrogation of the detainees had led to the April 10, 2004, capture of several other members of the cell who had made it into Jordan from Syria along with two cars reportedly filled with explosives, weapons, and bombmaking materials. An April 12, 2004, Associated Press dispatch reported that the suspects had bee apprehended in sweeps of Nuaimeh and Huwarah, villages outside Irbid. According to a credible April 2, 2004, report from the on-line intelligence service debka.com, which clearly has strong links to Israeli intelligence sources, the operation would have been claimed by HAMAS as revenge for the March 22, 2004, killing of their “spiritual leader” Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, although the Palestinian Islamist group would not have actually participated directly. The debka.com report had also claimed: “…the captured terrorists admitted that they had been assured they would not be bothered at the Syrian border crossing because the border guards had been told not to search the trucks.”

It remained doubtful through mid-April 2004 that the attacks by the Mahdi Army constituted a full-scale offensive by Iraq-based Iranian forces. Instead, the strikes appeared to be a test of a single component of the Iraq-based Iranian force structure designed to assess its readiness as part of the overall anti-Coalition campaign and, in the short term, convince the US electorate, in particular, and the Western populous, in general, that Coalition Forces were embroiled in an un-winnable “quagmire”.

The Mahdi Army’s April 12, 2004, abandonment of Iraqi police stations and government buildings in Najaf spoke to this fact. It was important to note, however, that this “test” could, if successful, swiftly be converted into the full-scale Iranian-sponsored anti-Coalition offensive that had been planned and prepared for more than a year. Substantial Iranian assets in Iraq remained untapped through the early April 2004 unrest. Among these, GIS sources noted, were the 29 warheads smuggled into Iraq from Iran in December 2003. As a February 24, 2004, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily special report entitled Iran, Syria Evaluate Iraq Policy; Imad Mugniyah Removed But Additional IRGC, HizbAllah Inserted detailed:

In a sign that Tehran was fast preparing contingencies for the potential need to intensify the “jihad” against the US-led Coalition in Iraq, GIS sources confirmed reports in December 2003 that Kurdish forces had stopped a truck in northern Iraq inbound from Iran carrying a warhead holding some form of high explosives [not C4, as had been sporadically reported]. The Kurds interrogated the driver of the truck who admitted that 29 other such warheads had been successfully smuggled into Iraq from Iran, including around six that may have been chemical warheads. There had been some speculation that the chemical warheads might have been “recycled” Iraqi WMD, but GIS sources believed that all the warheads, WMD-capable or otherwise, were from the Iranian military arsenal.

According to GIS sources, indications were that the warheads remained in Iraq as of mid-April 2004.

The April 2004 introduction of kidnappings into the Iraq theater by the “resistance” marked a significant new development in the conflict that had been presaged by a December 17, 2003, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report headlined, Imad Mugniyah Now in Iraq; “Iraqi Resistance” Set to Evolve in Response to US Offensive, Capture of Saddam. That report stated:

Imad Mugniyah’s arrival in Iraq was indicative of Tehran’s increased rôle, as well as the more focused direction that the insurgency would now take … The model for this new insurgency strategy would be based on the campaign waged by Iran, Syria, and the HizbAllah to evict US Forces from Lebanon from 1982-1984 that saw then US Pres. Ronald Reagan withdraw US Marines from the country in February 1984 …The terrorist offensive conducted by Tehran and Damascus with their HizbAllah proxy forces in Lebanon had also included the kidnappings of key foreign nationals. It could be expected that Tehran, Damascus, and Mugniyah would revert back to the tactics that had brought them such strategic gain in the early 1980s.

Although a variety of disparate jihadist groups had claimed credit for the kidnappings of foreign nationals in Iraq, it seemed that these operations were closely linked to Iranian and Syrian anti-Coalition activity with signs that Imad Mugniyah’s December 2003-January 2004 Iraqi sojourn may have been related to preparation for the April 2004 “hostage crises”. Tehran, Damascus, and their Islamist allies in Iraq [bin Laden linked or otherwise] would not have undertaken hostage-taking operations without a redundant support structure of safe-houses as had been the case in Lebanon’s Beqa’a Valley during the 1980s. While during the hostage-takings in Lebanon, Tehran had often moved prisoners into Iranian territory, it was not expected that the Iranian leadership would repeat this step in 2004, if only because such a move could only unnecessarily provoke Washington and the international community. This state of affairs emphasized the need for hostage-taking preparation within Iraq, which appeared to have been, at the very least, the partial purpose of Mugniyah’s trip. [A number of reports in early 2004 indicated that Imad Mugniyah had been “promoted” to the “number two” position in HizbAllah, beneath Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah but GIS sources stressed that Mugniyah remained the head of HizbAllah’s “special operations department”, for lack of a better term, taking orders directly from Tehran.]

The Mahdi Army offensive had opened in earnest on April 4, 2004, with attacks against Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) bases in Baghdad with subsequent attacks against Coalition and Iraqi Forces throughout Iraq the same day. The offensive included the seizure of five Baghdad police stations on April 4, 2004, (regained by Coalition Forces hours later), violent protests and street battles in Najaf where the Mahdi Army successfully attacked and assumed control of a Spanish-run, Coalition base at al-Kufra, and, continued early on April 5, 2004, with the seizure of the Governor’s office in Basra. The Mahdi Army would assume control of large segments of al-Kut, Najef, and Karbala by April 10, 2004.

Ostensibly, the nation-wide attacks came in response to the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) April 3, 2004, arrest of Sadr’s deputy, Mustafa al-Yaqoubi, in Najaf, and the March 28, 2004, closure of the Baghdad-based newspaper Al-Hawsa, published by followers of Sadr. These events, in fact, appeared to be only the public justification of the subsequent attacks; a justification aimed primarily at Western audiences and less at the local population. Sadr’s actions were instead a component of long-term Iranian efforts to subvert the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and CPA, force the withdrawal of Coalition Forces from Iraq, and remove the US Bush Administration from office in the upcoming November 2004 US presidential elections as part of Tehran’s broader grand strategy.

Iran may also have sought to respond strongly to the first reported direct US action against the Iranian build-up in Iraq: the expulsion of the Iranian chargé d’affaires in Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qomi.

According to an April 6, 2004, report in the London Arabic daily Al-Hayat, Qomi was “the recently appointed chief Iranian agent in Iraq” and an officer in the Pasdaran who had served in Lebanon, clearly alluding to Qomi having played a rôle in the Iranian and Syrian sponsored anti-US insurgency in the early 1980s. The Al-Hayat report also noted that Qomi had been the consul-general in the Herat province of Afghanistan until December 2003 when Tehran ordered him to Baghdad. Herat had been a center of Iranian-sponsored anti-US activity in Afghanistan. An April 9, 2004, report by the Iranian Mehr News Agency, though, quoted a “political analyst” close to the IGC as having said the expulsion of Qomi was the result of “sharp differences between the Iraqi Interior Ministry and Coalition Forces.” The state-run Iranian news service appeared to be attempting to “save face” on what could potentially prove an embarrassing incident for official Tehran.

The build-up of Iranian or Iranian-sponsored forces in Iraq with the intent to attack and remove any Coalition-backed government from Baghdad had begun before the official beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003, with the mid-February 2003 deployment of the Ayatollah Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim-controlled Badr Brigades into northern Iraq near the village of Banibee.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 24, 2003: Iran’s Iraqi Gambit: Tehran Decides to Move Specifically Against the US.]

The subsequent break between Ayatollah Hakim and Tehran resulted in a major setback for Iran’s Iraq strategy; Moqtada Sadr, it increasingly appeared by early April 2004, had filled this void. Integral to Iranian planning for Iraq is the presence of an Iraqi Shiite face at the head of any anti-Coalition movement, regardless of the presence and extent of non-Iraqi involvement in such actions, in hopes of garnering necessary local Iraqi Shi’ite support that would prove tactically relevant even if in demographically small numbers relative to the entire Iraqi Shi’ite population, which remained staunchly opposed to any form of Iranian-style theocratic system in Baghdad. [Iraqi Shiite support for the Coalition and against the Mehdi Army was further confirmed by reports on April 10, 2004, that Shiite residents of al-Kut had greeted the Coalition’s re-taking of the city center by pouring back into the streets with cheers and waves of approval.]

Reports on April 12, 2004, indicated that moderate Iraqi Shiite leaders, including representatives of Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali Sistani, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and the Da’wa Islamiyya, were in negotiations with Moqtada Sadr regarding the possibility that he would renounce violence and accept exile in Iran. The US military leadership in Baghdad emphasized that it sought to “kill or capture” Sadr, but regardless of how events proceeded, Tehran had been forced to recognize the possibility that its foremost “Iraqi face” might soon be removed from the equation one way or the other.

While it was unclear how the Iranian leadership would respond, it did retain a prominent Iraqi Shi’ite cleric loyal to Tehran in the form of Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-Ha’iri. Ayatollah Ha’iri, in exile in Iran through mid-April 2004, maintained close relations with Sadr and had issued a fatwa on April 9, 2003, advocating action against the US and Coalition Forces in Iraq. [Ha’iri had also named Moqtada Sadr as his “personal representative” in Iraq in April 2003.] The Qom-based Iraqi ayatollah stood to play an increased rôle in Iranian-sponsored Iraqi affairs if, in fact, Sadr was killed, captured, or exiled.

A number of regional reports on the Iranian rôle in the April 2004 violence in Iraq had appeared in the Arab press in early April, including two notable reports in the London Arabic daily, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. An April 3, 2003, interview with a former Iranian intelligence official in charge of activities in Iraq who recently defected, as GIS sources confirmed, detailed that “the Iranian money allocations for activities in Iraq, both covert and overt, reached $70-million per month”. The Iranian, who called himself Haj Sa’idi, added that 2,700 apartments and rooms had been rented in Karbala and Najaf to “serve agents of the Al-Quds Army and the Revolutionary Guards.” A separate source in the Quds Army subsequently told Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on April 9, 2004, that between 800 and 1,200 “young Sadr supporters have received military training, including guerilla warfare, the production of bombs and explosives, the use of small arms, reconnoitering, and espionage” at three Pasdaran-controlled camps in Qasr Shireen, ‘Ilam, and Hamid on the Iranian side of the Iran-Iraq border. The April 9, 2004, article also reported that the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad had distributed 400 satellite telephones to supporters of Sadr, and estimated that Iranian financial support to Sadr in “recent months has exceeded $80-million, in addition to the cost of training, equipment, and clothing of his supporters”.

US Pres. George W. Bush appeared to have strenuously avoided public acknowledgment of the rôle of Tehran and Damascus in the Iraqi intifadah. Acknowledgement would force Washington to take action to address the changing threat. This, then, became a critical issue in an election year in the US, a fact of critical importance to both the Iranian clerical leadership and to Pres. Bush. The question becomes whether US acceptance of the Iranian/Syrian challenge would hurt or hinder Pres. Bush’s re-election chances.

Appendix: The 1998 Report to the US Congress

The Iraqi WMD Challenge: Myths and Reality

The following report, dated February 10, 1998, was written by Yossef Bodansky in his capacity as Director of the US House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare. The report has subsequently appeared in the public domain.

Nobody likes the idea of Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles capable of delivering their lethal warheads. The ramifications of their potential use in anger — the numbers of fatalities and injured they might inflict — are horrendous. However, as the US is getting ready to bomb in Iraq in order to address the challenge of that country's remaining WMD arsenal, one should examine dispassionately what might be conceivably accomplished, and what would be the ramifications of the massive bombing campaign the Clinton Administration is advocating.

*

Despite Baghdad's protestations, Iraq does have a small but very lethal operational arsenal of WMD and platforms capable of delivering them throughout the Middle East and even beyond. Although Iraq has been subjected to an unprecedented regimen of UN inspection and destruction of strategic military programs since the end of the Gulf War in the Spring of 1991, the international community has proven incapable of learning the entire scope of the Iraqi programs for fielding weapons of mass destruction, let alone eliminate these programs as mandated by the Security Council.

Significantly, the first major independent study of the possible magnitude of the Iraqi undeclared and concealed WMD arsenal was not conducted until the Summer of 1994. For this study, the BND (German Intelligence) relied on KNOWN Iraqi post-Gulf War illegal acquisitions of technology, sub-systems, and strategic materials in Western Europe (mainly Germany, Austria and Switzerland) to assess what could be done with these acquisitions. Even without taking into consideration such diverse inputs as Iraqi acquisitions from countries of the former Soviet Union, the PRC and Iran, as well as rumored but unproven acquisitions in Europe, the results of the BND study were startling for they pointed to several specific programs that not only had the UN inspectors been unaware of in mid 1994, but they have so far proven unable to discover and stop. For example, the Iraqi purchase of a special kind of igniter, with a short shelf-life, for SCUD-type warheads, strongly suggested that the Iraqis used these igniters for operational SCUD-type missiles, as they are capable of increasing the range. The BND thus concluded that it was "difficult to assess" the magnitude of the current Iraqi weapons program. There was no doubt that not only "some of the material equipment" was excluded from discovery and destruction by the UN, but certain projects were being revived and run clandestinely.

A new approach to studying the Iraqi WMD programs was adopted in the aftermath of the "defection" of Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamal in the Summer of 1995. Originated as an audacious ploy to destroy the anti-Saddam movement from within, the "defection" went sour when Baghdad panicked over reports of contacts between Kamal and the CIA in Amman. Consequently, Baghdad was compelled to surrender to the UN large quantities of material Kamal might have divulged while in Amman. Consequently, Kamal and his brother were lured back to Baghdad where they were promptly assassinated. Meanwhile, the entire perception of the extent of the Iraqi WMD program had to be reevaluated.

Most important was the realization that there is an on going Iraqi program the UN inspections team is highly unlikely to discover and stop. In January 1996, the assessment of the Israeli Military Intelligence was that within the next four years, Iraq would have ten SCUD launchers and some 150 SCUD-type missiles. Some of these missiles are to be equipped with warheads containing WMD. A major aspect of the Iraqi program as of the mid-1990s was the organization of a highly mobile transportation system for the operational elements. Thus, by late 1997, the Iraqis were capable of transferring a few thousand liters of biological materials to new concealed sites within two or three weeks without supervision. As far as Baghdad was concerned, once the materials were hidden, supervision may be permitted to resume as usual. Another indication of an anticipated expansion of Iraq's ballistic missile activities came in late 1997/early 1998 with the appointment of two senior officers — Abd-al-Rizzaq Shihab of the Army and Muzahm Tassab al-Hassan of the Air Force — as deputy heads of the Military Industries authority. Both generals held senior command positions of Iraqi missile forces during the Gulf War and are considered Iraq's leading experts in ballistic missile operations. Moreover, during 1997, Iraqi military units conducted several simulated deployments and launching of ballistic missiles of the type and range Iraq is not permitted to have.

Meanwhile, despite the ongoing presence of UN inspectors and the threat of resumed bombing, the Iraqi strategic arsenal continued to expand as the current British Government's threat assessment testifies. In early 1998, Iraq is known to possess 48 SCUD-type missiles and six launchers. (Gen. Wafiq Samarraj, the former chief of Iraqi Military Intelligence, knew of at least 45 SCUD-type missiles with range of over 600 km and several others being repaired at the time of his defection in 1994.) A large portion of the 45 BW warheads/bomb containers Iraq acknowledged constructing in the late 1980s are believed to have survived the Gulf War and still elude the UN inspectors. The British Government estimates that the Iraqis still have 30 warheads capable of carrying chemical and\or biological weapons' material. For these warheads and other weapons, Iraq has at least 8,400 liters of Anthrax, as well as 600 tons of chemicals that are sufficient for the production of 200 tons of VX nerve gas — where a single droplet can kill. (Samarraj reported that in 1994 Iraq concealed 200 containers with biological weapons, more than half of which are still considered in operational condition.)

And while public attention is focused on ballistic missiles, Iraq has even more effective and lethal platforms of the delivery of its weapons of mass destruction. In late December 1996, German intelligence confirmed that Iraqi weapons technicians developed a drone described as "the little guy's cruise missile." This unmanned aircraft is made of plastics and plywood — simple and cheap to produce without any tell-tale equipment that can attract the UN inspectors. The drone has a range of about 700 kilometers and is equipped with a very accurate GPS navigation system illegally purchased in the West. Each drone can carry 30 to 40 kilograms of biological or chemical warfare agents to the intended target. It is almost impossible to detect this drone by radar because of its size, slow speed and lack of metal parts.

The BND's experts are most alarmed by the Iraqi fielding of a version of this drone that can be also launched from ships. Consequently, one cannot rule out the possibility of an Iraqi-controlled commercial ship suddenly launching these drones outside the coasts of Europe — from where these missiles can reach and threaten London, Paris or Berlin — as well as the Atlantic coast of the US.

Another type of chemical weapons known to be in the Iraqi arsenal is "Agent 15" nerve agent. According to British Government sources, Agent 15 is a non-lethal psychochemical nerve gas designed to stupefy enemy forces. It is a derivative of BZ. The agent can be disseminated in various forms — from artillery and rocket warheads to pouring into water supplies. Depending on the concentration, Agent 15 can cause weakness, dizziness, disorientation, hallucinations and loss of co-ordination. At the level of concentration likely to affect unprotected troops on a battlefield, Agent 15 is expected to disorientate and disable soldiers for a relatively short time (measured in hours). Iraq is known to have experimented with BZ and various derivatives since at least 1985. The British learned that Iraq had built up large stocks of an operational version — Agent 15 — only in late 1997.

Thus, Iraq still has a small, diverse, but very deadly operational arsenal of WMD. If used operationally, the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction can cause heavy casualties among both civilian population and military forces not just in the Middle East, but even in the US. The key warhead and bomb components are very small and can be easily moved from one place of concealment to another. Furthermore, if the bulky protective measures of these components are removed, at a risk to the Iraqi troops and nearby population, the movement and concealment of these key warhead and bomb components becomes even more easy. Moreover, it is then virtually impossible to distinguish from afar between these warheads and comparable high-explosive systems — say, artillery shells.

Assuming that the US located these clandestine WMD, it is still far from certain the US will be able to bomb and destroy all the Iraqi operational weapons. And this has nothing to do with the accuracy of aircraft or the penetrability of smart munitions. The problem lies in the ruthlessness of Saddam's regime and his desperate clinging to power. For example, what if the bulk of the chemical warhead components are stored in, say, the Baghdad Presidential Palace — two miles southeast of the edge of the Baghdad West Airport. The eruption of any such warhead, let alone a larger storage container, as a result of bomb damage will devastate the heart of Baghdad — killing countless innocent people. Is this a legitimate outcome of a US bombing campaign? The argument that Saddam is to be blamed for such a tragedy just because he had placed these weapons at the heart of Baghdad carries water only up to a certain point. Besides, Washington should dread the reverberations of such a justifiable act throughout the Muslim World. And what about an Iraqi "retaliation" against a US city using terrorists or a ship-borne drone?

*

Significantly, however, even if the US and its allies will have managed to destroy the bulk of Saddam WMD operational arsenal, this will provide only a short term solution. No bombing campaign against Iraq, and even an occupation of that country for that matter, is capable of destroying the hard core of Saddam Hussein's primary WMD development and production programs. The reason is that under current conditions these programs are run outside of Iraq — mainly in Sudan and Libya, as well as Algeria (storage of some hot nuclear stuff). Thus, once the bombing campaign is over, the Iraqis can be expected to smuggle new weapons from Iraq's development sites and production lines - sites that remain untouched by allied bombing as well as unchecked by UN inspection teams. And, for as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, this charade called disarming Saddam will continue.

One should not be surprised by this sad state of affairs.

The transfer of Iraqi WMD overseas started even before the outbreak of the Gulf War. Back in late 1990, when Baghdad realized Iraq would be subjected to intense bombing, key sensitive elements were smuggled out. Then, in the Spring of 1991, once the extent of the post-War inspection regime became clarified, especially given the type and amount of data provided to the West by numerous defectors, a second round of hasty smuggling took place. Essentially, the core of the next-generation projects of the Iraqi WMD programs was moved to safe-havens. A lot of know-how and key subsystems were shipped out with the idea of building alternate production facilities in the host countries.

Most important are the programs transferred to Libya and Sudan — two of Iraq's closest allies during the Gulf War that have strong aspirations for WMD of their own. Libya, long struggling to overcome embargoes and the cancellation of arrangements for the supply of technology and systems from Western Europe, has been looking for the Iraqi embargo-busting knowledge and for Iraqi proven solutions for Libyan problems. Sudan needs WMD in order to hit the Black rebels in the south and deter Western intervention against the Islamist terrorism empire.

Hence, Iraq found eager and willing partners for its efforts to circumvent the world's campaign against its WMD.

While the initial movements of WMD stuff were emergency measures or by-products of other considerations, Baghdad reexamined its posture by late 1993. By then, Saddam Hussein had already realized that the UN inspections were not going away, and that the US remained determined to continue the policy of containment and sanctions. Moreover, the US retaliation for the June 1993 narrowly averted an attempt on the life of former President Bush by Iraqi intelligence convinced Baghdad that there would be no reconciliation with the US in the foreseeable future. Hence, Baghdad adopted a long term strategy to endure the global pressure.

In March 1994, Babil (a newspaper run by Saddam Hussein's eldest son Uday) declared that it would be "desirable for the leaders of Iraq, Libya and Sudan to hold a summit meeting ... and adopt a common stance" to meet the challenges facing the Arab World.

Meanwhile, Iraq was reviving the international support system for its WMD development and production programs. By late 1994, Iraq's secret purchasing system was completely restored. It was operating energetically not only to just restore previous capabilities but to support new projects — mostly outside Iraq.

Anticipating that the sanctions would be lifted from Iraq, many European firms were rushing to grab a good share of what used to be a very lucrative market. Presently, the Iraqi-run system is made up of an endless and redundant web of Western firms and technology plants, liaison people, banks and financial institutes, secret merchants and middlemen — so that it is virtually impossible to discover all components, let alone bring down the system. The procurement system of the Iraqi intelligence has been resurrected, it functions, and it feels good. The present system has not only arose on the ruins of the previous one, but it has learned and overcome all the errors of the system of the 1980s. Significantly, virtually all the firms and plants that had worked for Iraq before the Gulf War have already found their way into the fold of the new system. This time however, many support and sustain programs in Libya and Sudan, as well as in third countries from where the Iraqis ship the goods on their own. Thus, when Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamal "defected" in the Summer of 1995, he was bringing data of what was left behind in Iraq — not on the wave of the future already being constructed in Sudan and Libya.

*
Sudan

The Iraqi-Sudanese strategic cooperation dates back to the close alliance between the two countries during the Gulf War. The Iraqi-Sudanese alliance has endured the close relations between Khartoum and Tehran. Originally, Iraq established a major expeditionary force in Sudan in order to strike Egypt and western Saudi Arabia. In late August 1990, the Iraqi deployment included several South African made G-5 155mm guns equipped with both high-explosive and chemical shells, as well as 14 SCUD-B launchers with several missiles each that were originally deployed along the Red Sea coast across from Yanbu and Jeddah. In early January 1991, the Iraqis delivered additional SCUD launchers to Sudan and handed them over to the government. The Sudanese armed forces deployed these launchers in northern Sudan. These SCUDs targeted southern Egypt, including the Aswan High Dam. (By 1995, Sudan would ask Russia for spares and expert technicians to fix its own SCUD missiles and other sub-systems. The serial numbers and other technical data provided by Khartoum proves that the Sudanese SCUD systems had been sold originally to Iraq.)

In March/April 1991, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz requested permission from Sudan's President Umar al-Bashir to move Iraqi chemical weapons and additional SCUD missiles to Sudan in order to circumvent their destruction by the UN. Al-Bashir agreed. Thus, in the Summer of 1991, as UN inspections became inevitable, Iraq transferred a large number of SCUDs, estimated at about 400 missiles, and chemical weapons, for "safekeeping" in Yemen and Sudan. Soon afterwards, with Saudi pressure on Yemen growing, the Iraqi ballistic missiles were shipped from Yemen to Sudan. In 1993, Iraq sent additional chemical weapons to Sudan, this time through Iran.

Meanwhile, Iraq also transferred in the Summer of 1991 some nuclear material to Sudan for temporary storage. This program continued into mid 1992 with fissionable material, documents, and weapons' sub-systems being shipped via Jordan utilizing Sudanese diplomatic mail privileges. For example, a truck carrying "furniture" from the Sudanese Embassy in Iraq to Khartoum in mid January 1992 was actually loaded with barrels of uranium. Among the Iraqi material sent to Sudan were approximately 27.5 pounds of 93% U-235 which had been originally supplied to Iraq by France for use in the French-built Osiraq research reactor. (However, since there are no nuclear facilities in Sudan, the bulk of the nuclear materials was shipped forward to the Algerian reactor in Ain-Oussera — a PRC-built reactor with military/weapons development capacity. Algeria is still storing the Iraqi nuclear equipment and radioactive materials.)

With the UN inspections continuing, Baghdad committed itself to bolstering the regime in Khartoum — a key storage site for Iraq's strategic systems. By the Fall of 1993, a large number of Iraqis moved into the area of the Red Sea mountain range — in Madabay in Khawr Ashraf, Port Sudan, in the region of Dalawat on the Red Sea near Hala'ib, and the city of Tawker in region of Karnakanat. The Iraqis brought into these installations high-tech equipment and computers, missiles, defense systems, anti-aircraft systems and radar systems. By late 1993, the regions surrounding these installations were experiencing strict security measures and 24-hour armed patrols roam around it. In some areas, such as in the Port Sudan area, shepherds and nomads were completely removed from security zones with a 60 km circumference.

The Spring-Summer of 1995 saw the emergence of an Iraqi-Iranian-Sudanese Axis. This Axis was the outcome of secret contacts between Iraq and Sudan, culminating in the visit to Khartoum by the Iraqi Social Affairs Minister Latif Nusayyif Jasim. In order to implement this Axis agreement, about 20 intelligence officers were added to the Iraqi Embassy in Khartoum (second only to the 26 operatives assigned to the Iraqi embassy in Amman, Jordan). Many of these intelligence officers are involved in sanctions busting via Sudan and Africa. Baghdad and Khartoum also reached an agreement to implement a comprehensive plan for strategic cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. The agreement included provisions for the dispatch of Iraqi Air Force officers and other military experts specialized in missiles, artillery, and ground battles in order to assist Sudan in meeting the ramifications of the mounting crisis with Egypt. Baghdad committed itself to supporting the Sudanese regime in what the Iraqis term "a cover for foreign interference in Sudan".

Providing Sudan with rudimentary chemical warfare capabilities was a major request from Bashir that Saddam Hussein authorized. The deal followed a visit to Sudan of a high-level Iraqi delegation, led by the Chief of the Chemical Weapons Directorate of the Iraqi Defense Ministry. The delegation surveyed the sites Iraqi experts would have to operate in. On their return to Baghdad, the delegation recommended a prudent approach to meeting the needs of the Sudanese. Saddam conveyed the message to Bashir and both presidents reached an agreement on CW cooperation.

Meanwhile, teams of Iraqi intelligence, military and commando officers arrived in Khartoum in the Summer of 1995 to assist the Sudanese armed forces against what the Iraqis now called "foreign intervention in Sudan." Officially, the Iraqi expeditionary units had two tasks: (1) to supervise and maintain the Iraqi strategic weapons and military equipment stored in Sudan away from the UN inspection teams; and (2) train the Sudanese in intelligence work and help reorganize the Sudanese Army along the same lines as the Iraqi Republican Guard. By the Fall, the impact of the Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation was apparent in the performance of units fighting in the south and deployed near the Egyptian border in the north-east.

Moreover, Iraqi Republican Troops were sighted by rebels in southern Sudan in the Fall of 1995, fighting in the Pibor area. About 120 Iraqi crews arrived in the area in stages along with tanks bearing the insignia of Iraqi Republican Guard units. Iraqi artillery forces were involved in the shelling of SPLA camps in Torit with Napalm bombs, killing or wounding 260 people. Uthman Abd-al-Qadir visited Baghdad — reminding the Iraqis of Sudan's support during the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War and requesting massive military support for Khartoum. Indeed, Iraqi military equipment and supplies soon arrived in Khartoum, as additional Republican Guard forces were preparing for direct participation in the war in the south along with the Sudanese units they had trained. Significantly, following Abd-al-Qadir's visit, Iraq deployed to Sudan some 50 "advanced SCUD launchers" and a similar number of al-Hussayn missiles. In October 1995, Iranian and Iraqi engineers, including some missile experts, were upgrading an old airfield in East Sudan for the arrival and storage of additional strategic weapons from Iraq. The majority of the Iraqi SCUD-type missiles were stored in a well protected and well concealed site within the Port Sudan military compound in late 1997/early 1998.

The first joint Iraqi-Sudanese WMD project was facilities initially readied for the handling and service of CW munitions and ultimately the production of basic CW agents. The CW facility was built during 1995 in an area near Wau, in the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province in south-western Sudan, some 300 kilometers from the Uganda border. The key CW facility is located in a big fruit production factory taken over by the military. Although the Wau facility is controlled by the Sudanese military, Iraqi technicians work there to supervise safety and security procedures.

Iraqi officers are also in charge of the gas storage site.

At first, the Iraqis sought to exhaust stockpiles of mustard gas they had stored in Sudan since the Gulf War. With a plausible Sudanese source for these munitions — the Wau facility — the Iraqis began using chemical munitions in the Fall of 1995, months before the Wau facility became operational. At first, planes piloted by Iraqis dropped crude chemical munitions around Kadugli and in the Namang mountains in southern Sudan. According to Sudanese opposition sources, witnesses reported that "deaths and injuries occurred among residents" and that "there was a big change in the color of the corpses and of animals and trees." Comparable sightings were reported in Afghanistan and South-East Asia. It was impossible to retrieve samples and more precise details because of the region's remoteness. Intelligence reports identified the agents used as low-quality Mustard taken from an early consignment shipped from Iraq to Sudan immediately after the Gulf War.

Meanwhile, Iraq and Sudan built the chemical weapons factory at a secret location near Wau. Production began in the Fall of 1995. At first, an Iraqi team manufactured the Mustard gas. Gradually, they handed over production to the Sudanese military. However, Iraqi technicians remained responsible for final phases of the manufacture of the gas and its safe storage. The Wau factory gave Khartoum the capability of using "home-grown" mustard gas against the rebels, thus not implicating its allies in chemical warfare. Toward the end of 1995, the Iraqi technicians were able to develop a crude but reliable delivery system for the Mustard Gas produced at Wau. Hence, the Iraqis could stop using their old bombs which were now implicating Baghdad. Instead, the Sudanese introduced crude canisters which they rolled off the back of An-24/An-26 transport aircraft. Most of these canisters missed their targets because of poor coordination between Sudanese ground forces and the aircraft.

Soon after production started in Wau, the Sudanese Armed Forces used Mustard Gas canisters against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) on at least two occasions in late 1995: The first was at Nimule and the second was at Kuya — both sites are near Juba, Sudan's southern capital then was defended by tens of thousand of government troops against a tightening siegeby the SPLA forces. Since late 1995, there have been several reports allegingthe use of chemical weapons in southern Sudan, and with varying degrees ofindependent corroboration and specificity of technical details. In 1997, several reports of use of Mustard Gas canisters during bombing raids in eastern Sudan, mainly in the Tulushi/Tulus mountains area, were corroborated independently.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis and the Sudanese continued to maintain the Iraqi clandestine arsenal in operational status. Some of the Iraqi equipment concealed in Sudan was examined and tested in early 1996, and then buried in several underground sites west of Khartoum. One such site is in Soba. The Iraqis and the Sudanese also carried out tests of chemical agents in the desert not far from the Al-Thoura district of Omdurman. In May, residents got sick when winds shifted suddenly and carried residues into the city.

A new phase in the Iraqi cooperation with Sudan began in early 1997. In mid-January, Baghdad officially termed the fighting in southern Sudan a US-Zionist conspiracy. "Washington does not hide its intention to destroy Sudan and it has already taken a series of hostile steps against Sudan, taking advantage of certain well-known developments that have emerged." TheIraqi propaganda machine stated that "Khartoum is being subjected to a US-Zionist scheme that seeks to achieve long-range objectives. Most prominent among these objectives is to ignite a civil war to divide this country, as a prelude to completely destroying Egypt and suffocating it by taking control of the Nile River water." Significantly, Baghdad concluded that "Sudan's national security is a vital part of pan-Arab security. What Sudan is undergoing is a dangerous episode in a series played by the enemies of the Arab Nation and the Muslims. These enemies are trying to destroy any hope for pan-Arab renaissance, scientific advancement, and unity. They are setting the appropriate conditions to establish Zionist-US hegemony over the Arab world."

These were not empty words. In late February, ships began arriving in Port Sudan loaded with Iraqi weapons removed from a storage in Yemen. The first ship to arrive was the al-Obied under the command of Captain Naji Asam Maki. It arrived from Mukalla (in Yemen) carrying, among other arms, 600 anti-tank weapons. Sudan officially denied the arrival of Iraqi weapons.

However, soon afterwards, in early March 1997, Sudan and Iraq pledged mutual support during talks here between Umar al-Bashir and the visiting Iraqi presidential envoy Shabib al-Malik. Bashir asked Malik to assure Saddam Hussein of Sudan's "support for Iraq and its rejection of attempts for UN sanctions against that Arab country." Malik expressed Iraq's support for Sudan "against the aggression it is facing" and promised military and other help. Most important was the conclusion reached by Iraqi military experts that only a ruthless total war has a chance of defeating the Black rebels in southern Sudan. Now, Malik assured Bashir that Iraq was ready to support and facilitate the required escalation given certain specific conditions — Iraq would build in Sudan sophisticated factories for chemical and biological weapons from systems presently hidden in Iraq and Sudan, as well as components acquired in the West and share some of the products with the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Consequently, in early May 1997, Iraq began to secretly transfer to Sudan equipment and materials for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein authorized the dispatch to Sudan of various components he had so far kept hidden in Iraq as a strategic reserve. Further more, Iraqi experts arrived in Sudan to begin preparing the storage and production of biological weapons that Saddam originally planned to use against the Kurds. At the same time, Iraqi teams conducted simulation training on firing long-range SCUD missiles even though Iraq is authorized to manufacture and own only short-range un-guided missiles.

By the Summer of 1997, Khartoum completed the building of a new and far more sophisticated chemical weapons production factory in the region of Kafuri, north of Khartoum on the banks of the Blue Nile. A key strategic installation, the Kafuri facility is under the direct command of Brigadier Bakri Hassan Salih, Sudan's Chief of Security Forces. Moreover, two NIF "ideological officials" — Imad Hussayn and Jamal Zaatan — supervise the activities in Kafuri on behalf of Hassan al-Turabi. The Kafuri facility is comprised of five separate departments — laboratories and test-run/prototype production sites for both chemical weapons (including nerve agents) and biological weapons, as well as storage sites for both bulk chemicals and loaded weapons (both chemical and biological). Initial test runs of some of the production processes of chemical weapons, most likely nerve agents, already has taken place. Among the chemical weapons tested in Kafuri are 122mm and 152mm artillery shells as well as rocket and tactical missile warheads. In building this factory, the Sudanese relied on technical assistance from Iraq and Iran. Additional expertise was provided by experts and technicians from Egypt, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Russia who were recruited by Iraqi intelligence on behalf of the Sudanese. The key experts are residing in a luxurious dormitory inside the compound.

The Iraqis also construct a separate facility for the production and weaponization of large quantities of chemical agents. In the Spring of 1996, work already started on a production facility in the Yarmook facility in the Mayu area, south of Khartoum. The first phase of the complex was commissioned on August 15, 1996, and the entire complex was in virtual operational status in the Fall of 1997. Formally known as The Yarmook Industrial Complex, the military-controlled strategic installations cover an area of 10x20 kms in al-Shagara, beyond southern Khartoum. There are over 300 small buildings and sheds in seven clusters in the compound. The complex includes a production line for chemical agents, as well as production facilities for military equipment and weapons connected with the use of chemical weapons (warheads, bombs, and cannisters, as well as protective gears, special modifications to combat vehicles carrying these weapons, etc.).

The Yarmook production lines for chemical agents are a derivative of comparable facilities built in Iraq. The key production facilities are comprised of German-made machines acquired by Iraqi intelligence and smuggled via Bulgaria. Additional equipment, mainly computers, were purchased by the Iraqis in France. In addition, the compound includes a special medical clinic, sport facilities, a mosque, a high security living site where Muslim foreign experts from Iraq, Iran, and Bulgaria live in two dormitories, guest houses for senior officials from Iraq and Iran (who are involved in these projects and make frequent visits to Sudan), as well as a small farm ensuring the supply of fresh milk, vegetables and dates (independent of the chronic shortages afflicting Sudan).

Anticipating large volume production, the Sudanese authorities and the Iraqi experts also began the construction of well protected underground storage sites south of Jebel Awlia (White Nile Province), the Kerari area (north of Omdurman) Shambat al-Araadi (north of Khartoum North), an area west of the Hrriyya bridge (Khartoum), an area near the Horse Race Course Club (in Khartoum South), Green Village (New Development area near Khartoum), as well as in Gedaref, al-Fau, and Shendi. The Sudanese military has recently begun training pilots and artillery officers in the maintaining and use of chemical weapons in a special school set up in the Wadi Seidna military compound (north of Omdurman). Another unique center for the development of chemical weapons for use by Islamist terrorists, mainly those affiliated with Usamah bin-Ladin, is being built near the Islamic Center in Soba (soth west of Khartoum). According to Sudanese opposition sources, Khartoum's plans call for the Kafuri and Mayu installations to go into full production sometimes in 1999. The Iraqi and Iranian experts anticipate the Kafuri installations to be largely operational in the first half of 1999, and the Mayu production and weaponization facilities to be operational in the second half of that year.

Khartoum's self-confidence in its growing chemical warfare capabilities came to light in mid-November 1997. Sudan formally threatened Uganda with strikes with chemical weapons if it continued to support the Christian Black rebels. This warning came despite Kampala's previous denials of cooperation with the Sudanese rebels and Khartoum's adamant denials of CW capabilities or use.

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Libya

Although ultimately decisive, the Iraqi involvement in the Libyan WMD program has been complex and at times contradictory. Back during the 1980s, the Libyans ran a massive development and production program of their own. For a while, the Libyans closely cooperated with both the Iranians and the Syrians — both enemies of Iraq. At the same time, however, Libya relied on the same West European suppliers as Iraq did. Moreover, key middlemen, such as Ihsan Barbouti, served both the Iraqi and the Libyan WMD programs. During the mid-1980s, the Libyans were out-spending the Iraqis, and recruiters of Libyan intelligence were offering huge payments in effort to entice key Egyptian, Iraqi and European scientists working in Iraq to transfer to Libya. Baghdad was apprehensive about the Libyan practices.

By the time the Gulf Crisis erupted in 1990, several Iraqi researchers were already working in Libya as individuals, as were several foreign scientists who had worked in Iraq beforehand. Most were working on Chemical weapons projects, primarily in Rabta. At first Saddam reluctant to share with Qadhafi some of the unique achievements of the Iraqis. However, with pressure from UN inspections mounting, and with intelligence leaking from defectors, Iraq had no alternative but to transfer more and more sensitive projects to Libya as the sole venue for their continuation. Although Sudan was glad to receive anything Iraq had to offer, it had such an abysmal scientific-technological infrastructure that it could not sustain the more sophisticated Iraqi programs. Thus, with not too many takers of the Iraqi systems, Libya would have to do. Meanwhile, Qadhafi was most interested in receiving extensive help from Iraqi scientists for his own covert, biological, weapons program and conditioned his support for Saddam on cooperation in this field. Thus, since the early 1990s, Iraqi scientists have been working in Libya in order to continue the key Iraqi research and production programs into advanced and next generation CW and BW.

At first, Baghdad considered the cooperation with Tripoli a temporary necessity. For a while, in the early 1990s, Iraq did not transfer complete projects to Libya. Consequently, several scientists and engineers from the Iraqi military industries were commuting between Iraq and Libya via Amman. They were using new passports with false names and occupations. However, as the contacts were expanding and the Libyans were being exposed to a wider variety of Iraqi programs, Tripoli decided to formalize and expand the cooperation. A special committee of the Libyan defense establishment arrived in Baghdad and negotiated a comprehensive agreement on expanded cooperation in conventional, chemical and biological weaponry. In accordance with these agreements, the Libyans signed contracts with several Iraqi military industry experts. These contracts were drawn as if they were academic invitations for Iraqi professors to lecture in Libyan universities and institutions. At the same time, however, the key Iraqi program equipment, systems and elements remained concealed inside Iraq in anticipation for the end of the UN inspections so that WMD development and production can be resumed.

Meanwhile, Baghdad at first drew the line concerning the Iraqi nuclear program. Lingering doubts concerning Libya's long-term strategic cooperation with Syria and Iran prevailed, and Iraq would take no chances. In 1991-92, Iraqi intelligence feared a Libyan use of financial enticements as an inducement for defections of Iraqi nuclear scientists to the point of undertaking extreme measures to prevent such a trend.

For example, in July 1992, Iraqi agents shot and killed in Amman, Jordan, Muayad Hassan Naji Janabi — an Iraqi nuclear scientist. Janabi worked for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission until 1986, when he was transferred to the Ministry of Military Industries. In 1992, Janabi was on vacation in Jordan. However, he was shot when on his way to pick up Tunisian visas for transit to Libya. He had been offered a "teaching position" at "an atomic institute" in Libya. Baghdad must have been worried because Janabi was supposed to return to Iraq a week earlier and rumors surfaced he had attempted to get to the UK and the US, and failed to get academic visas. By then, Saddam Hussein had banned key personnel in the military-industrial system from leaving Iraq without permission, and fearing that Janabi would not reveal Iraqi nuclear weapons program secrets, he was shot by two Iraqi agents. The two Iraqis were arrested for the assassination but quickly released and sent to Baghdad.

However, by the mid-1990s, Baghdad could no longer be selective in its cooperation with Libya. The BND's 1994 studies of the Iraqi procurement system in Europe was unsettling for it threatened Iraq's ability to revive key WMD programs just as the Iraqi system was being restored to its pre-Gulf War magnitude. Moreover, the UN inspection regime was beginning to grasp the complexity of the Iraqi challenge. Indeed, even before the Summer 1995 "defection" of Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamal, the UN was increasing its efforts to locate hidden stuff. As discussed above, Kamal's "defection" was prompted by Baghdad's apprehension that the UN was capitalizing on data provided by genuine defectors in order to zero in on Iraq's hidden WMD facilities. For example, Iraq's biological facilities were first subjected to a meaningful inspection in April 1995, on the eve of the "defection." Even though by then, Baghdad had already hidden its biological weapons cache and destroyed all evidence of its existence, the mere UN visit to the abandoned sites was too close for comfort.

Meanwhile, with the Iraqi-Libyan cooperation in chemical weapons development and production going well, Saddam authorized already in the Summer/Fall of 1994 the move of other weapons programs to Libya. Arrangements for closer cooperation were quickly made.

In January 1995, Iraq and Libya signed a major agreement whereby Iraqi specialists will work at a secret Libyan establishment on the development of a long-range ballistic missiles with range of about 1,000 km. A senior Iraqi Trade Ministry official, Hajem Attiya Salma arrived in Tripoli for final discussions with AbdAllah Hijazi, the head of Libya's Scientific Research authorities. In the agreement reached, Qadhafi agreed to pay the salaries of the Iraqi experts — some $1,200 a month — as well as finance the acquisition of Western technology. Moreover, the Iraqis were promised access to the Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean missile technology Libya had already acquired. Baghdad promised to share all the experience acquired in the Gulf War. Iraq did not have much alternative. Incapable of working, the Iraqi design teams built around experts trained at the best European and Russian establishments were falling apart. Now Qadhafi was offering to fund and provide cover for the revival of the al-Hussein and Badr missiles under the cover of the Libyan al-Fatakh program.

Meanwhile, the Libyans were most interested in the Iraqi experience with biological weapons, particularly the advanced stages of the militarization projects. In the ensuing negotiations, Baghdad acknowledged that Iraq still possessed several biological weapons and warheads for them. The Iraqis would share these technologies with the Libyans provided that Tripoli agreed to also sustain and fund the revival of the Iraqi military nuclear program. By 1995, some of the Iraqi nuclear materials were being held in Algeria while the key systems and design elements were being hidden all over Iraq in dormant state. Iraqi experts were apprehensive that the lack of proper maintenance and storage conditions under the sand in desert temperatures were destroying the sophisticated equipment. Hence, the Iraqi negotiators suggested that Iraqi nuclear fuel could reach Libya by sea within weeks after the signing of an agreement, and that Iraqi experts in Libya would then be able to begin enriching it after installing more small or medium-sized kilns/furnaces.

As expected by the Iraqis, the lure of nuclear weapons was irresistible for Qadhafi.

A high-level Libyan delegation led by Major Raad Bin-Id al-Daffi from the Libyan Engineering and Military Industrialization arrived in Baghdad on August 30, 1995. They negotiated with the Iraqis a comprehensive agreement that still serves as the cornerstone of the Iraqi-Libyan strategic and military cooperation. The agreement stipulated the extent to which Libya would go to assist Iraq in the expansion of the Iraqis' own WMD programs as well as in evading the UN stringent surveillance of Iraq's military plants.

The first step was the quick transfer to Libya of an Iraqi military nuclear project that numerous Arab and European experts described as being "in its final stages". By then, after Kamal's "defection" went sour, Saddam gave up on keeping the key elements of the WMD programs in Iraq and ordered their swift transfer to Libya before the UN closed in on them. Hence, several experts and equipment were immediately dispatched to Libya to prepare for the transfer of the nuclear program.

The main item Baghdad was adamant on saving was a limited quantity of semi-enriched nuclear fuel transferred to the Aba Agricultural and Scientific Research Center, east of Baghdad, under the direct supervision of Lt.-Gen Amir Rashid, director the Iraqi Military Industrialization Organization (MIO). The initial transfer was made possible by the suspension of UN surveillance of this center after the Iraqis had moved its equipment to Abu-Ghurayb region near Baghdad. In the meantime, Iraq was hiding the nuclear fuel in large underground storage facilities near the Aba center. After conditioning the nuclear material for transportation, it was sent by sea to Libya within weeks.

Meanwhile, a high-level MIO delegation headed by Dr Jafar Diya Jafar, one of Iraq's leading nuclear scientists, arrived in Libya in mid October 1995 to oversee the installation of the small nuclear furnaces. The Iraqi nuclear program would be located at Sidi Abu Zurayq in the desert 380 km southwest of Tripoli. By the end of 1995, the MIO experts began enriching the Iraqi nuclear material having successfully installed the small- and medium-sized kilns/furnaces there.

The most important indication of the intimate strategic cooperation between Baghdad and Tripoli was in Western Europe. Since the mid-1990s, Iraqi intelligence has been diverting purchases of dual-use and sensitive technologies in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland to Libya. In the process, Libyan intelligence was given access to the Iraqis' most secure shipment routes — where exported goods are shipped to Bulgaria where local companies are identified as the end-users, and from where the goods are forwarded illegally to Iraq and now also Libya.

Furthermore, starting the mid 1990s, Iraqi intelligence has been assisting Russian and other ex-Soviet scientists to acquire third-country passports in Central and Latin America so they can travel to and work in Iraq. Following the new cooperation agreements, Iraqi intelligence began sending these scientists to Libya for work on the joint Iraqi-Libyan WMD projects. Honduras was the site of a major program in 1995-96. Additional Iraqi intelligence operatives, all experts in the procurement of high-technology, arrived in Germany in early 1996. They began a still ongoing effort to revive dormant relationships as well as establish new ones. However, the reorganized Iraqi procurement system is now diverting the bulk of the goods to Libya rather than Iraq.

The first results of the January 1995 ballistic missile agreement were already showing by the Summer of that year. Using Western-made systems and computers smuggled from both Iraq and Europe, the highly experienced Iraqis succeeded to make sense in the Libyan convoluted missile program — integrating the inputs and technologies from the numerous and often incompatible foreign sources. In the second half of 1996, the Iraqi scientists and know-how provided such a boost to the Libyan ballistic missile program, that NATO's threat assessment had to be revised. The new assessment, NATO Report MC 161/96, concludes tha Libya could be in possession of medium-range ballistic nuclear missiles pointed at the NATO Mediterranean flank by the year 2006. The NATO study predicts that within a decade, Qadhafi's Libya will have medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of between 1,000 and 3,000 km that can be fitted with nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological warheads.

In late 1995, Saddam Hussein finally relented and authorized the transfer to Libya the secrets of Iraq's most sensitive armament programs — particularly the biological weapons program, which Qadhafi's wanted most. With the UN inspections now expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future, Baghdad decided to retain in Iraq only the operational biological bombs and warheads, as well as the equipment required to sustain them in operational posture. In early 1996, Saddam ordered that the surviving sophisticated development and production systems as well as the extensive know how and related documentation would be transferred to Libya.

The large extent of the Iraqi biological warfare effort and the huge magnitude of the systems and documentation that have eluded the UN inspections can be deduced from the fact that it took the Iraqis more than a year to collect their material and prepare it for clandestine shipment to Libya. Only then, once Baghdad was ready to begin the transfer of the BW program to Libya, was Tripoli notified. The framework for the new deal between Libya and Iraq was signed in May during a visit to Baghdad by members of a Libyan industrialists' organization. Soon afterwards, high-level Libyan delegations arrived in Baghdad in mid-1997 to discuss the modalities of the upgrading of the Iraqi support for, and participation in, the Libyan WMD program. On the basis of these discussions, Baghdad and Tripoli finalized the signing of the May 1997 agreement that still dominates their expanding strategic cooperation.

Between late 1997 and early 1998, on the basis of this latest agreement, Iraq undertook two distinct moves that, once completed, would dramatically alter Libya's WMD capabilities.

First, starting late 1997, Baghdad moved to dramatically upgrade the Libyan Chemical Weapons programs. Senior Iraqi scientists with experience in CW production joined other Iraqi researchers some of whom have been in Libya since the 1991 Gulf War, working on CW projects first in Rabta and presently in the plant inside a mountain at Tarhunah, 60 km south-east of Tripoli. The Iraqis are experts in the production of nerve agents and other chemical weapons. The Iraqis' primary contribution is in expediting the move from the research and development phase to the mass production of operational weapons. Once integrated into the Libyan CW program, the Iraqi expertise will enable Libya to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of chemical weapons. Given the current pace of construction in the underground chemical production plant near Tarhunah, the plant can become operational by the year 2000.

The second move was providing Libya with the key to operational Biological Weapons. About a dozen Iraqi scientists involved in biological research arrived in Libya around the beginning of 1998, where special living quarters have been arranged for them. They are to help the Libyans develop a new biological warfare complex under the guise of a Tripoli-area medical facility called General Health Laboratories. The Libyan biological warfare program is believed to be codenamed Ibn Hayan. Since this program will be based in its entirety on the Iraqi covert program to develop biological weapons, the Iraqi experts are expected to reach the weaponization phase quite quickly. Libya is interested in bombs and missile warheads with anthrax and botulism agents. For the running of the Ibn Hayan project, Qadhafi established a special office within the Libyan Ministry of Defense that reports directly to him. The program has been given the highest possible priority by Qadhafi and both Libyan and Iraqi procurement operatives throughout the world have been told to spare no funds in order to expedite the purchase of the sub-systems the Iraqi experts require for the "weaponization" programs.

*

And so, the US is planning an instant-gratification bombing campaign that would neither destroy Iraq's WMD operational capabilities nor touch its main WMD production lines in Libya and Sudan.

At the same time, the strategic mega-trends in the Middle East, exacerbated by the current crisis environment, entice a dramatic breakout in the form of a regional war. Saddam Hussein is not the only local leader aspiring for war as the best way out of a political deadlock. In the case of Iraq, with the entire Iraqi Armed Forces — from tanks and artillery pieces to aircraft, and from ammunition stockpiles to fuel dumps — high on the US target list, Baghdad has a special incentive to "lose" them in heroic martyrdom — say, spearheading and instigating a regional war with Israel — rather than have them destroyed by US bombs and missiles. There are enough non-state entities — from Arafat's pro-Iraq al-Fatah forces to the Islamist HAMAS, HizbAllah and Islamic Jihad — who would gladly provide the spectacular and lethal provocation required to spark the cataclysmic eruption.

No WMD are required to set the Muslim World ablaze.

Meanwhile, the panic afflicting Israel only reduces Jerusalem's ability to make a realistic threat assessment, and formulate its strategy in a cool and calculated
manner. And the US bombing campaign will only add some explosives and fuel to the flames.