

Strategic Policy in an Age of Chaos and Opportunity

A Five-Part Presentation

- 1. Grand Strategy; 2. The Next Era of Security;*
- 3. The Terrorism Phase; 4. Strategic Will*
- and 5. Current Security Challenges*

The Capstone presentation by
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Canada has emerged from the Cold War and the post-Cold War era into a dramatically different global context; one which is only at the beginning of its evolution. Today, I'll start with the broad canvas and, most importantly, some aspects of strategic philosophy so that we can frame our views of current issues.

Some understanding of this new context for Canada was clearly enunciated in the speech to Parliament on June 6, 2017, by Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland [see Appendix A].

The 20th Century gave us two world wars, a string of major revolutions and lesser wars, the advent of powered manned flight and space travel, nuclear weapons, and the creation of a hundred or more new sovereign states. It also gave us an unprecedented trebling of global humanity in the last half of the 20th Century without stressing food or energy production. But the 20th Century will seem like a stable and predictable age when compared with the 21st Century. The path of technological and scientific progress we have known in our lifetimes has already been disrupted. We are now in the “second electrical age”, where our lives and vulnerabilities are all existentially tied to the second-by-second delivery of electrical power. Our electrification is but a century old, and it brings together all of our hopes and – if only we knew it – all of our fears into a single flickering.

The decline in US global authority after the end of the Cold War paralleled the decline in British influence after World War I. The US strategic decline may have occurred at a faster rate than the British retrenchment from its global influence. Britain was eclipsed as the world's dominant economy by the US in 1872. By 2014, the People's Republic of China seemed to be overtaking the US as the world's dominant economy¹, although not yet in regard to global power potential. The US — and Western — lead in the global power arena was seen as severely threatened, and not just because of Chinese advances. Indeed, China's rise faces many challenges, and Chinese stability is fragile in some fundamental respects. So is the West's. China may find itself profoundly challenged by internal and geographic/structural issues in the coming decade, and the US Trump Administration may well slow the pace of the US strategic descent, and could possibly even bring about a Western resurgence. Whatever the West now is.

We are at present witnessing some pivotal developments:

- *The start of a substantial, but unevenly occurring, reduction in the global human population, already underway in the industrial economies.*
- *Our transformation to the second electrical age opens us to existential threats. This ties in to the reality that strategic scale nuclear weapons have been supplanted by cyber weapons. Nuclear weapons are now theater weapons.*
- *The failure of China to achieve dominance over Eurasia with its “one-belt/one-road” framework will change the entire global balance, one way or another. Within a decade we may see the re-emergence of Russia as a true global power; and so on.* [Slide 2]
- *Pres. Trump's negotiating approach with North Korea could yield a breakthrough as profound in its global ramifications as the Nixon to China breakthrough in 1972.*

¹ Giles, Chris: “China to overtake US as top economic power this year”, in *The Financial Times*, April 30, 2014.

- *Saudi Arabia and Turkey are engaged or all-or-nothing plays for survival which will almost certainly create major disruptions.*
- *The schism between the US and Continental Europe, which began well before the US Trump Administration, is now becoming profound.*
- *A war is now well underway between urban and regional cultural groups in many countries of the world. Civilisation is in abeyance. This war has nationalists pitted against globalists, and the globalists are in many instances prepared to see the destruction of their nation before they will allow the defeat of the cities.*

We will address these points and more in the discussion period.

The concept of the sovereign nation-state is also transforming: the Westphalian model, which began its formal evolution in 1648, has been assaulted, but is now responding.

Social lines and hierarchies, geographical attachments, and power all gradually return to clarity in fairly predictable patterns as the dust, inevitably, begins to clear. There will be much heartache before that clarity re-emerges. But re-emerging it is in the form of identity politics. And with this disruption, too, comes change in economic trends. The age of gross domestic product — GDP — as a means of measurement is passing, for example. But it's much more than that.

6 Minutes

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PART I: The Nature and Meaning of Grand Strategy

To understand where we are going, we need to understand grand strategy. It is not easily defined. It is called “grand” strategy not because it is grand in the theatrical sense, but because it embraces global elements; its scale and timeframe are grand. It is also constantly and dynamically interactive to a degree unknown in other forms of strategy.

Grand Strategy is the over-arching framework for the successful creation, maintenance, growth, and defense of a society. It begins with defining *the nature and goals* of a sovereign society into the indefinite future.

Henry Kissinger once said that if you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there. My definition is that if you don’t know where you’re going — as an individual or a society — then every road will lead to disaster.² Failing to articulate profound goals or failing to understand one’s own character places a society in a reactive mode, and reaction is almost always the losing hand.

National goals must be created and nurtured within a constantly evolving, deep introspective and contextual understanding. *Only then* can subordinate *processes* — the economic, military, and political strategies — be defined and implemented. Coordinating these strategic processes achieves the sovereign *goals* while preserving the *nature* of the sovereign entity.

Grand strategy, then, comprehends a society’s identity and its fundamental and long-term aspirations. It then identifies and manages intrinsic and emerging threats and opportunities at the largest realistic scale. It creates and manages capabilities to *achieve* what goals have been defined. The grand strategist must achieve that within the fluid *context* of constant global change. And that context is, to the greatest degree, outside the control of the single sovereign entity.

² Copley, Gregory R.: *The Art of Victory*. New York, 2006: Simon & Schuster’s Threshold Editions.

So grand strategy is a multi-dimensional process and long-term in perspective; and broad in its contextual understanding of its own self and society, and of other societies, and of nature, and all of history. But *the process can never take precedence over the goals*. It is process — in other words, policy, and policy implementation — which must be flexible to enable the achievement of goals. Here is a maxim: *Preoccupation with process and means is tactical; preoccupation with outcomes and future context is strategic*.

In the grand strategic framework, *everything* is interconnected. Henceforth, you must become a “specialist *generalist*”.

If the context changes, policies must also evolve commensurately. In the military we comment that “no plan of campaign survives the first shot”, because the very act of *doing* shatters the perfect, or idealised, concepts of the mind. Similarly, no strategy even remains *valid* if contextual reality changes. Despite that statement of the obvious, however, national policies often remain in existence until they are destroyed by events.

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Put more succinctly: *policies tend to remain unchanged until destroyed by realities generated by external — contextual — forces*. Even victory cannot bring policy changes in the victorious societies; indeed, victorious societies are the ones *most* reluctant to change their policies, even though their victory may have rendered the old policies null by virtue of having achieved their purpose. The geography in geopolitics remains constant, but politics remains fluid. Politics *is* people, and people move and change.

Pattern recognition is the key to Grand Strategy.

For the grand strategist, it is insufficient to know merely ourselves and any potential adversary; it is vital to comprehend the warp and weft of history and nature. The more that comprehension is possible, the more that it is then possi-

ble for an individual, a leader, or a society to create goals, and determine the means of achieving them, in the full understanding of context.

Grand strategy means getting out of our stovepiped communities.

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Let's encapsulate grand strategy:

1. Grand strategy uses strategic intelligence, coupled with historical analysis and experience, to identify and quantify the terrain, and the evolving nature of *patterns* in that terrain. This provides the *framework of understanding*; the situational context in the largest sense.
2. With a knowledge of the strategic terrain, grand strategy then enables the leadership to define *the national goals* in detail, in the short-, medium-, and long-terms (including the indefinite future). This includes defining the enduring characteristics and values of one's society.
3. Grand strategy defines milestones and interim steps to achieve the goals all the way into that indefinite future, and assigns responsibility for achieving those stages. It then manages and coordinates the "whole-of-society" process of achieving those goals. In all of this, the art of *psychological strategy* — what we are today calling "information dominance" (ID) — is the most important discipline to master. Napoleon Bonaparte said that on the battlefield "the moral is to the physical as two is to one". In other words, even in battle, intangibles and psychological factors are twice as important as physical factors. In grand strategy, psychological factors are *10 times* — perhaps a hundred times — as important as the physical. And physical capabilities, we must remember, are useless without the application of the human mind.

So what we are saying is that all aspects of life and policy form interlocking parts of the grand strategy matrix. Nothing is remote from it, from politics and

the social sciences, as well as science and technology, medicine and healthcare, religion and beliefs, agriculture and water supply, economics, military security, education, linguistics, and everything else you can think of.

We can see in all of this that the true dynamic element is human. Geography, climate, nature in general: all are important. But what shapes our destiny is human competition and human capability. Even so, what we see *least* discussed is the area of *population strategy* — perhaps the most critical element within the grand strategic matrix — so sensitive are we to any suggestion that the human shape of society should be managed. And yet that is *exactly* what social organisation is all about. Politics *is* population management.

8 Minutes

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PART II: Toward a Perspective on the Next Era of Global Security; Why the End of the Age of Consumerism and Scale Will Change the Balance of Power

Our present mini-era took on its distinct characteristics after World War II. But a very different world is now emerging, and with it a new power framework and new patterns of conflict and governance.

Everything changes when an age ends, because new values, weights, and priorities emerge. And all ages *do* end. What we have recently experienced can be described as “the age of consumerism and growing scale”.

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One of things which will cause the end of this particular era is the impending decline in global population levels, particularly within the core populations of major industrial societies. This decline is already occurring but is disguised by urbanisation and trans-national migration, which transform societies.

So, what *did* we see as the hallmarks of the second half of the 20th Century?

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Firstly, The second half of the 20th Century saw: The temporary bubble of the trebling of the global human population³. And that population bubble of “baby boomers” did not replace itself. It is now dying off.

³ Global population in 1950 was 2,525,778,669, growing at an annualized rate of 1.86 percent. Global population in 2015 was 7,324,782,225, growing at an annualized rate of 1.09 percent. Source: United Nations Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. The UN statistical research shows a continued decline in population growth rate through the end of the 21st Century, down to an estimated 0.09 percent in 2099. However, this computation is linear, to a great extent, and does not allow for precipitous declines in reproduction rates, now commencing, or for declining life expectancy as a result of economic and urbanization factors, and for a potential decline (again for economic and urbanization reasons) in successful live birth rates.

Secondly, The second half of the 20th Century saw: Compounding technological evolution (and therefore compounding efficiency in the output of goods, services, food, and energy), mostly linked to electricity. This led to the easy production of surpluses in almost all biological as well as inanimate products⁴;

Thirdly, The second half of the 20th Century saw: Dramatically rising average *per capita* wealth, leading to improved caloric intake, longevity, and more successful live birth rates globally;

Fourth, The second half of the 20th Century saw: The consolidation, efficiency, and scale of an open global trading and supply chain architecture; and

Finally, The second half of the 20th Century saw: The urbanisation of the majority of the world's population.

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What was created after World War II was a economic model predicated on the growth in the scale of human numbers, within an open-architecture market

There was, as a result, an unplanned, rapid growth in income *disparity*. Relative wealth growth generally enabled security and comfort on a scale and dispersal unprecedented in history, but income disparity meant that this good fortune

⁴ Significantly, as human numbers have risen, as have the numbers living in urban environments, the ability to grow and make things has grown even more rapidly, and, in the near-term, is likely to rise even further. Economic viability, in such circumstances, then becomes related to the scale of production, and therefore the scale of the market. Conversely, if more products can be produced more efficiently (therefore with fewer people in the production cycle), then new areas of employment must be found for those workers no longer necessary for the production of essential goods and services. By definition, much of this employment must be in “non-essential” areas; ie: areas not vital to human survival. The US *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, on March 25, 2016, published the following quotation: “The rapid increase in emerging technologies suggests that they are having a substantial impact on the workforce,” says Darrell West, director of the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution think tank. Oxford University researchers Carl Frey and Michael Osborn studied 702 occupational groupings in 2013 and found “47% of US workers have a high probability of seeing their jobs automated over the next 20 years.” The article’s author, Michael Bruno, went on to note: “Policy might ameliorate technology’s impact to some extent, but it will not stop the silicon-for-carbon swap happening across the workforce. It would behoove all of us to understand that sooner rather than later.”

was marred by one of the fundamental motivational human factors: *envy*. And envy fuels many things: revolt, migration, ambition, and so on.

Wealth and urbanisation *then* caused a massive decline in human reproduction rates. And it ultimately caused a rise in new, urban-related diseases such as diabetes and stress-related heart issues which have begun to hollow out life expectancy improvements in some socio-economic sectors.

The principal reason the era is ending is because the declining human reproduction rate means an inevitable reduction in population levels. This is particularly underway in the urbanized industrial societies which both generate consumption demand and technologically/financially facilitate it.⁵ This population decline in industrial societies is currently masked by incoming migratory flows, attracted by the wealth and security of industrial societies' urban anonymity. Within this compensatory migrant flow, however, is the reality that it takes, often, one or two generations (or more) to absorb and acculturate some groups of incoming migrants. The multi-generational transition often creates an increasingly dysfunctional, or less efficient/productive, sector of society.

So a range of changes is already becoming apparent. The Brexit vote in Britain, the Trump election in the US, and the large surges in nationalism are part of this. The trends which had been in favorable alignment for growth in the second half of the 20th Century ceased functioning as well in recent years.

The changes are occurring *not* because of the failure of Western civilisation, but because of its *dramatic success* as the most productive form of human organization the world has yet seen. The reality is that Western civilisation to some de-

⁵ See, again, Copley, Gregory R.: *UnCivilization: Urban Geopolitics in a Time of Chaos*. Op cit. That study highlighted the impending possible decline in average *per capita* life expectancy as urbanization-related diseases take hold, largely as a byproduct of sedentism. This is now beginning to counterbalance advances in medical science. The World Health Organization (WHO) in April 2016 released a study, *Global Report on Diabetes* (ISBN 978 92 4 156525 7), which noted that globally, an estimated 422-million adults suffered from diabetes in 2014, compared with 108-million in 1980; that the global prevalence (age-standardized) of diabetes has nearly doubled since 1980, rising from 4.7 percent to 8.5 percent of the adult population. The dramatic increase in diabetes (both Type 1 and Type 2) was ascribed to urbanization-related factors, leading to obesity. *UnCivilization* also noted the urban-related rise in other diseases likely to impact average lifespan expectancy.

gree exhausted itself and came to the end of its natural life-cycle as an intensely complex organism. Complexity gives civilisations incredible depth, protection, and resilience. But complexity also makes them ponderous and slow to grow, and less able to outmaneuver sudden, externally-imposed change, or to escape death by internal strangulation. Think of how fast your new computer was, and how slow it became within a year or so.

Civilisations have natural, predictable life-cycles, like all organisms.⁶ We now must see how much of our Western civilisation can be sustained through re-birth — as the Hellenic and Roman civilisations were — and what new offspring have been created. Western, or modern, civilisation was the result of the amalgam of a range of cultures, identities, and earlier civilisations, and a borrowing of themes and priorities which fused into what we have come to believe — wrongly — as an holistic and monolithic set of values. Today, most Western peoples regard this civilisation as somehow intrinsically bound up with democracy. This is hardly the case, and, in any event, what we call “democracy” today is already different from our description of it even a half-century ago. Our modern democracy would seem anti-democratic to Thomas Jefferson, but would have fulfilled Plato’s prediction that it would, if left to grow, become mob rule: *ochlocracy*.

But, given the rapid, incremental nature of change, societies manage to cope because change occurs at a rate which does not cause great alarm. It may be rapid, but it is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. [The frog in the heating water syndrome is apposite.] However, any quick reflection will comprehend the reality that many “civilisational norms” *have* changed in the past few decades, such as the expectation that the rule of law would be largely be *respected* rather than require *enforcement*.

Authors such as Elias Canetti⁷ have noted that societies function as self-regulating entities (through tools of political correctness, fashion, social and na-

⁶ See, Spengler, Oswald: *Decline of the West*. First published in 1918 as *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*.

⁷ Canetti, Elias: *Crowds & Power*. New York, 1978: Seabury Press. Originally published as *Mass Und Macht*; Hamburg, 1960: Claasen Verlag.

tional loyalties, etc.). Increasingly, as the 21st Century progresses, we see that self-regulation may no longer necessarily be the case, and coercion and protection supplant “self-regulation”. Again, societies have taken in their stride this growing, apparent necessity for top-down security enforcement. As I noted in *UnCivilization*, particularly referring to urban societies, “most individuals [as a response to increasing insecurity] choose and prefer the certainty of oppression over the uncertainty and opportunity of freedom”.⁸

Urbanised societies depend increasingly on the unbroken provision of electricity to facilitate life and all improvements in science and technology. The *new* electrical age — our second electrical age in the 120 years or so of our growing electricity addiction — does not eliminate earlier energy technologies, including nuclear power, but it changes the *balance* of how electricity is created and used and its place in the energy/tool hierarchy.

Corresponding with the growing evolution of dispersed (rather than grid-connected) electrical power generation and use is the growing *efficiency of output* at the same time as a growing *reduction in electrical power required* by most systems. So there is efficiency improvement at both ends of the spectrum. And this evolution *may* help compensate for the reality that population and social movements are transforming the world into less uniform socio-political structures. In other words this evolution is changing the nature of sovereignty.

So the matter of the viability of infrastructure becomes critical, and not just electrical infrastructure. There is a sclerosis in modern civilisational governance structures and physical infrastructure. And as political and economic models become stressed, we see the declining certainty of the open global trading network and the stability of currencies which underpin it.

It matters little that great achievements *potentially* remain to emerge from the linear progression of existing science and technology. We see all the reports about what great discoveries “will” emerge in the next 10 or 20 years. But not

⁸ *UnCivilization* (op cit.), p.121.

all of them will, in fact, emerge. Many great projects, including some medical advancements, will stop, or have already stopped, like half-completed buildings left to crumble when an economic boom ends.

Of course we will continue to see progress, even though disruptive technological solutions are appearing less frequently than in the late 20th Century.⁹ Indeed, had Roman civilisation been able to continue *its* evolution — as I said in 2006 in *The Art of Victory* — perhaps we could have seen supersonic air travel in the 15th Century¹⁰. But that civilization *did* collapse.

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What is becoming apparent is the reality of decreasing levels of *substantive* employment in many modern societies, leading to a leveling off, or decline, in real purchasing power. This leads to a decline in the demand side of the economy, exacerbated as levels of output continue to grow faster than the capacity or desire to absorb. Hence the periodic cycling down of raw materials pricing (particularly in the 2014-17 timeframe), which in turn has had sudden and profound decelerating effects on many economies. Look at Brazil, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Australia, Nigeria, Venezuela, and so on. Watch for this trend to continue, even as resource prices stabilize to some extent, impacting, for example, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Couple this to the marked deceleration of population growth — before decline commences globally — and the potential for disruption or transformation of the social/economic model becomes apparent.

⁹ André Geim, who won the 2010 Nobel Prize for Physics, said in an article in *The Financial Times* on February 6, 2013: “We are in the midst of a technology crisis. Disruptive technologies now appear less frequently than steady economic growth requires.”

¹⁰ Copley, Gregory R.: *The Art of Victory*. New York, 2006: Simon & Schuster. See page 204: “Had we been able to build on the pivotal lessons of Pericles of Athens in a consistent, unbroken line, it is probable that we could have seen such achievements of the mind as movable type and widespread literacy in the Ninth Century CE, and supersonic flight and space travel in the 15th Century. Today, had mankind not, through lapses of human judgment, failed to observe the lessons of history, we could have achieved a greatness which remains still unimaginable to us.”

So what options do most governments have to sustain national viability and stability in the face of long-term tendencies toward foundational decline?

The physical ability exists for most governments (*if they choose society interests over leadership interests*) to produce and deliver the basics of survival — food, water, and shelter, and even electrical power — even if they were forced to utilize resources only available within their own borders.

That is not the challenge.

The challenge is represented by the conundrum of *how to pay* — ie: in what form — for the equitable provision of such basics if the economy continues to decline. Because what comes into question in times of stress is not the tangible commodities themselves, but *trust in the mechanisms* to acquire and distribute them.

It is arguably the case that early 21st Century societies are entirely abstract in their economic frameworks. The more wealthy and sophisticated the society, the more abstract is its economy.

Economies are no longer sustained by the direct exchange of essential items (either as barter for other items, or for currency). They are sustained by a *highly* abstract system of trading equivalents, all of which are dependent on *trust*, a delicate psychological phenomenon. And this at a time when the disruptions in most societies are causing *distrust* in governments which are the source of the currency.

Thus, widespread currency collapse is far more possible moving forward than, for example, in periods in the early 20th Century when the concept of currency and credit was less tenuously abstracted than now. But even today, we can see the long-term impact of the currency collapse, around 1908, in Argentina. Argentina, one of the great economic hopes of the early 20th Century, has taken a century to really begin its recovery.

Currency weakness — or collapse — places all aspects of strategic performance in jeopardy, particularly the ability to fund and deploy defense forces. Currency crises are often accompanied by social unrest, which inevitably takes precedence over external defense or strategic power projection requirements.

In such an environment, the more basic and isolated societies — those which have benefitted least from the modern era — are likely also to *suffer least* from the impending changes. Poorer, cash-based societies are less vulnerable than wealthy, sophisticated societies to strategic-level cyber attacks.

No-one can foretell the future, but trend lines are emerging. We will see aspects of some of the *truly* ancient cultures, civilisations, and hierarchies re-emerge as identity security becomes a major reaction to the loss of social horizons. In fact, that is already happening.

In modern societies, horizontal, peer-to-peer communications epitomized by the internet and social media make leadership and vertical hierarchies difficult to sustain.¹¹ We have created a “horizontal hierarchy”, perhaps better described as the “anti-hierarchy”. In this urban age, then, leadership is feared. It breaks the horizontal appearance of harmony. We became happy to live in an age of management. But if electrical power becomes less reliable, historically-natural power structures — vertical hierarchies — revive.

Even in environments of adequate electricity and connectivity, top-down control of horizontal means of communications — the internet, social media, and cellphones — has helped sustain governance. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a case in point. Top-down enforcement increases the opacity of policy-level decisionmaking. This opacity brings with it, paradoxically, the ability to

¹¹ Copley, *The Art of Victory* (op cit.), noted, in Chapter 17 (“Perceptions of Leadership”): “The flattening of hierarchical lines is an inevitability of globalization and the surge of wealth- and technology-empowered individuals, but this lack of social structure — which is akin to a postapocalyptic landscape, in that traditional power structures have been eliminated or damaged — adds to the anxiety people feel as they search for guidance and horizons. It all adds to the genetic impulse of humankind to accept and assign responsibilities for individual and societal survival and victory. And stress mounts when the patterns of assigned responsibilities are changed.”

rebuild trust in, and respect for, leaders, institutions, and instruments (such as currencies).

It could be that if we continue our present reactive wars of the regions against the cities we *could* transition through a period of a social and strategic shaping which would resemble a winding-back to formats recognizable a century and more earlier. That's all part of the identity security trend.

Our recent era began as a sunny confluence of mutually-reinforcing trends which improved human welfare and numerical growth. The next era, as it emerges, will see an unwinding of those trends: that "alignment of the stars".

Declining population levels, *or* declining productivity, leads to a decline in property values. Urban property values, in particular, are the basis for economic leverage and therefore the credit-based economy. Declining population means that urban real estate values decline as supply exceeds demand. Declining population *productivity*, because of a population fractured by non-functioning elements, *also* means that the ability to fund real estate purchases is diminished. In both scenarios, the downward economic spiral accelerates.

Similarly, reduced rural populations affected by reduced demand for agricultural product and higher yield techniques, also leads to reduced overall rural real estate values. In the short term, however, demand for food by China will drive an agricultural resurgence for the coming decade at least, with suppliers ranging from North America and Brazil to Australia and New Zealand, and particularly Russia. Real estate values are the basis of much of the assessment of national gross domestic product (GDP), and the basis of leveraging through mortgaging to add funds (via credit) into the economy, thus funding overall economic growth. It is worth stressing that GDP measurement, like all credit-based assessments, are psychological in nature, and subjective.

The great tool of GDP as a means of determining nation-state economic viability has already become brutish, imprecise, infinitely variable in its interpretation. It is underpinned by the shifting sands of currencies of questionable pres-

tige. GDP was designed to fit the rigid structure of the post-World War II-defined “modern Westphalian state”, something which, by the early 21st Century, the urban societies were anxious to dismiss. Vitiating the sovereign nation-state distorts the meaning of GDP and other standards of wealth/power measurement. Whither, then, the objectivity of economic planning?

How governments handle the prestige of their currencies will determine the extent, speed, and relative level of stability of the handling of the present and imminent phases of transition. But that, too, assumes that governments remain in their present form, or some resemblance of the classic, balanced nation-state structure which has evolved since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648.

Modern urbanization created a globalism *philosophy* which has essentially broken down the cohesiveness of the classic (or Westphalian) nation-state. Even the *necessity* of the classic, balanced nation-state has been questioned in what has become a *de facto* world of city-states.

To counterbalance that, history shows that city-states are vulnerable to exercises of physical power from forces which draw their logistics from a more balanced base of agriculture and raw materials. This was demonstrated by Philip of Macedon, when he tired of the sophistry of Delphi, the United Nations of the day. And by such figures as Cesare Borgia, Duke of Valentinois, tackling the vulnerability of the city-states in medieval Italy.

Europe of the 16th and 17th centuries was a patchwork of small states, and most of those states have disappeared¹². Few today even remember them. The 20th Century itself was replete with a new wave of cratogenesis (the birth of nations), as well as cratometamorphosis (the reorganization of states), and cratocide (the murder of states), but the 21st Century will have more examples of all three of these phenomena.

¹² See, particularly, Davies, Norman: *Vanished Kingdoms: The Rise and Fall of States and Nations*. New York, 2012: Viking.

There is a widespread misperception that globalization leads to an end to the necessity for a Westphalian-style nation-state. In fact, it is not *globalization*, which has always been with human society in varying forms, but the urban *philosophy of globalism*, which has argued against the need for nation-states, and this has been a phenomenon which re-emerged in the late 19th Century. We have seen it before.

So if the current framework of the nation-state is allowed to collapse by the urban, globalist utopianists, what then?

The short-term situation, however, is that many of the present Westphalian-style nation-states will *not*, in fact, be allowed to disappear because, under threat, societies *naturally* return to “nationalism”.

Nationalism was very pointedly vilified in the post-World War II cycle, and was blamed as the cause of war because it was seen as the vehicle of competition between states. This competitiveness, particularly as urbanism rose during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, was regarded as unnecessary.

And yet, predictably, there has been a response to urbanisation and urban domination or hijacking of the democratic processes. The reactive result has been Brexit, the Trump elections, the rise of nationalist movements throughout Europe, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, China, and elsewhere. We saw the rise of Russian nationalism back in the 1980s, throwing off seven decades of globalism thinking in the USSR.

Sooner or later, everyone wants their past back. Their *identity*.

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In terms of the endurance of the modern, industrial nation-state, the principal security doctrine for survival and growth must be a “whole of government” strategy in which what we imperfectly call information dominance (ID) plays the umbrella rôle. This embraces physical protection (both internally and ex-

ternally) by hardening or transforming the electrical grid, creating autonomous energy zones. It also entails hardening the electronic cyber realm (including space assets). It involves building the “content” (intellectual) substance by enforcing the unity of society and its unity of action. It does this by creating cohesive structures and society out of increasingly diverse building blocks.

Information dominance first entails identity security and *identity* dominance. Identity security and identity dominance are the greatest determinants in strategic dominance. In essence, they spell confidence and the ability to resist assaults on values and hierarchies. They enable the projection of *will*.

25 minutes

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III. Addressing the Dangers of a Terrorism-Preoccupied Era

Most societies today see themselves as facing an array of seemingly urgent threats. Apparent confusion and short-term focus prevent leaders and analysts from seeing the larger strategic terrain, and from laying out a coherent perspective which identifies and prioritizes challenges and opportunities.

Seemingly urgent threats, indeed, so obsess us that we don't address the strategically-important global terrain; the great trends. Our *de-emphasis* on history, replaced by an *emphasis* on technology and tangible, short-term reward, reduces social horizons to the point where, despite "globalisation", most societies are actually in a very small, dark, and restricted world of thought. They are, paradoxically, the antithesis of global and open.

How can we understand the underlying drivers of our national security perceptions and actions? How can we learn to differentiate *perceptions* from significant structural *realities*?

It is because we find ourselves *not* looking at the broad horizons that most political leaders, and most national security organizations in the world today are preoccupied with *reacting* to the phenomenon of terrorism, or other forms of proxy warfare which are often incorrectly being labeled as terrorism. *It is necessary to stress, à priori, that reaction is not a war-winning strategy or a strategy for national or global leadership.* Reaction is generally the losing hand in any situation. This is even more the case when most of the combatant societies — including the so-called terrorists themselves — are unaware of the nature and *real* goals or real drivers of the wars in which they are engaged.

Moreover, the massive and clumsy global reaction to, and preoccupation with, terrorism has meant that what is vitally important — the geostrategic transformation of the entire world — is occurring beneath the surface of consciousness, without real consideration or analysis. It is this underlying transformation

which will determine the fate of civilisations and societies. But because the changes move the world into a new and uncharted realm, this process heightens economic and military uncertainty and therefore heightens the need to act carefully. This uncertainty and caution is fueling the proxy strategic wars which involve so-called terrorism, insurgency, and irregular warfare. This process also disguises the breakdown in the way in which warfare *technology*, and (more gradually) warfare *doctrine*, themselves are transforming.

We place great emphasis on technology as the saviour of both military and economic advantage, but *we may not be developing technologies appropriate to the dramatically transforming global environment*. In any event, the pace of technological development may already be slowing overall.

In the meantime, we are largely mired — and wired — into reactive mode. And the process of *reaction*, as we see, diverts societies and governments from articulating and pursuing their own goals through planned *action*. Reaction robs a society of initiative and control over its own destiny. And in the case of proxy warfare, the reaction is against *the symptomatic cause of pain*, or the supposed cause of fear, rather than addressing the origins of it.

Terrorism itself is a form of psychological warfare, and is designed to divert and paralyze the decisionmaking and priorities of target audiences.

This can cause a substantial impact on the strategic direction and capabilities of the target society.

Successful psychological operations or information dominance (ID) campaigns cause a target society either to move in the wrong direction, act in some instances against its own self-interests, or merely, through paralysis, allow an opening of strategic opportunity to others, particularly the sponsors and sustainers of the terrorist imagery.

The processes of terrorism and proxy warfare — and the psychological diversion or paralysis — are the physical elements (which used to be called “agit-

prop”: agitation propaganda) in the overall quest for information dominance (ID). *And ID, in psychological and physical terms, is the premier conflict, doctrine and weapon, or international competition methodology, of the coming decades.*

It becomes clear when we step back: we can see that there is a scale and order to the way human society historically determines its geopolitical structuring.

Right now, the world is in transition, a disruptive process which inevitably leads to fluctuating episodes of excessive caution, excessive opportunism, and confusion at governmental levels. Governments tend to cling to known or existing capabilities and resources — legacy systems and doctrine — even if these systems and doctrines are poorly suited to new tasks. But there is a natural hierarchy to the global frameworks. The long-term grand strategic visions and a durable terrain are at the top: this is the global, holistic view of where mankind and the planet can be seen historically and into the future. Beneath this are the theater strategic perspectives and the individual winds of the trends of technology, economics, and social functions. And beneath this, in the hierarchical framework, are the tactical environments which are short-term and immediate. It is vital that we have policies and plans in place at each strategic level.

It follows, then, that regional strategic dynamics are subordinate to, and often caused by, greater global trends, even though we, as humans, tend to focus on, and react to, the issues which we feel immediately threaten or benefit us.

So where are we today? What are the essential trends, visible now, which determine long-term outcomes?

Periods of transition between “rising powers” and “declining powers” have been described in terms of the so-called Thucydides Trap, when fear within a static or declining power (historically, Athens) of a rising power (historically, Sparta) makes war seemingly inevitable. The phenomenon today has been applied not only to the China (PRC)-US dynamic — as has been widely remarked — but to the Middle Eastern imbalance, the “north-south” imbalance, and so on.

But let me caution against reading any sense of inevitability into this, particularly in the US-PRC dynamic. It could well be that the PRC is *not* guaranteed a role as a rising power; the obstacles it faces internally are profound. Moreover, the US strategic resurgence under Trump may be significant. In the meantime, we are in a period of substantial great power *weakness*. And as we seek to find some equilibrium in the “balance of weakness” we find the almost all states project power through proxy forces, particularly including terrorists, *ihadists*, insurgents, and so on.

If you wish to think in terms of Thucydides, then you need to understand that the *sliding vertical scale* of strategic power balance is accompanied by the *sliding horizontal scale* of population volatility and movement. It is characterized by the breakdown of the Westphalian nation-state concept; by so-called globalization; by urbanization and hysteria-driven migration; and by the peaking and imminent troughing of global population numbers. Thus do we reach the four-dimensional chess game.

We now visibly see the prospect of a major power check-mate in the present global game.

It should not be surprising that these longer-duration mega-trends ultimately drive and dominate shorter-duration regional or mono-cultural trends, although the direct influence may not be immediately perceivable. Absent any long-term clarity, we tend to focus on immediate threats. We react unconsciously to, rather than see, the broader, longer strategic terrain.

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Right now, much of the world concerns itself with the perceived threat of terrorism. It's the specter which dominates the question of the survival of Western civilisation. However, it is worth recognizing the reality that *no terrorist phenomenon has ever sustained itself for any meaningful duration — or achieved strategic outcomes — in the absence of support from a nation-state or wealthy society.*

Does anyone really believe that the current phenomenon of “Islamist terrorism” has not been receiving major state support even since before the *al-Qaida* movement? And that particularly includes territory-holding entities such as the “Islamic State” or (briefly) *Boko Haram*. Does anyone believe that the leftist terrorism of the mid-Cold War period was not supported by state sponsors, ranging from the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and their allies? Does anyone believe that the Irish terrorism of that same period was not also supported by states or societal bodies (including trans-national criminal organizations)?

If we acknowledge that the cycles of terrorism, insurgency, and proxy warfare generally are driven by the discreet support of governments or societies, then we also have to question whether most of those sponsors have calculated — or are even in a position to calculate — the second- and third-order consequences of their actions. In other words, do most governments which sponsor such actions recognize the long-term impact of what they have done or are doing?

Are Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, or even the US, cognizant of the longer-term impact of their various levels and timings of sponsorship of Sunni *jihadi* groups over many decades? Unanticipated consequences ripple down the decades. The world is, after all, still living with the effects of the sponsorship of radical leftism which was designed and sponsored in the post-World War II era of Cold War as a proxy movement to oppose Western, free-market industrial efficiencies. It is inevitable, then, that we are starting to see some of the Wahhabist- or Muslim Brotherhood-origin *jihadi* or radicalism — supported by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the US (and even Iran) — now coming back to bite the original sponsors.

These sponsorships of proxy movements — civil society movements as well as armed movements — are often seen as expedient ways of opposing rival states without apparent consequences because the sponsorship is perceived as having plausible deniability. From a reactive standpoint, target societies need to un-

derstand the sponsorship origins of, or sustenance of, the threat, and how to deal with that form of information dominance warfare.

The sponsor or financier of the terrorist or insurgency threat is the driver of the threat. Deal with that sponsorship and the symptomatic threat diminishes. But then we need to know also what drives the driver. We will get to that shortly.

Today, there is an entire industry in the security sphere which has as its rice-bowl the study and parsing of Islamist ideology and sectarian differences. There was an earlier industry, during the Cold War, which had as *its* rice-bowl the study and parsing of marxist ideology and schismatic differences. The sectarian and schismatic differences *do* have strategic importance, but not because of the differences themselves, or the dialectic in which each social group engages. No, their importance lies in the fact that, as social groups, they represent the *temporary modes of social cohesion*. These enable populations to exist and manage their affairs in their geographic spaces and environments. The doctrines or religious groupings are a part of the survival logic because they create a political hierarchy.

In other words, ideologies (even ill-conceived ideologies) can keep societies intact because of the power of political correctness to achieve rigid and xenophobic adherence to national or social lines. Here I would refer you to the great writers Elias Canetti, who wrote *Crowds and Power*¹³; and Gustave Le Bon, who wrote *The Crowd*¹⁴.

Now, and for the foreseeable couple of decades, the “Greater Thucydides Trap” means that the world is not only in a period of potentially changing its power balance, or “correlation of forces”; it is in a period of dark uncertainty at very many levels, from global to regional to societal. It is no longer meaningful to think in terms of a two-dimensional Thucydides Trap, but rather a four-axis Trap, or more. That means, essentially, that *most powers are presently weak*, and therefore are cautious about behaving in a precipitous manner. Or they perceive

¹³ Canetti, Elias, *Crowds and Power*. Op. cit.

¹⁴ Le Bon, Gustave: *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. Paris, 1895.

that there is opportunity (or the imperative to act) because of the weakness of others.

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, what we are seeing is an emerging *balance of weaknesses*, a balance of relatively weak powers (and that includes the People's Republic of China and the United States), which each act with only relative degrees of boldness, when they see an advantage.

This, in turn, means that sovereign governments will continue, perhaps increasingly during this era of transition, to use proxy forces, such as terrorist groups, as their primary forces to achieve strategic outcomes. In some respects, the desired strategic outcome is merely to achieve paralysis or stalemate in a geopolitical arena. But *in almost every instance the guiding hand of such policy is power politics, rather than ideology or theology.*

We often spend vast amounts of our attention analyzing religious or ideological trends rather than looking at the underlying geopolitics. This is presently the case in the terrorist/insurgency jungles of the Middle East and Central Asia. The main problem is that we listen to what the operational protagonists — the “willing idiots”, as Lenin would describe them — say and believe, and spend insufficient time analyzing the core motives of their deep sponsors.

Again: Ideology and theology are carrier waves, not the message.

Does theology or ideology motivate “willing idiots”? And do the “willing idiots” have real grounds for the desperation which motivates their willingness to undertake terrorist or insurgent warfare actions? Without doubt. But to deal primarily with the carrier wave aspect is to be reactive and tactical; not strategic and in control of events.

Which brings us back to the question as to what are the overarching global trends — the drivers which drive the policies of proxy warfare — which dictate this realignment of the global power structure over the coming decades? There are several which bear consideration:

Firstly, we need to get back to global population trends. We are already seeing that global population rise is reaching its apogee, and we will see, within the coming decade or two, the start of a precipitous decline in human numbers. The decline will be — as we are already seeing — erratic and will vary in speed and intensity according to region. But overall, falling population levels are already being seen first in industrialized economies, and this has begun to have an impact on economic performance, productivity levels, and on commitments to research and development. I discussed this in 2012, in *UnCivilization*. This population decline trend is already beginning to interact with a number of other, related trends, particularly urbanization, trans-national migration, globalization, and the transformation of the concept of “democracy”.

Secondly, then, the transformative impact of urbanization and the counterpart spread of urban globalism philosophy. The decline in the power of Western civilisational and “democracy” models to react in support of the interests of the Westphalian states has now become profound. There are many aspects with regard to the impact of urbanization, but principal among these is the fact that the dominance of urban societies removes strategic balance from most Westphalian nation states.

Without getting into all the details, it is essential to understand that a weakened commitment to the Westphalian balanced, urban/rural nation-state concept means that societies become vulnerable. They lose not only national identity but they also lose control over the philosophical elements which are the hallmarks of self-sustaining communities. We saw in the era of the Hellenic city-states, and the medieval Italian city-states, just how vulnerable urban societies make themselves to external power forces.

The phenomenon of urbanization couples well with the *philosophy of globalism*. Urban societies feel that they understand and identify with each other — New York with Shanghai; London with Sydney, and so on — to a far greater degree than they identify with their own immediate hinterlands, which have historically been the key to their survival, through food production and mineral and en-

ergy resources. It is urbanization which makes cyber warfare and ID generally, and water issues, the core battlefields of the near future.

What we see, in essence, are massive, global trends of population decline emerging in a very uneven process. This is coupled with massive lateral population movement, both from rural to city, and from state to state, with the movement largely being inspired by economic incentives as well as from political unrest. All of this transforms economic conditions at the same time as the foundations of national unity are shaken because — as we discussed — urbanization and globalization have weakened the concepts of national identity and the Westphalian state. These are all components of unrest, and, of course, shake the foundations of currencies and therefore economic planning and capabilities.

The reaction to uncertainty among national security and governance authorities is to strengthen existing capabilities along known lines. However, the primary line of *societal defense* is an automatic reversion to a sense of national identity. This protects the basic elements of national survival, including self-reliance in economic and survival terms.

It is exactly this reversion to nationalism which is resisted by “modern, democratic societies” which see nationalism as the source of past wars. In reality, it is *anti-nationalism* which is the source of future collapse.

21 Minutes

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IV. Strategic Will: Back to Fundamentals

We need to return to a blank canvas to chart what is required to dominate the future.

Humanity, since it began to walk upright, has had a single weapon: will. The will, or genetic impulse, to survive and perpetuate, requires the necessity to dominate the geography which enables that survival and perpetuation. Everything else — from spears to nuclear weapons — is merely a tool of that will; all other things are *subsystems*, vehicles to support the imposition of will.

We have been confused into believing that the *technological medium* is the message. But the technology (spears, nuclear weapons, etc.) merely facilitates the delivery of willpower dominance over nature, over self and one's own society, and over adversarial societies.

Willpower, or its genetic driver of the survival/reproduction instinct, is embedded in our DNA, but it is directed by the conscious and unconscious actions of the mind. My late colleague, and the father of psychological strategy and grand strategy, Dr Stefan Possony, noted in 1975: “War is waged to affect and alter the will of the opponent. Seen in this light, war's only goal, and its most important method, is psychology rather than accurate shooting.”

Psychological strategy — as well as psychological warfare, propaganda, and the like — has become absorbed, along with cyber warfare, into what we are now calling “Information Dominance” (ID). But even that discipline is being interpreted by military practitioners through a narrow lens, in which the medium is still the message. At least now, to some extent, the “medium” has come to include the content substance as well as the technical means of delivery to the target audiences. But it is still essentially a crude tool.

All tools (military, economic, scientific, social, religious, language, etc.) are there to serve the imposition of will.

Any society understands that willpower (and the erosion of it in a competitor) is the key to its success. But success relies on the tools at hand. The modern world has come to see that the “tools at hand” are mainly large-scale formal military and security forces and large-scale economic capabilities. These are essentially psychologically-weighted coercive forces which perpetuate the power of governments and enable a continuation of social wellbeing.

If we look back at the history of human competition, we can see the evolution from directness to abstractness (indirectness) in the imposition of will. This was largely due to the fact that mediums of communication began as direct face-to-face mechanisms. They were visually-observable phenomena (ranging from displays of force or prestige, to marks on trees and rocks to demarcate boundaries), and included direct speech, and indirect messaging via rumors and deliberately-engendered superstition. This progressed through the use of broader communications voiced via religious pulpits and the control of education and literacy.

But willpower manipulation and imposition gained its greatest single boost with the creation of modern printing methods when, in 1450, Johannes Gutenberg introduced moveable type and mass printing techniques. That laid the basis for rapid, widespread, and deeply-embedded transmissions of ideas, as well as externally-imposed or suggested will. That proved to be the tipping point in moving from direct to indirect psychological domination, and also increased the distance (in terms of complexity) from policy decision to the achievement of will imposition.

From that point forward, there began an increasing preoccupation with the medium and with conscious messaging. In other words, it became preoccupied with the process *rather* than the outcome. It is unsurprising, then, that military institutions, so focused on their processes, structures, and systems (and contrasting them with their direct or perceived adversaries) are discouraged from seeing the fundamental objective. And achieving the fundamental objective is a

“whole of society” event, bigger than just military outcomes, and bigger even than just government desires.

Like agitprop — agitation propaganda — the use of military or economic weapons relies on physical demonstrations of power to influence the will, or the minds, of target audiences. Even the use in May 2017 of the WannaCry computer virus was a demonstration of cyber power by Kim Jong-Un to Pres. Donald Trump. At best, these expensive sets of physical demonstrations act as a deterrent, enabling goals to be achieved without conflict; at its worst, it results in the uncertain prosecution of kinetic conflict or economic warfare.

These crude instruments of authority are now fragile. Perhaps in some ways they have become *too* abstracted from the basic goals of species perpetuation.

The development of increasingly abstract societies has, of course, enabled wealth growth — and, for a period, lifespan increases — on a scale and shape never before seen in living beings. But what happens if (or when) cracks appear in this house of cards? When we find ourselves using blunt instruments instead of delicate surgery?

By taking a fundamental view of strategic *goals* — outcomes — we can more appropriately develop and utilize the tools to achieve them. What is already clear is that loss of national prestige — a psychological factor — is far more damaging to strategic influence than a declining *physical* capability in military technology. Again, Possony: “Prestige is the credit rating of nations.” This is not to ignore the physical capabilities of systems, but to recognize that, for example, the greatest power of a military structure, or weapon, is its capability to dominate the will of the opponent (or ally) through prestige.

Thus, Information Dominance would perhaps be better described as “willpower supremacy”. But if the goal is clear — and that, essentially, is control over the best paths for survival and reproduction — then the name is immaterial. Today, we should think of defense budgets in terms of the overall contribution they can make to that assertion of societal will. There are many subordinate

factors, and part of the clean-sheet analysis should be to debate the respective rôles of each element of power projection. The uniformed military rôle, which is central, should ideally be *less utilized* (although *not* necessarily less visible), to avoid the present temptation to seek military solutions to problems best addressed by less direct mechanisms.

Psychology is the basis of strategy. Perhaps it is not so much invisible as it is intangible and subjective. And military planners hate intangibles. [Recall the maxim at the start of the age of precision weapons: “If it can be seen, it can be hit; if it can be hit, it can be killed.”] But Information Dominance must include the classical psychological arts, as well as all of the cyber toolkit of weapons and defenses, and it also must factor into force planning the prestige and impact aspects of military operations.

National security and national capability (*will*, transformed into action) must directly engage the science of creating and enhancing societal identity. This includes cultural and linguistic identity security, visible and respected hierarchical structures around which to rally, and so on. And, yes, ID is also about communications mechanisms, and direct and indirect willpower projection tools. Communications infrastructure, as well as communications content, are vital components.

9 Minutes

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V. The Current Factors

Let me throw out a few basic observations which I hope will stimulate questions and discussion:

- 1. Global population transformations are creating totally new social, economic, and technology models. They will also transform the way we measure and compare our progress. We are seeing dramatic population declines, population movements, and changes in population cohesion.
- 2. Identity politics, including nationalism and all which that brings, will drive most emerging strategic scenarios. It will, for example, drive how India and China react to their existential threats.
- 3. Neither China nor India are likely, in their present forms, to become the strategic and economic center of the universe in the coming decade or two, despite their importance. But the relative position of the West is also yet to be determined, and alliance structures within the West are changing dramatically. Both the PRC and India are beset by threats to their water supplies which could absolutely determine their strategic viability and growth.
- 4. What will emerge will be in harmony with historical patterns. If harmony can be a term appropriately applied to an emerging period which will look, while we're in it, very much like chaos, or at least uncertainty.
- 5. In the very near-term — over the coming few years — it is likely that the PRC's "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) strategy will have been forgotten as we see multiple belts and roads drive the great East-West trade highway. Already, in May 2017, Beijing itself saw the writing on the wall and ceased calling it "one belt, one road", and simply renamed it the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). For good reason: the Trump move with North Korea and the Putin-Abe talks have already signaled that several new strategic routes and partnerships are now emerging, which will strengthen the positions of the US, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas.

- 6. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, both geostrategically significant, are facing existential threats to their existence. Both are embarked on “all-or-nothing” gambles by their governments to survive.

There's much more to discuss: the evolving shape of the Middle East and Red Sea; Africa; South America; the transforming Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan regions; the issue of polar resources and the opening of Arctic sea routes; and much more. We can also discuss, if it's not already a settled issue, the reality that the strategic nuclear age has ended, and look at the place of nuclear weapons in the tactical arena. Let's open to questions and discussion of all of this.

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Thank you.

9 minutes

Appendix A:

Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's foreign policy priorities

Speech

From [Global Affairs Canada](#)

June 6, 2017 – Ottawa, Canada

Check against delivery. This speech has been translated in accordance with the Government of Canada's official languages policy and edited for posting and distribution in accordance with its communications policy.

Mr. Speaker,

Here is a question: Is Canada an essential country, at this time in the life of our planet?

Most of us here would agree that it is. But if we assert this, we are called to explain why. And we are called to consider the specifics of what we must do as a consequence.

International relationships that had seemed immutable for 70 years are being called into question. From Europe, to Asia, to our own North American home, long-standing pacts that have formed the bedrock of our security and prosperity for generations are being tested.

And new shared human imperatives—the fight against climate change first among them—call for renewed, uncommon resolve.

Turning aside from our responsibilities is not an option. Instead we must think carefully and deeply about what is happening, and find a way forward.

By definition, the path we choose must be one that serves the interests of all Canadians and upholds our broadly held national values; that preserves and nurtures Canadian prosperity and security; and that contributes to our collective goal of a better, safer, more just, more prosperous, and sustainable world. One we can pass onto our children and grandchildren, with a sense of having done the right thing.

This is no small order, Mr. Speaker. It is what I would like to spend few minutes talking about today.

Since before the end of the Second World War, beginning with the international conference at Bretton Woods in 1944, Canada has been deeply engaged in, and greatly enjoyed the benefits of, a global order based on rules.

These were principles and standards that were applied, perhaps not perfectly at all times by all states, but certainly by the vast majority of democratic states, most of the time.

The system had at its heart the core notions of territorial integrity, human rights, democracy, respect for the rule of law, and an aspiration to free and friendly trade.

The common volition toward this order arose from a fervent determination not to repeat the immediate past.

Humankind had learned through the direct experience of horror and hardship, Mr. Speaker, that the narrow pursuit of national self-interest, the law of the jungle, led to nothing but carnage and poverty.

Two global conflicts and the Great Depression, all in the span of less than half a century, taught our parents and grandparents that national borders must be inviolate; that international trading relationships created not only prosperity but also peace; and that a true world community, one based on shared aspirations and standards, was not only desirable but essential to our very survival.

That deep yearning toward lasting peace led to the creation of international institutions that endure to this day—with the nations of Western Europe, together with their transatlantic allies, the United States and Canada, at their foundation

In each of these evolutions in how we humans organize ourselves, Canadians played pivotal roles.

There was Bretton Woods itself, where the Canadian delegation was instrumental in drafting provisions of the fledgling International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

A few years later in 1947, a Canadian, Dana Wilgress, played a leading role at the meetings in Geneva that led to the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, precursor to the WTO.

It is a Canadian, John Humphrey, who is generally credited as the principal author of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. That was the first of what became a series of declarations to set international standards in this vital area.

And let us not neglect the great Canadian perhaps best known for advancing the cause of humanitarian internationalism—Lester B. Pearson. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership during the Suez crisis in 1956, for the creation of modern peacekeeping.

These institutions may seem commonplace now, Mr. Speaker. We may take them for granted. We should not. Seventy years ago they were revolutionary. And they set the stage for the longest period of peace and prosperity in our history.

It was the same appreciation of the common interests of the human family, in caring for our common home, that led us to the acid rain treaty of the Mulroney era. It is what led us to the Montreal Protocol of 1987 to phase out CFCs and preserve the ozone layer. It is what led us to Paris, Mr. Speaker, with 194 signatories at our side. That is global co-operation.

And it is important to note that when sacrifice was required to support and strengthen the global order—military power, in defence of our principles and our alliances—Canada was there. In the Suez, in Korea, in the Congo, in Cyprus, in the First Gulf War, in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, up to and including today in Iraq, among many other places, Canada has been there.

As the Prime Minister has often said, that is what Canadians do. We step up.

Today it is worth reminding ourselves why we step up—why we devote time and resources to foreign policy, defence and development, why we have sent Canadian soldiers, sailors, aviators, diplomats, aid workers, intelligence officers, doctors, nurses, medics and engineers into situations of danger, disaster, and chaos overseas, even at times when Canadian territory was not directly at risk.

Why do we spend billions on defence, if we are not immediately threatened?

For some countries—Israel, Latvia come to mind—the answer is self-evident. Countries that face a clear and immediate existential challenge know they need to spend on military and foreign policy. And they know why.

For a few lucky countries—like Canada and the United States—that feel protected by geography and are good neighbours, the answer is less obvious. Indeed, you could easily imagine a Canadian view that says, we are safe on our continent, and we have things to do at home, so let's turn inward. Let's say Canada first.

Here's why that would be wrong.

First, though no foreign adversary is poised to invade us, we do face clear challenges. Climate change is by definition a shared menace, affecting every single person on this planet. Civil war, poverty, drought and natural disasters anywhere in the world threaten us as well—not least because these catastrophes spawn globally destabilizing mass migrations. The dictatorship in North Korea, crimes against humanity in Syria, the monstrous extremists of Daesh, and Russian military adventurism and expansionism also all pose clear strategic threats to the liberal democratic world, including Canada.

Our ability to act against such threats alone is limited. It requires cooperation with like-minded countries.

On the military front, Canada's geography has meant that we have always been able to count on American self-interest to provide a protective umbrella beneath which we have found indirect shelter.

Some think, some even say, we should therefore free ride on U.S. military power. Why invest billions to maintain a capable, professional, well-funded and well-equipped Canadian military?

The answer is obvious: To rely solely on the U.S. security umbrella would make us a client state. And although we have an incredibly good relationship with our American friends and neighbours, such a dependence would not be in Canada's interest.

That is why doing our fair share is clearly necessary. It is why our commitment to NORAD, and to our strategic relationship with the United States, is so critical. It is by pulling our weight in this partnership, and in all our international partnerships, that we, in fact, have weight.

To put it plainly: Canadian diplomacy and development sometimes require the backing of hard power. Force is of course always a last resort. But the principled use of force, together with our allies and governed by international law, is part of our history and must be part of our future.

To have that capacity requires a substantial investment, which this government is committed to making. The Minister of Defence will elaborate fully on that tomorrow. I know he will make Canadians justly proud.

Whatever their politics, Canadians understand that, as a middle power living next to the world's only super power, Canada has a huge interest in an international order based on rules. One in which might is not always right. One in which more powerful countries are constrained in their treatment of smaller ones by standards that are internationally respected, enforced and upheld.

The single most important pillar of this, which emerged following the carnage of the First and Second World Wars, is the sanctity of borders. And that principle, today, is under siege.

This is why the democratic world has united behind Ukraine. The illegal seizure of Ukrainian territory by Russia is the first time since the end of the Second World War that a European power has annexed by force the territory of another European country. This is not something we can accept or ignore.

The atrocities of Daesh directly challenge both the sanctity of borders and the liberal international order itself. They create chaos, not only because of the carnage they perpetrate on their innocent victims, but because of the humanitarian crises and migratory explosions that follow. This is why the world has united against this scourge; violent extremism challenges our way of life. We will always oppose it.

Another key benefit for Canada from an international system based on rules, is of course free trade. In this sphere as well, beggar-thy-neighbour policies hit middle pow-

ers soonest and hardest. That is the implacable lesson of the 1930s, and the Great Depression. Rising trade barriers hurt the people they are intended to help. They curb growth, stifle innovation and kill employment. This is a lesson we should learn from history. We should not need to teach it to ourselves again through painful experience.

The international order an earlier generation built faces two big challenges, both unprecedented.

The first is the rapid emergence of the global South and Asia—most prominently, China—and the need to integrate these countries into the world's economic and political system in a way that is additive, that preserves the best of the old order that preceded their rise, and that addresses the existential threat of climate change. This is a problem that simply cannot be solved by nations working alone. We must work together.

I have focused these remarks on the development of the postwar international order—a process that was led primarily by the Atlantic powers of North America and Western Europe.

But we recognize that the global balance of power has changed greatly since then—and will continue to evolve as more nations prosper.

The G20, in whose creation Canada was instrumental, was an early acknowledgement of this emerging reality. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia are on the ascendant, delivering ever-increasing living standards to fast-growing populations bursting with innovation, creativity and enterprise.

This is not a trend anyone should fear: it is one we should embrace. Let us recognize that the peace and prosperity we in the West have enjoyed these past 70 years are desired by all, and increasingly within reach of all. And, as Canadians, let us be agents of that change.

Let us seize the great opportunity we now have to help the people of the world's fastest-growing countries join the global middle class and the multilateral system that supports it. Peace and prosperity are every person's birthright. The second great challenge is an exhaustion in the West of the belief among working people, the middle class, that the globalized system can help them better their lives. This is an enormous crisis of confidence. It has the potential, if we let it, to undermine global prosperity itself.

At the root of this anxiety around the world is a pervasive sense that too many people have been left behind, betrayed by a system they were promised would make them better off, but hasn't.

Here's the key: it's true that the system is flawed. But international trade is the wrong target, Mr. Speaker. The real culprit is domestic policy that fails to appreciate that continued growth, and political stability, depend on domestic measures that share the wealth.

Admittedly, this is a complicated problem. If there were easy solutions everybody would be applying them.

But let's be clear on this point: it is wrong to view the woes of our middle class as the result of fiendish behaviour by foreigners.

The truth is that the nature of work has changed because of profound, and generally benign, global economic innovation. This transformation, driven primarily by automation and the digital revolution, is broadly positive.

Managed fairly, it has the potential to increase prosperity for all—not just the global one percent. That means supporting families, supporting pensioners, and supporting education and retraining—as the Minister of Finance did in his recent budget.

By better supporting the middle class, and those working hard to join it, Canada is defining an approach to globalization that can be a model. At the same time, we strongly support the global 2030 Goals for Sustainable Development, Mr. Speaker. The world abroad and the world at home are not two solitudes. They are connected.

Likewise, by embracing multiculturalism and diversity, Canadians are embodying a way of life that works. We can say this in all humility, but also without any false self-effacement: Canadians know about living side-by side with people of diverse origins and beliefs, whose ancestors hail from the far corners of the globe, in harmony and peace. We're good at it. Watch how we do it.

We say this in the full knowledge that we also have problems of our own to overcome—most egregiously the injustices suffered by Indigenous people in Canada. We must never flinch from acknowledging this great failure, even as we do the hard work of seeking restoration and reconciliation.

Now, it is clearly not our role to impose our values around the world, Mr. Speaker. No one appointed us the world's policeman. But it is our role to clearly stand for these rights both in Canada and abroad.

It is our role to provide refuge to the persecuted and downtrodden, to the extent we are able, as we are so proud to have done for more than 40,000 Syrian refugees.

It is our role to set a standard for how states should treat women, gays and lesbians, transgendered people, racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities, and Indigenous people.

We can and must play an active role in the preservation and strengthening of the global order from which we have benefited so greatly. Doing so is in our interest, because our own open society is most secure in a world of open societies. And it is under threat in a world where open societies are under threat.

In short, Canadian liberalism is a precious idea. It would not long survive in a world dominated by the clash of great powers and their vassals, struggling for supremacy or, at best, an uneasy détente.

Canada can work for better, Mr. Speaker. We must work for better.

Let me pause here and address the United States, directly. As the Prime Minister said last week: Canada is deeply disappointed by the decision by the U.S. federal government to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate.

That said, we will continue to seek opportunities for constructive progress on the environment, wherever we can find them, with our counterparts in Washington and across the great United States, at all levels of government and with partners in business, labour and civil society.

As I have said, we Canadians can rightly be proud of the role we played in building the postwar order, and the unprecedented peace and prosperity that followed.

Yet even as we celebrate our own part in that project, it's only fair for us to acknowledge the larger contribution of the United States. For in blood, in treasure, in strategic vision, in leadership, America has paid the lion's share.

The United States has truly been the indispensable nation, Mr. Speaker. For their unique, seven-decades-long contribution to our shared peace and prosperity, and on behalf of all Canadians, I would like to profoundly thank our American friends.

As I have argued, Canada believes strongly that this stable, predictable international order has been deeply in our national interest. And we believe it has helped foster peace and prosperity for our southern neighbours, too.

Yet it would be naive or hypocritical to claim before this House that all Americans today agree. Indeed, many of the voters in last year's presidential election cast their ballots, animated in part by a desire to shrug off the burden of world leadership. To say this is not controversial: it is simply a fact.

Canada is grateful, and will always be grateful, to our neighbour for the outsized role it has played in the world. And we seek and will continue to seek to persuade our friends that their continued international leadership is very much in their national interest—as well as that of the rest of the free world.

Yet we also recognize that this is ultimately not our decision to make. It is a choice Americans must make for themselves.

The fact that our friend and ally has come to question the very worth of its mantle of global leadership, puts into sharper focus the need for the rest of us to set our own clear and sovereign course. For Canada that course must be the renewal, indeed the strengthening, of the postwar multilateral order.

We will follow this path, with open hands and open hearts extended to our American friends, seeking to make common cause as we have so often in the past. And indeed, as we continue to do now on multiple fronts—from border security, to the defence of North America through NORAD, to the fight against Daesh, to our efforts within NATO, to nurturing and improving our trading relationship, which is the strongest in the world.

And, at the same time, we will work with other like-minded people and countries who share our aims.

Mr. Speaker, to put this in sharper focus, those aims are as follows:

First, we will robustly support the rules-based international order, and all its institutions, and seek ways to strengthen and improve them.

We will strongly support the multilateral forums where such discussions are held—including the G7, the G20, the OAS, APEC, the WTO, the WHO, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie, the Arctic Council, and of course NATO and the UN.

A cornerstone of our multilateral agenda is our steadfast commitment to the Transatlantic Alliance. Our bond is manifest in CETA, our historic trade agreement with the European Union—which we believe in and warmly support—and in our military deployment this summer to Latvia.

There can be no clearer sign that NATO and Article 5 are at the heart of Canada's national security policy.

We will strive for leadership in all these multilateral forums. We are honoured to be hosting the G7 next year, and we are energetically pursuing a two-year term on the UN Security Council. We seek this UN seat because we wish to be heard. For we are safer and more prosperous, Mr. Speaker, when more of the world shares Canadian values.

Those values include feminism, and the promotion of the rights of women and girls.

It is important, and historic, that we have a prime minister and a government proud to proclaim ourselves feminists. Women's rights are human rights. That includes sexual reproductive rights and the right to safe and accessible abortions. These rights are at the core of our foreign policy.

To that end, in the coming days, my colleague the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie will unveil Canada's first feminist international assistance policy, which will target women's rights and gender equality. We will put Canada at the forefront of this global effort.

This is a matter of basic justice and also basic economics. We know that empowering women, overseas and here at home, makes families and countries more prosperous. Canada's values are informed by our historical duality of French and English; by our cooperative brand of federalism; by our multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic citizenry; and by our geography—bridging Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic. Our values are informed by the traditions and aspirations of the Indigenous people in Canada. And our values include an unshakeable commitment to pluralism, human rights and the rule of law.

Second: We will make the necessary investments in our military, to not only redress years of neglect and underfunding, but also to place the Canadian Armed Forces on a

new footing—with the equipment, training, resources and consistent, predictable financing they need to do their difficult, dangerous and important work.

We owe this to our women and men in uniform. We will not let them down, Mr. Speaker.

Canada's broader interest in investing in a capable, professional and robust military is very clear: If middle powers do not implicate themselves in the furtherance of peace and stability around the world, that will be left to the Great Powers to settle among themselves. This would not be in Canada's interest.

Third, we are a trading nation. Far from seeing trade as a zero-sum game, we believe in trading relationships that benefit all parties. We look forward to working with our continental partners to modernize the North American Free Trade Agreement, and to making a great trading partnership even better. We will also intensify our efforts to diversify Canadian trade worldwide. We will actively seek new trade agreements that further Canadian economic interests and that reflect our values—with the Canada-EU Trade Agreement as our template.

We are proud of the role Canada has played in creating a rules-based international trading order. We believe in the WTO and will continue our work to make it stronger, and more responsive to the needs of ordinary people in Canada and around the world.

We believe in progressive trade that works for working people. That is why we are very proud that this month, Canada will ratify the last of the fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organization.

In summary, we will be tireless in pursuing our national interest, tireless in upholding progressive Canadian values, tireless in working to create a rules-based international order for the 21st century. Seventy years ago Canada played a pivotal role in forming the postwar international order. We are now called—by virtue of our unique experience, expertise, geography, diversity and values—to do this again, for a new century.

Mr. Speaker, these are ambitious objectives. There is no guarantee of success.

We set them, not in the assumption that success will come easily, but in the certain knowledge that it will not. We will venture, in noble and good causes. We will risk. We will enjoy victories—and we will suffer defeats. But we will keep working toward a better world, Mr. Speaker, because that is what Canadians do.

Let me conclude on a personal note.

A popular criticism today of the argument I am making here, is that all such ideas are abstract, perhaps of interest to the so-called Laurentian elite, or the media, or the Ottawa bubble, but not at all relevant to “real” Canadians.

That line of reasoning is the ultimate, elite condescension; it is nonsense. And in reply, I offer the example of my grandfather, John Wilbur Freeland.

He was born in Peace River, Alberta—the son of a pioneer family. Wilbur was 24 in 1940, and making a bit of a living as a cowboy and boxer. His nickname was “Pretty Boy” Freeland.

My grandpa was the opposite of an Upper Canada elite. But in the darkest days of the Second World War, Wilbur enlisted to serve. Two of his brothers, Carleton and Warren, joined up too. Wilbur and Carleton came home. Warren did not.

My grandfather told me they signed up partly for the excitement—Europe, even at war, was an exotic destination for the youths of the Peace Country.

But there was more to it than a young man’s thirst for adventure. My grandfather was one of a generation of Canadians who intuitively understood the connection between their lives, and those of people they’d never met, whose speech they couldn’t comprehend, who lived on a continent so far away as to constitute, back then, another world.

That generation of Canadians—the Greatest Generation, we call them, with good reason—had survived the Great Depression. They were born in the aftermath of the First World War. They appreciated viscerally that a world without fixed borders or rules for the global economy, was a world of strife and poverty. They sought to prevent that from ever happening again.

That is why they risked and gave their lives to fight in a European war. That is why, when they came home, they cheerfully contributed to the great project of rebuilding Europe and creating a postwar world order. That is why they counted themselves lucky to be able to do so.

They were our parents, and grandparents, and great-grandparents. The challenge we face today is significant, to be sure. But it pales next to the task they faced, and met.

Our job today is to preserve their achievement, and to build on it; to use the multilateral structures they created as the foundation for global accords and institutions fit for the new realities of this century.

They rose to their generation’s great challenge. And so can we.

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authored and edited the encyclopædia, *The Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook*, from 1976 until the present time, taking it from a 2,500 page print book to an even bigger online publication in recent years.

He has received a significant number of orders and decorations from governments, including, in 2007, being made a Member of the Order of Australia for his contributions to the international community in the field of strategic analysis. He was made a Fellow of the Royal Canadian Geographic Society in 2011, and was awarded the Society's Erebus Medal in 2015.

Mr Copley also has had an extensive career as an industrialist, owning several shipyards and engineering companies in the United Kingdom, a naval architectural firm, and a chemical company in France. Among his other activities, he founded Argonaut LLC, a company exploring — and delivering — remote area, mobile energy and water purification solutions. He served as Vice-Chairman of the Scottish national airline, Highland Express.

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